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ABSTRACT 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resultant war in the Persian Gulf is con-
sidered to be a high watermark in the contemporary history of international 
relations in general and that of the United Nations in particular. The challenge 
posed to international order by the Iraqi invasion prompted unprecedented, quick 
and clear response. Surprisingly, the United Nations, generally known as a dor-
mant body to respond timely to armed conflicts quickly rose up to appraise the 
development. A^ Tithin no time a diplomatic and military coalition comprised of 33 
nations was created - a phenomenon of unity, organization and military - political 
cohesiveness had no parallel in post second world war international affairs. The 
United Nations response to Iraq-Kuwait conflict was novel and unprecedented 
because no other conflict in the world arena since the inception of the United 
Nations caused such an active and vigorous resort to the charter framework for 
the collective enforcement of international peace and security. It was a unique 
kind of UN's collective security action in which the United States of America and 
not United Nations, played the central role. 
The Cold War antagonisms between the two super powers severely dam-
aged the ideal of collective security. The United Nations' accomplishments, dur-
ing the Cold War, were modest and only occasionally - when the Soviet Union was 
absent from the Security Council. Apart from Korean crisis, the only enforce-
ment actions under chapter-VIII of the UN charter adopted by the Security Coun-
cil were a mandator)' embargo of the white breakaway regime of Rhodesia (passed 
in 1969 and extended in 1968 and 1976) and a mandatory arms embargo declared 
against South Africa in 1977. 
But with the end of the Cold War and subsequent demise of the Soviet 
Union, the potentialities of the Security Council was rediscovered. The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait was not only the most blatant case to come before the Secu-
rity Council, but also the first serious test case after the change in the Soviet 
policy. Without the protection of the Soviet Veto, Iraq was exposed to an inter-
national consensus of unusual strength. The result was the most extensive use 
ever of the Council's powers. Mandatory sanctions of unprecedented scope were 
adopted with near universal support and were implemented with the most effec-
tive enforcement ever put in place. Following this, a large and diverse coalition 
of countries contributed a multilateral fighting force that was able to bring in 
overwhelming superiorit>' over Iraq. 
It is against this backdrop the Gulf War and the United Nations response 
become important to analyse. Various other aspects of the United Nations and its 
role in the Gulf War and its aftermath need to be examined. Was the UN Charter 
invoked for its genuine objectives or it was manipulated by the United States? 
Were the sanctions given enough time before resorting to use of force? Were the 
provisions under chapter VII of the Charter distorted and used selectively? Can 
the UN be used as an instrument of any member-state's policy? What were the 
actual aims of the US? ^'as it just the liberation of Kuwait or the destruction of 
Iraq as the war finally showed? What is the rationale of continuation of sanctions 
against Iraq after liberation of Kuwait? Whether sanctions have achieved their 
desired goals or have missed the target? What is the justification of frequent 
bombing of the Iraqi targets by the US? Did the handling of the crisis indicate that 
the two cardinal principles of the UN Charter - "to save the succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war" and "to maintain international peace and security" 
are contradictory? And finally, has the UN lost credibility or vindicated its status 
as the organ of the international community with primary responsibility for inter-
national peace and security? 
This work is an endeavour to make a detail study of the above raised 
questions and to find.the answers. This study has been divided into six chapters. 
The first chapter provides a historical overview of Iraq's claim over Kuwait and 
prelude to August 2, invasion. Chapter II deals with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and the Gulf War. Chapter III deals with the UN role in the Gulf crisis and 
examines the controversy over legality of the UN actions. Chapter IV provides an 
overview of global response to the Gulf crisis. Chapter V and VI deal with eco-
nomic sanctions and arms inspection imbroglio. A summary of all discussions 
and some suggestions to improve collective security system of the UN have been 
presented in the conclusion. And also a new Iraq policy has been suggested. 
A great deal has been written about the causes leading to the Iraqi attack 
and annexing of Kuwait in August 1990. Some of them undoubtedly lie in the 
historical claims and counter-claims, boundary disputes, controversy over the 
quantum of oil production in the Rumailah oil fields, Kuwait's attempt to subvert 
OPEC's oil prices by over production resulting in the loss of oil revenue to Iraq 
etc. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claimed that Arab states of the Gulf had 
robbed Iraq of $14 billion by depressing oil prices in the international market and 
Kuwait had exploited its southern Rumailah oil field stealing oil worth $2-4 
billion. But unfortunately the world community including Arab countries either 
failed to understand the validity of Iraq's grievances or they did not want to get 
involved in finding an acceptable solution to the Iraqi claims. Many dubbed Iraqi 
action motivated by its financial difficulties in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war 
and pursuit of regional hegemony. 
Whatever be the causes Iraq fell into the trap by marching its troops into 
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 violating all rules of international legitimacy, lofty 
Islamic and Arab values and the principles of good neighbourhood which consti-
tute a pillar in international relations. Paradoxically all this happened at a time 
when the world was witnessing a most impressive scene of international rap-
prochement. This mistake of Iraqi leadership led to the beginning of grief and 
miseries of the innocent Iraqi people - who had hardly any control over decisions 
taken by their leadership. 
The international response to Iraq's invasion was swift and harsh. Within 
hours Iraq's assets were frozen worldwide and the Security Council showing un-
precedented unanimity called for an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal 
and within days economic sanctions were imposed. But defiant Iraqi leadership 
instead linked its withdrawal from Kuwait to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 
Arab territories, which paid little dividends even among many Arab-Islamic states. 
In a strategic move Iraq, hoping to forestall an imminent American attack, took 
all foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait into custody and confined them in stra-
tegic places to be used as human shields and their release conditional upon with-
drawal of the US forces from Saudi Arabia and end of its economic boycott. All 
these last minute tactical moves by Iraq could not prevent or deter multinational 
forces from taking military action against it. 
Once Iraq failed to implement the Security Council Resolution 660 of 
August 2, 1990, UN instruments of peaceful dispute settlement were quickly 
turned into instruments of coercion. Non-negotiable resolutions that succeeded 
each other swiftly became tools of waging war. Most notorious of all resolutions 
passed by the Security Council to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait was Resolution 678 
authorizing the use of force as an ultimate action to achieve effective and desired 
end. There is a great deal of controversy and confusion about the legitimacy of 
authorization of use of force under Resolution 678. The resolution ignored the 
provision mentioned in chapter VII of the charter which specially empower the 
Security Council (not any member state) to involve in use of force and to conduct 
the operation under the Military Staff Committee and under the UN flag. It was 
also in contravention of Article 27(3), which requires that an important resolution 
of the Security Council must have the concurrence of the five permanent mem-
bers. Since China abstained it implied that it did not concur. Moreover it was 
evidently clear from the war that the Security Council had very little control over 
the war authorized by it. No other than the then UN Secretiuy General Perez De 
Cuellar himself admitted that "the council which has authorized all this, is in-
formed only after the military actions have taken place". The disproportionate 
authority exercised by the United States over decision making and implementa-
tion has subverted the authority and credibility of the United Nations. It was also 
feared that the United Nations was acquiescing too readily in US use offeree. For 
many this authorization was illegitimate, unwise, or merely constituting a multi-
lateral veneer for unilateral action. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait undoubtedly represented a blatant challenge 
to the body of rules goveming inter-state behaviour, as laid down in the UN 
charter. But what the U.S. and its allies did in the name of upholding it and 
maintaining international peace and security in the region was not less blatant 
challenge. The way the war was fought by the US and allies not only demonstrated 
the utter helplessness of the Security Council but also exposed them. It would be 
a grave mistake to believe that the primary purpose of the US initiated war on Iraq 
was the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait. The eviction was no more than a means to 
various ends. It is plain enough that the United States has no principle (as opposed 
to tactical) objection to aggression by sovereign states against others, and so the 
reasons for the onslaught on Iraq must be sought elsewhere. The Iraqi misadven-
ture was not the first or only occasion when a UN member had committed a grave 
violation of its charter principles. The US did not work to activate the UN in 
military opposition to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and other Arab lands, to the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor; or various South African invasion of Namibia, 
Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, there is ample evidence that it conspired, to 
various degrees, in such invasions; and, of course, the US itself has invaded many 
sovereign states (notable Grenada and Panama in recent years). 
The war on Iraq realistically viewed was intended to serve a number of 
purposes. It was useful to demonstrate to the world that any grave threat to American 
interests would not be tolerated, particularly where these required the unimpeded 
supply of fuel to the world's most energy profligate nation. It was useful also to 
signal the new global power structure, the 'new world other' in which a post-cold 
war United States could operate without the bothersome constraint of another 
global super power. It was to educate the world about post-Soviet political reali-
ties. 
The UN response to the Iraqi invasion confirmed the international ascen-
dancy of the United States. The US seemed to have exploited the Council and the 
UN Charter as a tool of foreign policy goals and the UN was an instrument in 
American hands. Entire operation was controlled by the United States. With the 
break up of the Soviet Union as an effective deterrent power to the US the latter 
emerged as supreme intemational actor in new international order. During the 
whole Gulf crisis Security Council functioned under the US's will. Not even a 
single veto was exercised by any permanent member to avoid incurring US ill 
will. The whole world was clamouring against the shameful role of the UN in the 
Gulf Crisis. The UN was deaf and dumb, limp, and life-less - a rubber stamp in 
the hands of the major powers of the world. It was for the first time an individual 
had been authorized to take military action against another member under the 
umbrella of the UN. The US was a singular importance in the Gulf war as the sole 
surviving super power with the military superiority to conduct such a military 
operation even with little or no support of its allies. The UN was made a scape 
goat and had to take the blame for unlawful acts, omissions and commissions of 
its member states. The UN role was ineffective and inadequate. 
The cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991) signed be-
tween the United Nations and the Iraqi government, which ended the Gulf War 
failed to bring any relief to innocent Iraqi people who were forced to pay the 
price of madness of their leadership. The resolution 687 put yet another 'unjust 
and hard' conditions on the Iraqi people. The unconditional acceptance of various 
provision contained in it was made a precondition to formal cease-fire. The main 
provisions of the resolution included payment of reparation by Iraq, continuation 
of the sanctions, UN guarantee of the boundaries and Iraq's co-operation in the 
destruction of it nuclear, biological weapons or weapons based technology and 
facility. These conditions were never freely negotiated but rather formulated uni-
laterally and imposed on Iraq under chapter vii. of the UN charter. 
The UN cease-fire resolution 687 made it obligatory upon Iraq to destroy 
all its weapons of mass destruction under international supervision and monitor-
ing. Despite almost a decade of hard work of inspecting every nook and comer 
of Iraq in search of weapons of mass destruction the UN team has failed to give 
a certificate, so that sanctions could be lifted. The process has now reached a 
worrisome impasse, setting Iraq, the US and Britain and for that matter, the UN 
on a prolonged course of military confrontation, at the cost of making the region 
more unpredictable and volatile than has been the case historically and imperilling 
the chances of creating a stable Post-Cold War World Order. 
The UN weapons inspection resolutions are so punitive and humiliating 
that any slight attempt to erode them by Saddam Hussein has led air attacks and 
bombings by the US and its allies. Air strikes; through misinterpreting the UN 
resolutions, on Iraq has become almost a routine feature. Taken as whole, there 
is ample evidence to suggest that the US and a few of its European allies have 
arrogated to themselves the exclusive right to interpret and implement the UN 
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resolutions without recourse to the Security Council. This constitute a clear 
usurption of the functioning and authority of the United Nations. 
The UN as an international organization working for international peace 
and security, should not surrender itself to the will of a superpower or allow itself 
to be used as an instrument for achieving certain self interests of that power. The 
UN has to play its role reflecting the wishes of the international community. It 
should bring an end to the dilapidation that Iraq is affected with. The Iraqi people 
should not be punished for the madness of Saddam. They are the victim of Saddam's 
insanity and US' vindictive attitude. The situation that the Iraqi people are passing 
through now is more than what human being can bear. Thus the UN must do 
something to ameliorate their condition. The UN will and not the desire of the US 
should prevail. The UN must be accorded full scope to act as it was intended to 
act, with any ultimate decision to employ force being made by tiie Security Council 
in accordance with the Charter. 
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PREFACE 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resultant war in the Persian 
Gulf is considered to be a high watermark in the contemporary history 
of international relations in general and that of the United Nations 
in particular. The challenge posed to international order by the Iraqi 
invasion prompted unprecedented, quick and clear response. Surpris-
ingly, the United Nations, generally known as a dormant body to 
respond timely to armed conflicts quickly rose up to appraise the 
development. Within no time a diplomatic and military coalition 
comprised of 33 nations was created - a phenomenon of unity, 
organization and military - political cohesiveness had no parallel in 
post second world war international affairs. The United Nations response 
to Iraq-Kuwait conflict was novel and unprecedented because no other 
conflict in the world arena since the inception of the United Nations 
caused such an active and vigorous resort to the charter framework 
for the collective enforcement of international peace and security. It 
was a unique kind of UN's collective security action in which the 
United States of America and not United Nations, played the central 
role. 
The review of the role of the United Nations during Gulf crisis 
by various scholars has indicated that it has not acted impartially. 
And its role was manipulated by the powerful members to serve their 
own interests. It is also misleading to describe Operation Desert Storm 
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as the quintessential example of traditional collective security inter-
vention. It, infact, inaugurated a new model for the use of military 
force in the post-Cold War era. The allied resistance against Iraqi 
aggression represented a unique and novel form of unilateralism which 
was pretended to be a collective security action. The precedents set 
by the United Nations' involvement in the Gulf War and its aftermath 
have had wide implications for the future use of force, the UN's 
credibility and a multilateral worjd order. 
The Cold War antagonisms between the two super powers severely 
damaged the ideal of collective security. The United Nations' accom-
plishments, during the Cold War, were modest and only occasionally 
- when the Soviet Union was absent from the Security Council. Apart 
from Korean crisis, the only enforcement actions under chapter-VIII 
of the UN charter adopted by the Security Council were a mandatory 
embargo of the white breakaway regime of Rhodesia (passed in 1969 
and extended in 1968 and 1976) and a mandatory arms embargo declared 
against South Africa in 1977. 
But with the end of the Cold War and subsequent demise of 
the Soviet Union, the potentialities of the Security Council was 
rediscovered. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not only the most 
blatant case to come before the Security Council, but also the first 
serious test case after the change in the Soviet policy. Without the 
protection of the Soviet Veto, Iraq was exposed to an international 
Ill 
consensus of unusual strength. The result was the most extensive use 
ever of the Council's powers. Mandatory sanctions of unprecedented 
scope were adopted with near universal support and were imple-
mented with the most effective enforcement ever put in place. Following 
this, a large and diverse coalition of countries contributed a mul-
tilateral fighting force that was able to bring in overwhelming su-
periority over Iraq. 
It is against this backdrop the Gulf War and the United Nations 
response become important to analyse. Various other aspects of the 
United Nations and its role in the Gulf War and its aftermath need 
to be examined. Was the UN Charter invoked for its genuine ob-
jectives or it was manipulated by the United States? Were the sanc-
tions given enough time before resorting to use of force? Were the 
provisions under chapter VII of the Charter distorted and used se-
lectively? Can the UN be used as an instrument of any member-state's 
policy? What were the actual aims of the US? Was it just the lib-
eration of Kuwait or the destruction of Iraq as the war finally showed? 
What is the rationale of continuation of sanctions against Iraq after 
liberation of Kuwait? Whether sanctions have achieved their desired 
goals or have missed the target? What is the justification of frequent 
bombing of the Iraqi targets by the US? Did the handling of the crisis 
indicate that the two cardinal principles of the UN Charter - "to save 
the succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to maintain 
international peace and security" are contradictory? And finally, has 
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the UN lost credibility or vindicated its status as the organ of the 
international community with primary responsibility for international 
peace and security? 
This work is an endeavour to make a detail study of the above 
raised questions and to find the answers. This study has been divided 
into six chapters. The first chapter provides a historical overview of 
Iraq's claim over Kuwait and prelude to August 2, invasion. Chapter 
II deals with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War. Chapter 
III deals with the UN role in the Gulf crisis and examines the controversy 
over legality of the UN actions. Chapter IV provides an overview 
of global response to the Gulf crisis. Chapter V and VI deal with 
economic sanctions and arms inspection imbroglio. A summary of all 
discussions and some suggestions to improve collective security system 
of the UN have been presented in the conclusion. And also a new 
Iraq policy has been suggested. 
CHAPTER - I 
Iraq Kuwait Conflict: A Historical Overview 
The traditional regimes in the Middle East can be subdivided 
into kingdoms and emirates (Principalities) since Saudi Arabia, Oman 
and Jordan are ruled by Kings, while Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates by Emirs. All these states came into being 
between 1921 and 1971 and always with the active help of Britain, 
then the leading imperialist power in the region.' 
All the kingdoms and emirates are in the Arabian Peninsula, 
the least populated part of the Arab-East, which until the late 1960s 
was also the least economically developed.' The discovery of oil in 
the beginning of the century has entirely changed the economy of 
the Middle East countries. Russia, Britain, Germany and USA established 
their presence in this region in one way or the other for their oil 
interest and thus a network of refineries came into being with the 
collaboration of local entrepreneurs in a form of joint ventures. Oil 
is produced by nationalized companies or corporations. State owned 
corporations or multinationals oil producing companies were engaged 
1. Dlip Hire, Inside /he Middle lUisi (London and Henley, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1982) p.9. 
2. Ihid., p.9. 
by the Governments and the profit was divided between the companies 
and the producing countries as per mutually agreed terms.' 
The United States being an important player in world politics 
has always tried to make its presence felt in the region. The primary 
objective of American policy in the region has been the establishment 
of American dominance, to control a politically volatile region which 
is of great economic and strategic interest to the policy makers in 
the State Department. The Gulf region is one of the major producers 
of oil and they control the oil wealth and be in a position to defer 
the mine price of oil in the world markets. At the same time exercise 
considerable influence in the economic policies of its competitors.^ 
Oil is perhaps the most volatile commodity in the world whereby 
governments have been overthrown and wars fought to secure possession 
of oil fields in the region. An American presence in the Gulf poses 
a threat to Central Asia, the strategic underbelly of the former Soviet 
Union. The continuing turmoil in the former Soviet Union and the 
growing restiveness of the Muslim people of Central Asia could provide 
the United States an opportunity for overt and covert intervention 
and it is not surprising that clcnieiits in the former Soviet Union view 
with extreme suspicion the possibility that the US military presence 
would continue despite the opposition from the local people.' 
T. K.L. Chanchreek (ed). The Gulf War : A Global Crisis, (Delhi, 
Chandigarh: H.K. Publishers and Distributors, 1991) p. 11. 
4. K.M. Pannikar, I'or a l-'ew Barrels of Oil (New Delhi: Patriot 
Publishers, 1991) p. vii. 
5. Ibid., p vii. 
Emergence of Kuwait: 
Among the territories that the Saudis failed to overrun and add 
to Saudi Arabia in the 1920's was Kuwait. Along the entire South-
western shore of the Persian Gulf lived half-wild Arab tribes, led 
by Semi-independent Sheiks (Chiefs). The Ottoman Turks had never 
really made good their control here, though eastern Arabia was nominally 
a part of their empire. In the late nineteenth century, increasing attention 
was focused on this area, there were proposals to build a railroad 
all the way from Central Europe to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf 
and to concentrate the trade between Europe, India, and the Far East 
on this eastern railhead. Under such a plan, the shores of the Persian 
Gulf would assume very great strategic importance.^' 
The sheikdom of Kuwait, lying directly to the Southwest of 
the delta of the Shatt-al-Arab, had been ruled by the descendants of 
Sabahabu Abdullah since the middle of (he eighteenth century. In 
1897, Sheikh Mubarak thought his semi-independence was being 
threatened by the Turks and asked the British government to give 
him protection. If the route through the Persian Gulf* was going to 
6. R.C. Kingsbury and N.J.G. Pounds, An Atlas of Middle Eas/ern 
Affairs (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1964) p.78. 
* The Persian Gulf is an arm of the Arabian sea separating Iran from 
the Arabian Peninsula. Connected to the Gulf of Oman by the strait 
of Harmuz, the Gulf is about 990 km (650mil) long and 56-338 km 
(35-2 lOmi) wide; it has an area of approximately 240,000 km- (92, 
500mi-). The gulf is bordered by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait. Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the L'nitcd .Arab! Emirates. The island Sheikhdom of 
Bahrain is the largest of the many islands in the gulf See for details, 
S.Shashi (ed), Fjwyclopaedia of Hitmanities and Social Sciences, 
(New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1979) Vol., 35, p.457. 
become important. Great Britain was resolved to have some share 
in its control. So Britain accepted the Sheikh's invitation and established 
a protectorate over Kuwait in 1899. At the outbreak of World War-
I, in which Great Britain was aligned against Turkey, the wholly 
theoretical Turkish sovereignty over this area was renounced, and 
Kuwait became a sovereign state under British protection. At this 
time, Kuwait was an ill-defined area, its boundaries had never been 
agreed upon on paper or marked on the ground. In 1922, with the 
rise to power of the Saudis, it became necessary to clarify this matter. 
It proved difficult, however, to secure agreement, and in one geographical 
area no agreement was ever reached. To the south of Kuwait is a 
so-called Neutral Territory, in which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in default 
of a boundary settlement, agreed to share equal rights. They continue 
to do so, even now that oil has been found there. West of Kuwait, 
a second Neutral Territory is shared by Saudi Arabia and Iraq.^ 
Kuwait might today be as obscure as several other Sheikdoms 
in eastern Arabia if oil had not been discovered there. Oil production 
began in 1946 and increased quickly. Kuwait was found to have one 
of the richest reserves of oil in the world. An oil port and refinery 
were built at Mina al Ahmadi; oil royalties began to pour into the 
treasury of Sheikh Sir Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, and the eyes of 
Kuwait's neighbours were turned on this small, weak but rich state. 
The British protectorate ended in 1961. At once, Kassim of Iraq put 
7. Ibid. 
forward a claim to the territory, based on flimsy historical grounds, 
and his threat to annex it brought back the British forces that had 
only recently been withdrawn. This show of force deterred Kassim. 
The independence and sovereignty of Kuwait received general recognition 
when the territory was admitted to the United Nations, but Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and even Kgypt were quietly awaiting their chance to move 
in." 
The Kuwait affair was the first major crisis of the p.ost-Cold-
War period in the Gulf region." In August 1990, when Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait claiming it as a part of Basra region* 
of Iraq. Kuwait owes its origin to the British imperial decision at 
the beginning of the century and it remained a source of dispute between 
8. IhiiL. pp 78-79. 
9. K.M. Pannikar, n.4., p.viii 
* Basra (Basra. Bussora, or Bassorah) is an oil-shipping port of 
South-eastern Iraq and the capital of Basra province. It is situated 
on the Shatt-al-Arab about 11.^  km (71 mi) from the Persian Gulf 
The population is 720,000 (1981 est.). Industries include oil 
refining and the manufacture of petrochemicals and fertilizer. 
Petroleum products, wheat, wool, barley, and dates are exported. 
The city was founded in 636 by Caliph Umar I. An important 
centre of letters, science, poetry, finance, and commerce under the 
early Abbasids, it declined in later centuries but revived with the 
completion of the railroad to Baghdad in the early 20th century. 
Occupied by the British in World War I and II, it was an important 
staging post in the Allied supply route ti> (he DSSR after 1941 
Basias rapid commercial development after world war II was due 
to its advantageous location as a port and to the major oil fields 
nearby. Since the long Iran - Iraq war broke out in 1980, however, 
the port has been virtually closed. See for details, S.S. Shashi 
(ed.). Encyclopaedia of Hiimanilies and Social Sciences (New 
Delhi; Anmol Publications, Vol 4, 1979) p.247. 
the two states since the beginning of 16th Century.'" The Iraqi* claims 
over Kuwait was based on two issues, namely the historical connection 
of Kuwait with the Ottoman Empire and the succession of the new 
State of Iraq to the territorial Sovereignty of that Empire over Kuwait." 
Until the turn of the twentieth century Kuwait had been officially 
part of the Ottoman Empire since the eighteenth century, however, 
the Empire's rule over the principality had been nominal. The al-
Sabah family descendants of the Bedouin Utub Clan, had settled around 
the Gull 's finest natural harbor, and in 1756 they established an 
autonomous sheikdom in Kuwait. It was a patriarchal desert society 
where authority was based on traditional tribal rule without elaborate 
administrative hierarchy.'-' 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Kuwait and Britain 
discovered each other due to common interest. Kuwait feared the 
10. Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, Unilcd Nadons' Role in ihc (nilf 
Crisis (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1992) p.20. 
* Iraq has not only been the cradle of the earliest world civilization of 
Mesopotamia, bul il is also one of the "new stales". The present slate 
of Iraq came into existence after the World War- I with the 
disintigration of the Ottoman Empire. The modern history of Iraq as 
a politically organized community begins with the Revolt of 1920 
against the British occupation. The country came under the British 
Mandate which, for its own convenience, created a throne in Iraq for 
a person brought in from Hijaz in 1921. The monarchy lasted for 37 
years as it was abolished by a break through Coup d'etat in July 
1958. See for details, M.A. Saleem Khan, The Monarchic Iraq: A 
polilical Study (Aligarh: Centre of West Asian Studies. .Algiarh 
Muslim University, 1977) p.v. 
11. Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, n.lO, p.21 
12. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, A /'o/ilica/ 
Hiof^raphy (Brassey's. 1991) p.63. 
reassertion of Constantinople's authority while Britain resented 
Germany's growing ambitions in the Gulf. On January 23, 1899, the 
two parties signed a bilateral agreement which gave Britain responsibility 
for Kuwait's defense and foreign affairs. When the news of agreement 
reached Constantinople, the Sultan hurried to declare Kuwait a district 
of the Velayet (Province) of Basra and nominated the Sheikh of Kuwait 
as Qaimaqam (district Officer), implying that Kuwait was subordinate 
to the Governor of Basra. This move, however, was purely symbolic 
and in October 1913 Britain and Kuwait renewed the 1899 agreement 
with its exclusivity clause to cover oil as in important source of 
promoting and strengthening bilateral relations. Britain was the sole 
country to grant concession in dealing into oil and its wealth.' ' 
Earlier that year, on July 29, 1913, Britain and the Ottoman 
Empire concluded a significant agreement, "The Draft Convention on 
the Persian Gulf Area", which restricted Ottoman sovereignty over 
the Sheikdom, recognized the autonomy of the Sheikh of Kuwait and 
acknowledged Britain's status in Kuwait. According to this agreement. 
the territory of Kuwait proper was to be delineated by a semi-circle 
to indicate the area within which the tribes were to be subordinated 
to Kuwait and the Ottomans were not allowed to establish garrisons 
or undertake any military action in the Sheikdom without London's 
approval or to exercise administrative measures independently of the 
Sheikh of Kuwait. The agreement also stipulated the inclusion of the 
13. Ibid., pp. 63-64 
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Warba and Bubiyan islands, strategically located at the northern tip 
of the Gulf, within Kuwait's boundaries. However, as a result of 
the outbreak of the First World War the agreement was not ratified.'^ 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First 
World War created a pressing need for delineating the borders of the 
new entities established on the ruins of the regional empire. This 
problem was especially acute in the Arabian peninsula not only due 
to the lack of a historical legacy of precise permanent territorial 
boundaries, but also because there were no outstanding topographical 
landmarks or clear-cut ethnic divisions. At an international conference 
in the early 1920s , the boundary of Kuwait were established, both 
on its northern side with Iraq and in the South with Saudi Arabia. 
Since some difference remained unresolved, the so called Kuwait Neutral 
Zone was as declared that both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to share 
jurisdiclion and oil resources, should Ihcsc be discovered.'' 
On June 19,1961 Kuwait was proclaimed an independent state, 
and a month later was admitted to the Arab League. Britain guaranteed 
the newly established state military support if the latter so requested. 
That same year the monarchy elected a Constituent Assembly, which 
adopted a constitution for the independent state in November, 1962.'^' 
14. Ihid., p. 64. 
I .S. Ihiil. 
16. Ihid. 
Kuwait anxiety to promptly assert its newly gained independence 
was not motivated by domestic considerations alone, but rather by 
the desire to affirm its determination to cling to its independence. 
A tiny state in possession of mammoth wealth, with a large natural 
harbor and some 120 miles of Gulf coastline, Kuwait was painfully 
aware that it would have to constantly vigilant with the neighbours 
because of their evil designs on its wealths. Although immediately 
premier Nuri Sa'id recognized the boundaries set in the 1913 treaty*, 
Baghdad never shed away from trying to subvert the Al-Sabah regime. 
Moreover, in the late 1930s King Ghazi began openly demanding the 
incorporation of the whole of Kuwait inio Iraq.'^ 
During the mid - 1950s, when Kuwait raised the question of 
demarcation of its borders with Iraq^ it seemed as though the countries 
might agree to solve the border dispute in a favour of Iraq. Under 
this proposal, Kuwait would have granted Iraq a 99 year lease over 
the most northerly parts of its territory, together with the island of 
Warba. Iraq was to guarantee supplies of fresh water to Kuwait in 
exchange. This was the first occasion when an Iraqi government linked 
* Kuwait registered the agreed minutes as a I'reaty with the U.N. 
more significantly Kuwait showed its readiness to review the 
1961 agreement with Britain and made a grant of 30 million 
dinars to Iraq. Iraq in return agreed to provide Sweet water to 
Kuwait from Shatt-al-Arab. But this understanding did not lead 
to the resolution of their border demarcation problem. See for 
details, A.K. Pasha (ed.). The Gulf in Tiiimoi: A Glohal Response 
(New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1992) pp. 23-24. 
17. M/c/., pp. 64-65. 
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the question of its border with Kuwait with certain territorial adjustment 
and demanded transfer of certain island by its southern Sheikhdom. 
The Amir, however, rejected the idea or any change in the border 
as he worried that Iraq could blackmail Kuwait often and its claim 
for Kuwait might be perpetuated.'" 
In 1954 the pro-western Iraqi Nuri Sa'id had tried unsuccessfully 
to persuade Nasser to bring Egypt into a western - sponsored alliance 
designed to secure the Middle East against Soviet expansionism. The 
first element of the alliance was already in place by February that 
year when Pakistan and Turkey signed a mutual defence pact. Nuri 
Sa'id had been an officer in the Turkish army captured by the British 
in the Basra campaign in the First World War. But he had since come 
to regard the relationship with Britain as the key to Iraqi foreign 
policy. He saw the Soviet Union as Iraq's natural enemy. Premier 
Gamal Abdel Nasser too was an anti-communist but he believed that 
the real Soviet threat was of internal subversion which could only 
be combated by improving the lot of the Arab masses. He had, in 
any case, defied the Western powers by purchasing arms from the 
Soviet block.'" 
Nasser declined to join the new alliance and in February the 
following year Iraq went its own way by signing a defence treaty 
18. Gazi Ibdcwi Abdul Ghafour, n.J0, p. 22 
19. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Saddam's War (London and 
Bostol: Faber and Faber, 1991) p.66. 
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with Turkey, the foundation stone of what became known as the Baghdad 
pact including Iran, Pakistan, the United States and Britain. Iraq's 
membership of the pact created an irrevocable rift with Egypt and 
was viewed by nationalists at home as yet another surrender to western 
interests. Nuri Sa'id's reputation was further damaged when it was 
revealed that he had conspired with the British before the Suez crisis 
to plot the overthrow of Nasser. These factors helped to sow the 
seeds of the revolution of 1958, as did Nuri Sa'id's creation of the 
so-called Arab Federation between Jordan and Iraq, presided over by 
the Hashemite monarchs, Faisal II and Hussein, a conservative reaction 
to the setting up of the United Arab Republic.'" 
In 1958, Nuri Al-Sa'id suggested the accession of Kuwait during 
a meeting of the Baghdad Pact. But the ruler of Kuwait Abdullah 
al Saleem. rejected this because Kuwait had no desire to join the 
Pact. He also rejected Nuri Al- Sa'id call to Kuwait to join a Hashemite 
Federation of Iraq and Jordan to counter the Egypt - Syria federation.-' 
Syria and Gamal-Abdel Nasser's Egypt at that time formed a 
unified country, the United .Arab Republic which had been formed 
in 1958, and in February 1960 Saddam moved from Damascus to Cairo. 
Ostensibly a student, his main activity for the next three years was 
to increase his stature in the Baath. He became a full member of 
the inner party, having up to then been only a probationer. The Egyptian 
"20^  fhid., pp. 66-67. 
21. Ghazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, n.lO, p. 22. 
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tolerated the exiled Baathists, who formed a large community in Cairo, 
but it seems the intelligence services had reason to distrust Saddam, 
and they denied him the funding often disbursed to exiles. He nevertheless 
succeeded in getting a small retainer paid from the petty cash of the 
presidential palace. Saddam is said to have regarded life in Cairo 
as the equivalent of a prison sentence." 
Saddam Hussein and Modern Iraq: 
The three and a half years of exile until the Baathist - led coup 
which overthrew Qaseem in 1963 were the most obscure of Saddam"s 
often shadowy and contradictory history. The failed assassination 
attempt in 1958 in which Saddam played his part had created a rift 
in Baathist ranks, because a small group of the party's regional (Iraqi) 
leadership had gone ahead with the attempt without the direct approval 
of the national (pan-Arab) leadership, then based in Damascus. After 
the failure of the plot some Baath leaders abandoned the party believing 
that it should not resort to criminal acts. However, the organizer 
of the plot, Fuad-al-Rikabi Justified the assassination attempt on the 
grounds that Qassem was a traitor to Pan-Arabism and that the attack 
had the approval of the masses. As a result of the split, the Iraqi 
party in exile was dissolved and reformed under a new leadership. 
Ali Saleh Saadi, who was to become deputy premier after the 1963 
coup, was appointed secretary of the new Iraqi party in 1962 and 
made clear his opposition to those responsible for the botched murder 
22. .lohn Bulloch and Harvey Morris, n.l9, p 37. 
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attempt. It was Saadi's party that finally took control of Iraq with 
a bloody coup on 8 February 1963 that overturned the Qassem regime. 
This so-called Ramadan Revolution was mounted by a group of Baathist 
army officers, although the Baath disguised its role, preferring to hide 
behind the anonymity of a National Council for the Revolutionary 
Command.'" 
At the behest of Ali Saleh Saadi. the Secretary of the Baath, 
Abdel Salem Aref was installed as provisional president. Aref was 
one of the leaders with Qassem of the 1958 revolution but had 
subsequently been purged by the dictator, tried and sentenced to death. 
In line with his usual practice, Qassem had left the sentence unsigscruples 
and had Qassem e.xccuted the day after the coup. Perhaps it was 
from this that the young Saddam learned the lession that, once in 
power, it was safer to liquidate ones opponents rather than leave 
them to fight another day. Saddam had returned to Iraq after the coup, 
to find the party still riven by ideological struggle. Between the 
right and the left factions (the latter led by Saadi) a centrist faction 
held sway, led by Saddam relative, the former army officer from Takrit 
. Hassan al-Bakr . Saddam was soon seen gun in hand, acting as 
bodyguard for Bakr. The leftists wanted to give priority to the 
introduction of socialism, and warned against relying on the military 
elements who had organized the Ramadan Revolution. But Saadi, 
the deputy primer in the new regime, was criticized as trying to impose 
23. Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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single party rule, rather than co-operating with other nationalist groups. 
In an effort to reconcile the factions, Michel Aflaq, the Syrian founder 
of Baath was brought to Baghdad. But he effectively supported the 
rightist group." 
Iraqi Claims Over Kuwait: 
It was clear that the Sheikh of Kuwait wanted to keep his state 
away from any political alliance with Iraq. He rejected the Iraqi 
demands of unity or federation. He did so in order to avoid giving 
any kind of opportunity to Iraq to establish its leadership which may 
eventually lead to Iraqi influence or domination over Kuwait or even 
of giving Iraq another excuse which might be used by Iraqi leaders 
to justify their claims over the State of Kuwait.-' 
On June 1961 just six days after Kuwait gained independence. 
Premier Qasim of Iraq stated that "Kuwait is an integral part of Iraq. 
The expected Iraqi congratulations turned into a confrontation when 
the Iraqi premier laid irredentist claims on the whole territory of Kuwait". 
In a press conference on 25 June 1961, Qasim announced that he 
did not recognize a "forged treaty" imposed on Kuwait by the Britain. 
He also claimed that Sheikh Mubarak was bribed to sign the treaty 
of 1899 and said that a decree would be issued appointing Kuwait's 
ruler as Qaimmqam (Governor) of the Kuwait district of Iraq. He 
24. I hid., p. 38. 
25. Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, n.lO, pp.22-23. 
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stated that Iraq's border extended from north o f Zago' (Zaiko to South 
of Kuwait).-'' 
Qasim's claims were based on shaky historical grounds- (1) Kuwait 
had been part of the Basra Wilayet in the Ottoman Empire, and (2) 
that Britain and other powers had recognized Ottoman's sovereignty 
over Kuwait both before and after the signature of the 1899 agreement 
under which Kuwait became a British protectorate. So Iraq, as the 
successor of that Empire was legitimately and rightfully the proprietor 
of territories. The above historical ground, even if it is fully valid, 
did not justify Qasinis claim over Kuwait because Kuwait is not the 
only new state which was created by foreign powers. Applying the 
rule of historical rights as criterion for international relations paves 
the way for Turkey and Iran to demand the annexation of Iraq. The 
agreement that Qasim pointed at and tried to use as evidence to justify 
his claim, was signed between two states in various stages, either 
between the ruler of Kuwait and the Ottoman Empire or between Britain 
and the Ottoman Sultan. The two were the colonialist powers of 
the area and Iraq was not a signatory to this agreement. If the Kuwait 
had submitted at a time to the terms of an Ottoman rule of Basra 
it was because the entire Arab region was under the Ottoman domination. 
It is true that the Sheikh of Kuwait once accepted the title of Qaimmaqam 
in order to protect this state from external threats. Thus, the claim 
on territory which is based on the concept of "historical right", if 
26. Ihid., p.23. 
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agreed to, would lead to chaos not only in the Arab world but in 
the whole world." 
Despite the fall of Qasim's regime, the consequence of the crisis 
lingered in the sentiment of Kuwait and other Gulf States. That 
manifested itself in the continued complaints of Kuwait from the probable 
renewal of Iraqi ambitions. Hence came the attempt of the new regime 
leaders in Iraq reasserting their will of rectifying what Qasim's regime 
had spoilt through the good neighbourhood and the bolstering of bilateral 
economic and cultural relations. The two governments soon moved 
to purify their relations by meeting in Baghdad in October 1963. The 
Kuwait side was led by Sheikh Sabah Al Sabha the Prime Minister 
and the Iraqi side was led by General Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, the 
Iraqi Prime Minister. Discussions ended by signing a mutually agreed 
upon minute containing the consolidation of the bilateral relations 
to their mutual interest and desire to erase the damage inflicted on 
these relations by Qasim's regime and to open a new chapter of bilateral 
relations between the two sister states in conformity with their bonds 
and relation free from all shades of estrangement fabricated by the 
former regime. Therefore, the two sides agreed on the following 
terms: 
1. The recognition by the Republic of Iraq of the independence 
and total sovereignty of the state of Kuwait within its borders 
as defined in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 
27. ihiJ., pp. 23-24. 
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July 21. 1932 and approved by the Ruler of Kuwait in his 
letter dated August 10,1932. 
2. The two governments will bolster their fraternal relations between 
their two brotherly countries inspired by their national obligation, 
common interests and aspiration to a comprehensive Arab unity. 
3. The two government will undertake to establish bilateral, cultural, 
commercial and economic co-operation and to exchange technical 
information. 
4. To accomplish the above goals, the two countries have decided 
to promptly exchange diplomatic representation at ambassadorial 
level. (An agreed upon Minute between the Iraq Republic and 
the state of Kuwait, Baghdad 4/10/1963).=" 
It is worth mentioning that the Kuwaiti Govemment has registered 
that agreement with United Nations and the Arab League thus becoming 
recognized at the Arab and international levels. And though Iraq has 
not objected to these registration procedures its ill-intention towards 
Kuwait was evident in its deliberate refrain from submitting it to the 
concerned Iraqi council for its ratification so as to evade its responsibility 
in the event of an available opportunity.-'^ 
Nevertheless, the following years witnessed the growth and 
strength of bilateral economic, political and cultural relations. Kuwait 
28. The Iraqi A^^resssion on Kiiwaii, /'he inilh and the 7'rct^eJy 
(Kuwait: Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 1994) p 50 
29. Jhni, p. 50 
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in particular benefited from the loans and the generous financial grants 
offered by Kuwait. After the signing of the aforesaid agreement, an 
Iraqi delegation visited Kuwait, detailed agreement were reached by 
which Kuwait offered Iraq a free loan of thirty million dinars. The 
Kuwaiti Government emphasized that loan was within the scope and 
goals of the Kuwaiti Fund which was created to serve developmental 
projects in the Arab countries in December 1961 shortly after 
independence.'" 
Though the Iraqi - Kuwaiti relations moved within their natural 
course, tension between the two states re-emerged due to the continued 
Iraqi ambition in the wealth of Kuwait, asking for more loans and 
grants using the border problems with small neighbour as a means 
of pressure or blackmail. That, naturally, led to a halt in coordinating 
the Joint economic and developmental projects. And though Kuwait 
did not object to signing an agreement approved by the National 
Assembly to convey without conditions, about 120 million gallons 
of water from Shatt-Al-Arab, yet the political sensitivity and other 
obstacles associated with the project have suspended it preventing 
its realization. Another agreement has been reached after the quiescence 
in the border problems in the late seventies when the two sides agreed 
in the early part of 1978 to adopt the necessary steps for implementation. 
However, Iraq's domestic problems and its problems with neighbour 
Iran prevented the adoption of practical measures to implement the 
30. Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
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project which no longer remained vital for Kuwait.'' 
Following the end of the Kuwait - Iraqi crisis by the collapse 
of Qasim's regime and the signing of October 1963 Agreement between 
the Kuwait and Iraqi Governments under which Iraq recognized the 
independence of Kuwait, its existing borders and exchanged the 
diplomatic representation, talks regarding the demarcation of those 
borders were held directly between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi Governments 
under which Iraq recognized the independence of Kuwait, its existing 
borders and exchanged the diplomatic representation, talk regarding 
the demarcation of those borders were held directly between the 
representatives of the two governments/'-
Despite the financial commitments of Kuwait in the Arab summit 
conference held in Khartoum to offset the impacts of the Israeli 
aggression on the Arab territories in 1967, it did not hesitate to offer 
a twenty five million Kuwaiti dinars to Iraq in October of the same 
year to finance the power project of Samcrra Dam and other development 
projects. It has been proved that the Kuwaiti loans helped to alleviate 
the crises fabricated by the Iraqi Regime against Kuwait. That transpired 
in Al-Sameta event of March 1973 when some Iraqi troops attacked 
two Kuwaiti border posts in the north east of Kuwait and penetrated 
three Kilo-meters inside Kuwait.'' 
31. M/c/, p5l 
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Those forces did not withdraw till Kuwait offered Iraq a loan 
with easy terms. Though Iraq showed response to Arab mediation 
after the crisis to go ahead with the demarcation of the borders as 
per the 1963 Agreement, Iraq used to justify the delay by its domestic 
problems. Soon after, the Iraqi Regime got engaged with Iran after 
the advent of its Islamic Revolution. It announced the revocation 
of Algiers Agreement of 1975, then it got invaded in a war that lasted 
for eight year (1980-1988).'^ 
It is true that Saddam Hussein is an ambitious man. Merely 
eight months before invading Iran, he had boasted that "Iraq is as 
great as China, as great as the Soviet Union and as great as the United 
States". It is equally true that the Algiers Agreement, which established 
Iran's sovereignty over half of the Shatt-al-Arab and recognized its 
superiority to Iraq, was anathema to him. And yet. despite the humiliation 
attending the conclusion of the 1975 Agreement, the outbreak of war 
in SeplLMnber 1980 could not have been more ill-timed for the young 
and dynamic President. Due to the world oil boom in 1979 and 1980 
the Iraqi economy enjoyed unprecedented prosperity. Oil export revenues 
rose from $ 1 billion 1972 to $ 21 billion in 1979 and $26 billion 
in 1980. During the months preceding the war, these revenues were 
running at an annual rate of $ 33 billion, enabling Saddam to cany 
out ambitious development programmes. Numerous construction projects 
mushroomed throughout the country. Baghdad was grooming itself 
TT Ihiil. 
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to host the summit of the non-aligned movement in 1982. Living 
conditions of many groups within Iraqi society were on the rise. War 
could only risk achievements and, in consequence, render Saddam's 
domestic standing more tenuous.'^ 
But even if these weighty disincentives to war had not existed, 
explanations that concentrate on Hussein's ambitions present only one 
aspect of the determination that drove him to invade Iran. The other 
aspect was most certainly his insecurity, a growing fearfuUness bred 
by the precariousness he perceived in his own regime and by Iraq's 
glaring vulnerability vis a vis Iran. To the contemporary state of Iraq, 
Iran represented the major geo-political challenge. A much larger 
country in territory and population, with its major strategic centers 
located deep inside the country and with a long Gulf Coastline, Iran 
easily towered over its smaller neighbour to the West. Recognizing 
Iran's fundamental superiority, Iraq had no aspirations of competing 
with its larger neighbour for gulf supremacy. Instead, it directed its 
energies toward the Arab world (as evident by Saddam's Eight - Point 
National Charter of February 1980), a less risky and potentially more 
rewarding arena. In concluding the 1975 Algiers Agreement Saddam 
virtually acquiesced in a new regional order based on Iranian hegemony 
in the Gulf in order to stave off any threat to Iraq's lands and his 
political position. There were no indications what so ever during 
35. Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, n.l2, p. 136. 
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the latter part of the 1970s that he was seeking to upset this peace 
with Iran, let alone go to war for this purpose.'*^ 
Against this backdrop Hussein followed with much concern the 
growing revolutionaiy turmoil in Iran in the late 1970s, which threatened 
to undermine the status quo set up by the 1975 Algiers Agreement. 
It is true that a weakened and fragmented Iran could turbulence is 
channeled oulsidc a state's boundaries to engulf its neighbours."^ 
Saddam's positive attitude toward the revolutionary regime 
continued well throughout Spring and Summer 1979. When Iran decided 
to pull out of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) - an organization 
for military and economic cooperation formed in 1959 by Britain, 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as a successor to the Baghdad Pact*-lraq 
offered its good services in case Iran should decide to join the non-
aligned-movement. When in June 1979 Iraqi aircraft mistakenly bombed 
the Iranian side of the border in the course of operations against the 
kurds, Baghdad quickly filed an official apology. By that time President 
Baker, was referring to Iran as a brotherly nation, linked to the Arab 
people of Iraq by "strong ties of Islam, history and noble tradition", 
and praising the re\olutionary regime in Tehran for pursuing a policy 
that underlined these "deep historical relations". In July 1979, the 
36^ Ihid.^ pp. 136-13 7. 
37. I hid., p. I 37 
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newly installed President Saddam Hussein of Iraq reiterated his interest 
in establishing close relations with Iran "based on mutual respect and 
non-interference in internal affairs". The dismissive Iranian response 
to his appeal did not dissuade Saddam Hussein. As late as in August 
1979 he extended an invitation to Bazargan to visit Baghdad.'" Tehran 
did not, however, reciprocate Hussein's goodwill. On the contrary, 
from its early days in power the revolutionary regime sought to overthrow 
the Iraqi regime.'*' 
In June 1979, the revolutionary regime began publicly urging 
the Iraqi population lo rise up and overthrow "the Saddamitc regime". 
A few months later Tehran escalated its campaign by resuming support 
for the Iraqi Kurds (which had been suspended in 1975), providing 
aid to underground Shia'ite movements in Iraq and initiating terrorist 
attacks against prominent Iraqi officials. These reached their peak 
on April 1. 1980, with a failed attempt on the life of the Iraqi Deputy 
premier, Tariq Aziz, while he was making a speech at Mustansirriya 
University in Baghdad. Two weeks later, the Iraqi Minister of 
Information and culture, Latif Nusseif al-Jasim, narrowly escaped a 
similar attempt. In April alone, it was estimated that atleast 20 Iraqi 
officials were killed in bomb attacks by militant Shi'ite underground 
organisations.""' 
38. Ihid., pp 137-138 
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With the isolation of Egypt over the Camp David Agreement 
Iraq after the Baghdad Arab Summits (1978-79) emerged as the dominant 
Arab state. The Iranian revolution further pushed Iraq to primacy 
in Arab affairs. In fact the Gulf region appeared ripe to respond 
positively to Iraqi goals. It had become well known that Saddam 
Hussein wished lo spread Baalh ideology in the Arab world especially 
Gulf, under the Iraqi leadership. This Iraqi boldness emerged partly 
because of the perceived decline of Iranian power."" 
The revolution in Iran in 1978-79 was a watershed in the postwar 
politics not only in the Gulf but in entire area of South-West Asia. 
It changed the politics and role of Iran in the region. The area was 
overturned. At the same time it brought about a profound change 
in the relationship between regional states including Iran and the west. 
The revolution approximately coincide with cataclysmic events taking 
place by about the same period. Camp David accord in 1978, disbanding 
of CENTO. Kaaba seizure and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan an 1979, 
Gulf war starting in 1980 and the seizure of US diplomats in Tehran 
- all contributed towards a qualitative transformation of Middle East 
politics.^-
The Iranian revolution practically marked the end of the west's 
"informal reliance on Iran - Saudi cooperation in the Gulf (envisaged 
41. A. K. Pasha (ed.) The Gulf in Turmoil: A Global Response 
(NewDelhi: Lancers Books, 1992) p.26. 
42. M. .\bdul Hafiz, "An Emerging order in the Gulf", BiSS Journal, 
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on the local substitute for Britain's paramountcy after 1971)". For 
the first time, the US political and military dominance of the Gulf 
was directly challenged. The period also witnessed a general decline 
in US influence in the region. The CENTO was disbanded by about 
this time and the US connection had started to be looked upon as 
an anathema in the Gulf. The seizure of US diplomats as hostage 
in Tehran exacerbated the situation further lowering US prestige in 
the region. The Gulf's oil supply on which west's both economy 
and security were critically dependent had been seriously threatened. 
The Soviet efforts were a foot in gaining foothold in areas close 
either to the Gulf or Red sea. As the US position in the region 
seemed to be touching an all time low in postwar period, Soviet invasion 
in Afghanistan added a new dimension to the prevailing scenario. 
The US concern was distinctly voiced by President Jimm\ Carter of 
United States, in his State of the Union Message to the Congress 
in 1980: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests 
of the United States of America. And as such an assault will be 
repelled by any means necessary including military''.^' 
A rather desperate situation prompted the US to make some 
adjustments in its security arrangements in the Gulf. The US first 
few steps in the direction was to "increase its naval power in the 
Indian Ocean, create Rapid Deployment Force and work towards a 
4 ^ I hid., 11. 
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structure of base facilities in or near the region that would be available 
for use by the US forces. Initially few came forward to provide base 
to the US because of apparent US inability to protect her allies in 
crisis and a US backed Camp David accord universally condemned 
by the Arabs. Even Saudi Arabia, one of the twin pillar of US security 
"started demanding that the United States presence should be 'over 
the horizon' and not on its soil". 
Just as the Iranian revolution alarmed the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) States they were also concerned with the export of the Iraqi 
revolution. They suspected Iraqi intentions as outlined in Saddam 
Hussein's "Arab National Charter", of February 8, 1980. Undoubtedly, 
this charter atleast in part at Saudi dominance of the lower Gulf States. 
Riyadh clearly resented Iraqi intrusions and attempts to spread its 
influence. Thus GCC states came to suspect both Iran and Iraq. Although 
the Iraqi threat (despite Saddam recent moderation) in the long run 
was considerable the Iranian threat was seen as more serious and 
immediate. It is against this backdrop the Iran - Iraq war broke in 
September, 1980. Although Iraq went out of its way to exploit GCC 
states' fears, the Arab pledge of support for Iraq before the war was 
not easily forthcoming. Initially the GCC States, although concerned 
at Iranian threat to export revolution, gave only verbal support to 
Iraq. Even after the outbreak of the war Arab suspicion of Iraqi 
ideology and its export persisted, (besides not wanting to antagonize 
Iran). The full measure of Iraqi irritation found expression in a passage 
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of Saddam Hussein"s speech on July 17, 1981 in which he complained 
not only of those Arab States "blatantly avowing total bias" in favour 
of Iran, but also those who had failed to conform with the "minimum 
level of the Pan-Arab bond" and had "outdone themselves in expressing 
neutrality". In order to pre-empt any support from Gulf Arabs to 
Iraq, Tehran threatened to launch air strikes against any Gulf states 
that helped the Iraqi war efforts. Basically due to the revolution 
(and fears of the spread of the Gulf war) the GCC was formed in 
May 198J. The GCC leaders went out of their way to reassure Iran 
when they said: "We do not want the GCC to be misinterpreted as 
an alliance against Iran".^^ 
With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq again raked up 
the question of contiol over the Warbah and Buhiyan islands and justified 
its demand on national security and strategic grounds. The summer 
of 1981, President Saddam Hussein, in a statement, expressed his desire 
to control two islands for five years. The Kuwaiti official discreetly 
refused to accept the proposal. However, immense financial aid by 
Kuwait and political and logistic considerations put effective constraints 
on Iraqi pressure for some time.^' 
But in 1984, in the face of Iranian military pushes, Iraq redoubled 
its pressure for securing the Kuwaiti islands. Kuwait eventually relented 
and when Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah visited Baghdad in mid 
I T A.K. Pasha n. 41, pp. 26-27. 
4.S .A.S.H Abidi and R.K. Sngh (eds.), I he Culf Crisis (New Delhi: 
Lancers Books, 1991) p. 14. 
28 
November, it was reported that the two countries had agreed that three 
islands of Kuwait-Warbah, Bubiyan and Faylaka would be put under 
Iraqi control for security reasons. In a sense this was the first de-
facto step towards Iraq's complete control over Kuwait/* 
The response of the GCC to the Kuwaiti bombing was in essence 
a reiteration of its previous policy: Some tough language towards 
the Iranian threat, followed by the return to a more moderate position. 
The GCC foreign ministers in June 1984 reiterated their calls for 
a peaceful end to the fighting. Concurrently, in order to "provide teeth" 
to their diplomacy, their military chiefs of staff met to plan responses 
in the event of further escalations. In the face of growing external 
threats and internal discontent the Kuwaiti ruler dissolved the National 
Assembly in mid-1986 at the very time when Iran recaptured Mehran. 
The Iranian Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani linked the Kuwaiti move to 
Iraq's defeat. "To our belief, Kuwait's political crisis has nothing 
to do with the (Gulf) war and the (Kuwaiti) people's growing opposite 
views on oil prices and oil production". Iranian hostility was also 
directed at Kuwait because of its policies which hurt Iran more than 
any other OPEC country. Iraq's intensified campaign of air strikes 
against economic and oil targets led to further Iranian reprisals against 
shipping on the Arab side of the Gulf Iran stepped up attacks on 
vessels to and from Kuwait identifying it as one of Iraq's key supporters. 
Kuwait went public and invited former Soviet Union, China and US 
"46^  Ibid., p. 14. 
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to reflag its oil tankers. This brought about massive naval presence 
in the Gulf of the US and other states. Kuwait became the target 
of vitriolic Iranian propaganda, and the government faced persistent 
requests from the US naval forces for facilities in Kuwaiti territorial 
waters which were politely but firmly turned down. Kuwait's 
determination to see its policy through despite Iranian intimidation 
was widely praised. Kuwait's handling of the delicate issue showed 
considerable depth of experience in dealing with world powers.^^ 
Soon after the Iran-Iraq cease-fire in August 1988 Kuwait 
confident of Iraqi friendship asked for the demarcation of its border. 
The Iraqis sent their interior Minister Samir Abdur Razzaq to Kuwait 
and both agreed to constitute a joint committee to complete the task 
of demarcation. Again Iraq raised the issue of Bubiyan island and 
was firm that unless this is transferred to Iraq there won't be demarcation. 
As before Kuwait turned down Iraqi demand and the situation reverted 
to the stalemate. It must be stressed that the Al-Sabah rulers were 
convinced that if they were to yield Iraq on this issue, it would be 
seen as a grave provocation by Iran. Later in October 1990 Iran 
told Kuwaiti exiled rulers not to grant the island of Bubiyan to Iraq 
and that it would take appropriate measures (meaning they themselves 
will occupy it) if they actually did so as part of any settlement.^" 
The Kuwaiti delegation to their shock discovered that Saddam Hussein 
intoxicated with the illusion of victory over Iran made disparaging 
4T A.K. Pasha, n.4I, p.30 
48. I hid., p.3 1. 
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remarks on Kuwait's support to Iraq against Iran. Moreover he said 
"we expected that after the termination of the war the Emir of Kuwait 
would pay a visit to Iraq". Of course, the Kuwaitis quickly realized 
that there is no use expecting gratitude for the immense help given 
to Iraq, but the Iraqis by inviting other Arab countries "particularly 
Kuwait" to join the Arab cooperation council which had given the 
Iraqis a stronger line of defence against Kuwaiti demands were making 
it clear that Kuwaitis "still have dues to pay before they can expect 
a border agreement". Al Azmina-al-Arabia concluded that Kuwait's 
"hopes of drawing up a border agreement have been drowned in the 
waters of the Shatt-al-Arab" Fed up with the protracted border problem 
the Kuwaiti ruler in a rare gesture had gone to Baghdad in September 
1989 to sort out the problem of demarcation, but was sent packing 
in a manner that was barely polite.^' 
Saddam Hussein by borrowing heavily from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and others had mortgaged Iraq's extensive oil resources for into future 
to pay for a war that brought Iraq none of the territorial gains or 
battlefield glories that he promised. However, he was convinced that 
but for Iraq's "Victory" over Iran, most of the Gulf Arab states would 
have fallen to Iran, the first being Kuwait. It is this assessment which 
propelled him to mount pressure on the Al-Sabhas to be more generous 
in financial aid and when not forthcoming he invaded Kuwait on August 
2,1990.-" 
49. IhiJ., p. 32. 
50. I hid, p.33. 
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CHAPTER - II 
Iraqi Invasion and the Gulf War 
At about 2 a.m. (Baghdad time) on August 2, 1990; three Iraqi 
Republican Guard divisions invaded Kuwait. One proceeded down a 
coastal road to Kuwait city, a second seized the island oil fields, and 
the third proceeded to the Saudi Arabian border. Kuwaiti A-4 aircraft 
and Chieftain tanks fought for three days until their fuel and ammunition 
were exhausted. The small Kuwaiti Navy also made a valiant showing, 
with the last two fast attack craft escaping while firing at pursuing Iraqi 
tanks.* 
Iraqi forces quickly captured Kuwait city and the Emir's palace, 
while the Kuwaiti ruler. Sheik Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, fled to Saudi 
Arabia and established government in exile. On August 3rd, the 
remainder of Kuwait was captured and by the 4th, Iraqi forces wee 
amassed along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border for a possible invasion of Saudi 
Arabia, it would not only establish itself as the secular leader of the 
Arab world, but also would control 45% of world's oil.' 
Iraqi Invasion: 
The reasons for the invasion dated back to the creation of present-
1. Bruce W. Watson (ed). Military Lessons of the Gulf War (New Delhi: 
Lancer International, 1991) p. 15. 
2. Ibid., p. 16 
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day Kuwait. In 1899, Great Britain and Kuwait signed a treaty in which 
Britain assumed control of Kuwait's foreign affairs. This was done in 
order to thwart German imperialist designs in the region, and after world 
war I began, London established a protectorate over Kuwait. World war 
I also led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation by 
the European power of Iraq and a number of other countries. These events 
and decisions reflections of the European balance of power that did not 
consider the region's culture or politics, still reverberate, and the finding 
of oil and later, in the 970s, its greatly enhanced value, aggravated trouble 
at times tribal, situations. Kuwait was an artificial creation imposed by 
the West, and in both denied Iraq a considerable amount of oil and 
restricted its access to the seas. This arrangement was never accepted, 
and when Kuwait received its independence on June 19, 1961, Baghdad 
almost immediately claimed it, basing this on the facts that Kuwait had 
been a part of the Ottoman Empire, that it was an artificial British 
creation, and it threatened Iraq's access to the sea. Threatened by 
invasion, Kuwait appealed to the British, whose military reaction in July 
1961 was enough to thwart Iraq. Kuwait was admitted to the United 
Nations and the Arab league, but Iraq did not renounce its claim, would 
often resurrect it, and would cite it to justify the August invasion.' 
Iraq perceived that Kuwait was drawing more than its share from 
the common north-south Rumaila oil field. In addition, Kuwait had 
3. /A/J., p. 16 
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increased its oil production and reduced its prices, damaging the 
economies of several Arab countries, including Iraq and Libya. In recent 
years Kuwait has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in the U.S., 
Japan and Western Europe, and yet unemployment is extremely high 
in many Arab countries including Jordan, Yeman, Egypt, Algeria and 
Moracco. Interestingly enough the ruling family in Kuwait has not 
invested any substantial amounts of its wealth in its Arab neighbours.'' 
Other grievances articulated during the cease fire with Iran in 
August 1988 and the Jeddah conference before the invasion on August 
2, 1990 include the following: 
1. The overproduction of OPEC quotas. 
2. The Iraqi debt to Kuwait ($ 20-30 billions). 
3. The oil allegedly taken from the Rumaila field (worth $ 2.4 
billion). Kuwait's "'war" on Iraq, Kuwait alleged alliance with 
foreign powers, to effect the economic collapse of Iraq. 
4. Lack of implementation of an Arab Marshall plan for Iraq. Iraq 
claimed it was entitled to expect the Gulf countries to launch a 
Marshall plan to support its recovery from the war. Just as the 
U.S. has done in Europe after world war 11, and, 
5. Kuwait's alleged reluctance to negotiate with Iraq. 
These complaints were intensified two years prior to the invasion 
4. Dilnawaz .A.. Siddiqui, Abbass F.Alkhafaji, The Gulf War: Implications For 
Global Business and Media, (Appllo: Closson Press, 1992) p. 18. 
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in August, 1990. There is no doubt that the Muslim nations in general 
and the Arab countries in particular have either failed to understand the 
validity of Iraq's grievances or they did not want to get involved in 
finding an acceptable solution to this problem. In both cases they failed 
to diffuse the rapidly deteriorating crisis^ 
In early 1990, the Kuwaiti oil minister. Sheikh Ali Khalifah al 
Sabah, called for the system of oil-production quotas to be scrapped as 
soon as possible. "From a practical standpoint, the quotas are already 
irrelevant so all that is needed is a recognition of that fact", he said. 
He had been closely associated with the policy of high levels of oil 
production to keep the world oil price low and stable. In May, he was 
shifted from the ministry of oil to that of finance mainly to assuage 
Iraqi suspicions of Kuwait over production. The oil production and 
pricing policy of Kuwait had, by then, become an additional irritant in 
the Iraqi-Kuwait relations which had already been soured on account 
of Iraqi demands of cancellation of its debts to Kuwait, Kuwaiti 
investments in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and right of access 
to Bubian.'' 
On 7th July, the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein claimed that the 
Arab states of the Gulf had 'robbed' Iraq of $ 14 billion by depressing 
oil prices on the international market. The next day, the Iraqi foreign 
5. IhiJ., p. 19. 
6. Gulshan Dietel, Through Two Wars and Beyond (New Delhi: Lancers 
Books, 1991) pp. 257-258. 
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minister Tariq Aziz charged in a letter to the Arab League that Kuwait 
had erected military outposts on Iraqi soil and exploited its southern 
Rumaila oil field stealing oil worth $ 2.4 billion.^ 
Kuwait at the time had oil production quota of 1.5 mbd and was 
producing 1.9 mbd instead. Till the end of the Iran-Iraq war, it had also 
produced an additional amount of 1,25,000 bd and supplied the proceeds 
of its sale to Iraq under the "war relief" agreement. As the agreement 
was discontinued with the termination of the war, the Iraqi allegations 
in this regard were well-tied and the Kuwaiti response time-tested. It 
was widely believed that Kuwait had offered one billion dollars to settle 
the dispute." 
Prior to a meeting of the OPEC Ministerial Council in Geneva 
on 25 July. 1990. Iraq had implied that it might take military action 
against countries which continued to flour their oil production quotas. 
It had also accused Kuwait of violating the Iraqi border in order to 
steal Iraqi oil resources worth, $ 2.400 m., and suggested that Iraq's 
debt to Kuwait, accumulated largely during the Iran-Iraq war, should 
be waived. On the eve of the OPEC meeting in Geneva, Iraq stationed 
two armoured divisions (about 30,000 troops) on its border with Kuwait.'^  
The Iraqi threat and military mobilization led to a sharp increase 
7. Ibid., p. 258. 
8. Ibid. 
9. The Middle East and North Africa-1994, (London: Europa Publication 
Limited, 1994) p 448. 
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in regional tension. Before the OPEC meeting in Geneva on 25 July, 
1990, President Mubarak of Egypt and Chedli Klibi, the Secretary-
General of the Arab League, travelled to Baghdad in an attempt to calm 
the situation. The USA, meanwhile, placed on alert its naval forces 
stationed in Bahrain. At the conclusion of the OPEC meeting, however, 
the threat of Iraqi military action appeared to recede: both Kuwait and 
the UAE agreed to reduce their petroleum production, while OPEC agreed 
to raise its 'benchmark' price of crude petroleum from US$ 18 to $ 
21 per barrel.'" 
Direct negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait commenced in Saudi 
Arabia at the end of July 1990, with the aim of resolving dispute over 
territory, oil pricing and Iraq's debt to Kuwait. Kuwait was expected 
to accede to Iraqi demands for early negotiations to draft a border 
demarcation treaty and Iraq was expected to emphasize a claim to the 
strategic Islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, situated at the mouth of the 
Shattal-Arab (After Kuwait obtained independence in 1961—it had 
formerly been under the protection of the UK-Iraq claimed sovereignty 
over the country, Kuwait was placed under the protection of British 
troops, who were later withdrawn and replaced by Arab League forces. 
On 4 October 1963, the Iraqi government fonnally recognized Kuwait's 
complete independence and sovereignty within its present borders). On 
1 August, however, the talk collapsed, and on 2 August Iraq invaded 
10. Ibid., p. 448. 
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Kuwait taking control of the country and establishing a (short-lived) 
provisional free government." 
There was no evidence at all to support Iraq's claim that its forces 
had entered Kuwait at the invitation of insurgents who had overthrown 
the Kuwaiti Government. The invasion appeared more likely to have been 
motivated by Iraq's financial difficulties in the aftermath of the Iran-
Iraq war; by strategic interests. Iraq had long sought the direct access 
to the Persian Gulf which it gained by occupying Kuwait; and by Iraq's 
pursuit of regional hegemony.'-
The second of August 1990 was a sad day witnessed by the world. 
On that day, humanity retracted to the barbaric age, in which the law 
of the jungle prevailed, as Iraq attacked the state of Kuwait. Ever since 
its independence, Kuwait has contributed-most enthusiastically to the 
consolidation of international peace and security, and to the enhancement 
of international cooperation in economic, cultural and social fields. This 
aggression was, surprisingly, waged by an Arab Islamic state against a 
fraternal neighbouring state, equally Arab and Islamic. Peculiarly enough, 
the attacked state pursues a foreign policy held as exemplary in good 
neighbourhood vis-a-vis the attacking neighbour. The Iraqi aggression 
against Kuwait, not only violates the rules of international legitimacy, 
but also runs contrary to the lofty Islamic and Arab values and the 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ihid. 
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principles of good neighbourhood, which constitute a pillar in 
international relations in general.'^ 
Paradoxically, this illegitimate aggression took place at a time in 
which the world was witnessing a most impressive scene of international 
rapprochement, as though the aggressor meant to wade against the 
current. Iraq's expansionist ambition in Kuwait had no legal basis and, 
indeed, contradicted the fundamental principles of international law, 
which underscore the principle of stable boundaries and the peoples' right 
to self-determination. The Iraqi treacherous aggression against the state 
of Kuwait was indeed a human catastrophe. Its negative effect on Arab 
interests and world economy were manifold, apart from the flagrant 
injustice to the right of the Kuwaiti people.'^ 
On 2 August, 1990, Iraq launched what was in pure military 
professional terms a brilliant operation. At 0200 hours, three Iraqi 
Republican Guard armoured divisions with nearly 300 tanks (mostly T-
72s) rolled over the Kuwaiti frontier, in a move coordinated with 
heliborne air assault with nearly three commando battalions of the special 
forces. The main force of commandos were landed on Kuwait 
international airport to make it secure for troops flown in by transport 
aircraft immediately afterwards. The second element of the heliborne 
commandos quickly captured most of the key points in the city including 
13. Abdulla Yusuf-al-Ghunaim, Kiiwail: Slalehood and Boundaries (Kuwait: 
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science, 1992) p. 13. 
14. Ibid. 
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the command and control centres of the Kuwaiti army. There was hardly 
any resistance except by the guards at the royal palace." 
In the few hours which were all it took for the Iraqis to reach 
the city, the duty officers at defence, headquarters and managed to alert 
the government; the minister of defence. Sheikh Nawaf, hurried to the 
command post, was given an account of what was going on, and as 
he informed us later in Saudi Arabia, sensibly left the soldiers to cope 
while he hurried off to warn the other ministers and the Emir. By the 
time the Iraqis reached the Dasman Palace, the Emir was well on his 
way to the Saudi border. Sheikh Fahd was the one hero of the whole 
affair. He stood with a few guards at the top of the palace steps as 
the first Iraqi arrived, barring their way with drawn pistol. One of the 
Iraqis casually shot him dead.'* 
In Kuwait city there were many individual acts of bravery, and 
a few units put up spirited resistance before being mown down by the 
ruthless firepower of the Iraqis. But in seven hours it was all over, Kuwait 
was totally invested by the invaders, the government gone, armed 
resistance at an end, and the airport closed. An unfortunate British 
Airways plane enroute to India landed in Kuwait just as the invasion 
began: the crew and passengers were taken prisoner, and the men moved 
to Baghdad to form part of the human shield which Saddam so quickly 
15. Akhtar Majeed (ed). Encyclopaedia of West Asia (Aligarh: CSSS, 
Aligarh Muslim University, 1996) p. 169. 
16. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Saddam's War (London. Faber and 
Faber, 1991) p. 107. 
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deployed to protect vital targets. It was the sort of quick and efficient 
victory he had tried for in vain against Iran.*' 
Saddam initially claimed that Iraqi troops had entered Kuwait 
at the request of a revolutionary movement opposed to the Al-Sabah, 
but this claim was soon discredited by his inability to find Kuwaiti 
nationals willing to serve in a puppet government. This did not prevent 
the Iraqis installing a provisional cabinet on 4 August which three days 
later declared Kuwait a republic. The head of this short-lived regime 
was Alia Hussein Ali, said to be a colonel in the Kuwait army. Kuwaiti 
sources, however, identified Alaa as an Irqi officer who had fought in 
the Gulf war and written a military history of the conflict and who, 
until the invasion, had been incharge of Iraq's Fao-I-anti-missile 
programme.'* 
The US's immediate concern was to prevent any Iraqi incursion 
into Saudi Arabia. President Bush stressed that the integrity of Saudi 
Arabia, its freedom, are very, very important to us; and he promised 
US support to repel any Iraqi attack.'^ 
The invasion was launched at 2300 GMT. Iraqi units entered 
Kuwait city's centre within a few hours. Waving Iraqi flags. Jubilant 
soldiers in vehicles raced along the thoroughfares. Iraqi helicopters flew 
overhead. Some of the fiercest fighting was on the banks of the Gulf 
17. Ibid, pp. 107-108. 
18. /hid, p. 108. 
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at Dasman palace, residence of the Emir, which was attacked by Iraqi 
tanks and Jets. Smoke billowed from the area witnessed reported loud 
explosions and heavy machine gun fire.'" 
The Iraqis also ran into resistance at Mutla, 35 km north of Kuwait 
city. A foreign resident saw a lone Kuwaiti Jet shoot down an Iraqi 
helicopter. The Jet swung back to attack another helicopter but was 
chased away by Iraqi guns. On the ground, hundreds of tanks, armoured 
personnel carriers, fuel and water tankers and trucks carrying troops 
headed toward Kuwait city in temperatures above 40 degrees centigrade.-' 
The 'Free government' broadcast its first communique on a 
previously unused frequency; saying it had dismissed Kuwait's National 
Assembly. Election would be held when stability was secured, it said." 
Reports on the conduct of the Iraqi troops in Kuwait varied. Some 
highlighted the brutality of the Iraqis, focusing on allegations of mass 
rape of expatriate women.-' 
The reprisals and tortures carried out by the Iraqis were terrible. 
Torture on a previously unimaginable scale became the norm, as did 
summary executions. No Kuwaiti was safe, even in his home. Young 
men were taken, tortured, returned home and shot in front of their 
families, who were then forbidden to collect the bodies from the street. 
20. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, September, 10-16, 1990, p. 21337. 
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Women, girls, men, boys, and even young children were raped. Children 
were executed for singing the national anthem, or hanged for no good 
reason. The entire population was brutalised.'^ 
The Iraqis set up a number of torture and detention centres. Those 
who survived were left physically, emotionally and mentally scarred. 
Those who did not, were often brought to the Kuwait morgue for burial.^' 
Other reports claimed that the Iraqi forces were generally 
wellbehaved, and that many soldiers had apologized to the civilian 
population for the invasion. According to some sources the situation had 
deteriorated when popular Army units entered Iraq soon after the 
invasion. Looting was certainly widespread, but a major part of it 
appeared to be organized by the Iraqi government. The New York Times 
of August 14, 1990, reported that Iraq had transferred between US $3,000 
million and $ 5,000 million in gold, foreign- currency ad goods from 
Kuwait and that this had significantly increased Iraq's financial reserves 
which had stood at an estimated US $ 6,500 million before the invasion. 
However, in a warning to looters Iraqi television broadcast on August 
16 pictures of an executed Iraqi officer hanging above his looted booty 
in Kuwait city.-'' 
24. Gailseery, Kuwait:A New Beginning (Dubai:Motivate Publishing, 1993) 
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International Response: 
In fact, the international response to Iraq's invasion was 
remarkably swift. Within hours Iraq's assets were frozen world wide and 
the first of 11 critical United Nations Security Council-resolutions-
Resolution 660, calling for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal - had been 
passed. The speed of the response was due, in no small part, to the 
fact that neither the former USSR nor China-both permanent members 
of the UN Security Council-attempted to oppose the resolutions. The 
following day, a majority in the Arab League condemned the Iraqi 
invasion at a vituperative meeting hastily convened in Cairo. Three days 
later, the United Nation imposed wide-ranging import and export 
sanctions against Iraq. The day after, Saudi Arabia accepted an offer 
by the USA of up to 50,000 troops to help defend its territory. Western 
air and naval power began to gather in Gulf, the Red Sea and the 
Mediterranean, while Saudi Arabia and Turkey shut down Iraqi oil 
exports by pipeline across their territories. Iraqi oil exports were thus 
virtually blocked, while exports by sea through the Gulf were blockaded 
by western naval power. Only Jordan continued to offer a limited point 
of access to the outer world for Iraq.-^  
On August 3, 1990, West Germany, Japan and several other 
countries joined a US led move toward economic sanctions against Iraq, 
27. George Joffe, "Iraq and Kuwait: The Invasion, the War and the 
.Aftermath" The Middle East and North Africa 1992 (38"^  ed.) (London: 
Ellropa Publications, 1991) p. 14. 
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saying they would effectively freeze Kuwaiti assets in their countries 
to keep them away from Baghdad.'" 
The European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization prepared to consider calls for broader trade embargoes and 
freezing of Iraqi assets.-^ 
Italy, Belgium and Luxumbourg also announced plans to freeze 
Kuwaiti assets. Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia joined the Soviet Union 
in suspending arms exports to Iraq. The shift from condemnation to 
diplomatic and economic moves reflected in part the difficulties that 
military retaliation against Iraq would pose. Switzerland, stopping short 
of a freeze, asked its banks to scrutinize carefully any withdrawals of 
Kuwaiti funds. The Dutch Government froze all Kuwaiti bank accounts 
and export credits to both Iraq and Kuwait . It said it was considering 
banning tankers carrying Iraqi crude oil from entering the port of 
Rotterdam.-" 
France, the second-largest supplier of weapons to Iraq, issued a 
'total and unreserved condemnation of the intervention of Iraqi troops 
in Kuwait', and demanded an immediate withdrawal. It also froze Kuwaiti 
and Iraqi assets.'' 
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China described Iraq and Kuwait as 'friends', saying that there 
was 'no conflict of fundamental interests among Third world countries 
and that no one should resort to force of arms'.-^ ^ 
Japan, which gets more than .10 percent of its oil from the two 
countries, called for withdrawal of Iraq's forces (Japan imports 99 percent 
of its oil, and its economy has proved vulnerable to 'oil shocks', 
emanating from conflict in West Asia).^ ^ 
On August 5, 1990 the UN Security Council approved an economic 
embargo of Iraq and Kuwait.^ ^ On August 6, 1990, the UN Security 
Council met once again in an emergency session and voted 14 to 0 to 
condemn the attack. It demanded the immediate and unconditional 
withdrawal of all Iraqi forces to the position in which they were located 
on August 1, 1990.'' 
Iraq announced on August 8, 1990 that Kuwait was part of Iraq 
and called for "full unity between Kuwait and Iraq". The statement 
stopped short of saying Iraq had annexed Kuwait, but strongly suggested 
that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq had no intention of giving up 
the Emirate, which his tioops seized in a lightning attack. A statement 
by the ruling Iraqi Revolution Command Council red over Baghdad 
television'declared "a comprehensive and eternal merger", later, a 
32. Ibid. 
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statement by the Armed Forces General Command said Israel was 
preparing to attack Iraq using aircraft painted with American colours and 
warned of massive retaliation. The statement was issued as the first US 
troops were arriving in Saudi Arabia. It said Israeli fliers were issued 
with false US identity papers. It vowed to defy a rapidly growing western 
military build-up in the Gulf, sent to bolster Saudi Arabia in case of 
invasion by Iraqi forces. Baghdad denied that it would attack.-^ * 
The statement about a merger of the two countries confirmed that 
Saddam Hussein was determined to hold on to Kuwait and defy world 
pressure for an immediate withdrawal, including a UN-ordered blockade. 
There was about half-an-hour of wild shooting in the air to celebrate 
the merger announcement, but the shooting stopped on order of the 
authorities.'' 
The Armed Forces General Command said Iraq had learned that 
USA had established 'detailed coordination with the Zionist entity' and 
had identified Iraqi targets which it planned to strike, 'believing this 
will divert Iraq from its national and pan-Arabians' The United States 
had failed to win the support of other countries, it said, and was 
disguising Israeli aircraft as its own in an attempt to divert Iraqi military 
retaliation.'" 
36. Asian Recorder, October 1-7, 1990, pp. 21370-21371. 
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On the same day (August 8, 1990) the UN Security Council 
convened and adopted a unanimous resolution (No. 662), which declared 
the annexation of Kuwait to be nulland void, and urged all states and 
institutions not to recognize it."" 
President Hafez al-Assad of Syria desired an Arab solution of the 
crisis. He emphasized that it should be limited to a regional solution 
and that foreign powers should keep out of the region. Another attempt 
to hammer out a solution was made by the Arabs on August 9, 1990 
when the Arab leaders met in Cairo-Talks continued on August 11, 1990, 
when the Leagues voted to sent an Arab-peace-keeping force to Saudi 
Arabia which felt threatened. Saudi Arabia had solicited immediate 
military succor from the United States. In fact, once the American troops 
were invited by Saudi Arabia, and were deployed, all hopes of finding 
an Arab Solution to the crisis were dashed to the grounds.^" 
King Hussein of Jordan was under pressure from USA to close 
Jordan's only port at Aqaba to Iraqi commerce. It was openly hinted 
by USA that if Jordan did so, USA would provide some financial 
compensation to Jordan for the loss of its revenue."" 
King Hussein faced an agonizing situation. If he refuses to accede 
to President Bush's wishes, USA might block exports from Aqaba, if 
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he closes the port, he may have a pro Sdddam uprising in Jordan. On 
August 16, 1990, Bush ordered a total naval blockade of Iraq shortly 
after King Hussein's mission failed to persuade him to desist from the 
move/' 
On August 17,1990, Iran and Iraq began exchanging the prisoners 
of their war of eight years and Iraqi troops simultaneously began vacating 
disputed Iranian territory. An estimated 70,000 prisoners of war were 
held by Iran and 30,000 held by Iraq. Peace with Iran released three 
divisions for Iraq to face USA in a conflict that appeared to be imminent 
with the imposition of a US naval blockade."*^  
Iraq, hoping to forestall an American attack, took all foreign 
nationals in Iraq and Kuwait into custody and confined them in strategic 
places to be used as human shields. This Iraqi action led to an unanimous 
Resolution 664 passed by the Security Council on 18 August, 1990. It 
demanded that Iraq should release all foreign nationals held in Iraq and 
Kuwait and that Iraq should permit and facilitate the departure of foreign 
nationals from Kuwait."*^  
While addressing the people of Iraq on 19 August, 1990 Saddam 
Hussein blamed the US and Britain for the plight of the trapped 
foreigners. He offered to release foreign detainees if President Bush 
offered written guarantees that the US forces will be withdrawn from 
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Saudi Arabia and the economic boycott against Iraq would end. Thus, 
Saddma left no doubt that the foreigners would be used as shields, ' 'their 
presence, along with Iraqi families, as vital target, may prevent military 
aggression", he said. President Bush called Iraq's restriction on 
"innocent civilians from countries" unacceptable and an "offense 
against all norms of international behaviour". Bush referred to the 
detained foreigners as "hostages". Iraqi troops began rounding up 
western nationals from their homes at gun point. On 22 August, 1990 
foreign ministers of the European Community rejected Iraq's 24 August, 
1990, deadline for the closure of all foreign embassies in Kuwait. On 
24 August, 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev sent an urgent message to Hussein 
warning him that the Gulf situation was "extremely dangerous". 
Gorbachev signal led that he was ready to back additional measures to 
toughen the UN embargo against Iraq. '^ 
On 25 August, 1990, the UN Security Council, in a sweeping 13 
to 0 vote with Cuba and Yemen abstaining, adopted Resolution 665 
authorizing "measures as may be necessary" including military action 
to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq. Several members of the 
UN expressed their serious concern over the situation and some of them 
had reservations but on varying degrees and grounds. Yemen perceived 
the situation as alarming. It noted that it was for the first time in the 
whole United Nations' histoiy, that unclear powers were being provided 
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to undertake such action which were neither specified nor had any clear 
definition of the Security Council's role and powers of supervision over 
those action."**" 
The Iraqi aggression on Kuwait started by the destruction of the 
economic, social and political structure of Kuwait. First, it tried to create 
a lackey government; failing to find collaborators, the Iraqi regime issued 
a resolution annexing Kuwait to Iraq declaring it on August 28, 1990 
as the 19th Govemorate under the name of Kazima. The Iraqi media 
constantly reiterated that the decision of annexation is eternal and 
irrevocable. The Iraqi Regime issued several nominal resolutions to begin 
carrying out some projects like the building of a railway from Basra 
to Kuwait and the conveyance of Shatt al-Arab waters and others project 
he claimed to have been executed. He also proceeded with his attempts 
to change the demographic structure in Kuwait by forcing the Kuwaitis 
to leave their country or to apply for the Iraqi nationality and to replace 
Kuwaiti families with Iraqi ones. The International Community 
denounced all these illegal acts.^ ^ 
Following the Iraqi invasion, there wee widespread reports that 
Iraqi forces were plundering Kuwait city, looting goods from shops and 
warehouses, and searching for Kuwaiti resistance fighters and westerners 
in hiding. Iraqi troops, in an attempt to subjugate the population of 
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Kuwait, reportedly burned houses and torture and suspected of opposing 
the occupation forces. Many installation were dismantled and removed 
to Iraq.^ " 
The Secretary-General of United Nations, Javier Pereg de Cuellar, 
acknowledged on September 2 that he had failed in an attempt to bring 
about a solution to the crisis in West Asia. He said that in two days 
of talks in Amman with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, he 
had met with total inflexibility "Yes, I failed, of course I failed", Perez 
de Cuellar said in a television interview.^' 
Although President George Bush had made it clear that he would 
like to see President Saddam Hussein of Iraq removed from power. The 
administration's diplomatic plan in the Gulf rested on the more modest 
goal of forcing him to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. Then, according 
to the thinking in Bush's inner circle, the United State and its allies 
could probably contain Saddam Hussein and neutralize him as a regional 
power without toppling him. Administration officials said this approach, 
which had come into focus in recent days, is based on the notion that 
the Gulf crisis had so rearranged west Asia and indeed much of the 
rest of the world-politically and militarily, that Saddam Hussein would 
be unable to pursue an expansionist policy.'" 
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While the European Community fully intended to stand by the 
US in the Gulf crisis, what became increasingly apparent at the EC 
foreign ministers' conference was the anxiety over what one delegate 
described as ' the US appetite for war'. 
The final communique issued after conference emphasized that a 
watertight, firmly applied embargo 'Is the essential condition for reaching 
a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis'. This European foreign ministers 
felt that it was the best way of keeping the US penchant for a first 
strike, firmly reined. 'Whatever the dangers, the embargo must be strictly 
respected. This is the only means of avoiding armed conflict', said the 
Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michelis. Italy was the EEC's then 
president. 
The US President, George Bush was likely to hear the same 
message from the Soviet President, Gorbachev in Helsinki . It reflected 
the determination of the European allies not to allow the anti-Saddam 
consensus to be in anyway vitiated by a unilateral strike by the US. 
Shielded as they were by UN approbation, the Europeans feared that 
they would wake up to a US inspired fait accompli which would 
undoubtedly lead them all into war.'" 
The Super Power Summit held in Helsinki on September 9, 1990 
ended in a rare display of unit\ between the USA and USSR in regard 
to the Gulf crisis. The joint declaration demanded that 'nothing short 
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of complete implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions is 
acceptable'. However, there was a slight difference in approach, namely 
that he Soviets still preferred a political solution to the problem, with 
Gorbachev urging President Saddam Hussein to 'display sobriety'. 
Whereas President Bush indicated clearly at the press conference 
following the meeting that the United States did not exclude, the use 
of force 'if the current steps fail'. While the Helsinki Summit was under 
way, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz was visiting Tehran in a 
desperate attempt to reach an understanding with Iran to break the UN 
embargo. According to reports emanating from Tehran at that time, Iran 
had been prepared to consider supplying food and medicine to Iraq and 
to provide an outlet for its blockaded oil. The difficulty was that in 
such an event the UN Security Council may be expected to extend the 
present embargo, which covers Iraq and Kuwait (under Iraqi occupation) 
to cover Iran as well adding a new dimension to the situation. 
The Joint Declaration issued after the Helsinki Summit had, in 
fact, covered this aspect by stating that the economic embargo could 
be relaxed to allow for humanitarian aid only if it was ensured that the 
supplies of food and medicine were strictly confined to those for whom 
it was meant, 'with special priority being given to the needs of the 
children', through strict monitoring by appropriate international 
agencies." 
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The United Nation Security Council had still not arrived at a 
decision about whether "humanitarian circumstances" in Iraq and Kuwait 
were such that they merit the supply of food. The issue seemed to be 
bogged down in a welter of UN bureaucracy, politics and questions about 
sovereignty of Kuwait. 
At the heart of the debate was the unseemly haste demonstrated 
by an impulsive Security Council which in drafting Resolution 661 did 
not visualize the consequences of using food as a weapon. Essentially 
the Big Five were now trying to find a face-saving way to wriggle out 
of it in the face of an impressive Third World solidarity, excluding Gulf 
states, which would have seldom been emotionally a part of this 
grouping.-' 
The continuing Gulf crisis was characterized during September 
1990 by - (i) the progressive strengthening of the military position of 
the multinational anti-Iraq coalition, as forces arrived to take up positions 
in the region and further commitments were made, (ii) the tightening 
of the economic embargo, extended to include interdiction of air traffic 
from September 25, 1990 and (iii) the growing perception on the 
diplomatic front that a negotiated solution might only be achievable in 
the context of a wider consideration of conflict in the region.*^ 
The US Secretary of State James Baker and Treasuiy Secretary 
Nicholas Brady were highly successful in efforts in the first half of 
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September 1990 to reinforce the altl?iti^ lU|fc^ ziSi^ fion by securing large-
scale financial commitments, notably from Japan and West Germany, 
while Saudi Arabia and other smaller Gulf Sheikdoms contributed 
massively towards the cost of the US mobilization of forces. Meanwhile 
the adverse economic repercussions, especially for Jordan, Egypt and 
Turkey were offset in part by promises of financial assistance, but the 
position for Jordan in particular was much aggravated by the refugee 
crisis caused by the displacement of hundreds of thousands of foreign 
workers from Kuwait and Iraq." 
Economic consequences were particularly severe for countries 
which were forced to bear the costs of accommodating large numbers 
of refugees, such as Jordan and Turkey or suffer the loss of workers' 
remittances, such as Egypt, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and the 
Philippines. The drying up of remittance flows was compounded by the 
rising cost of oil imports, and the loss of earning stemming from the 
trade embargo on Iraq and Kuwait. Jordan, Egypt and Turkey had earned 
substantial revenues from workers' remittances and trade with, Iraq and 
Kuwait. Some middle income countries such as India relied heavily on 
oil imports from Iraq and also benefited from sizeable remittance flows, 
and for some low income countries, including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh and the Philippines, the loss of remittances and the rising 
cost of oil imports were expected to slow growth rates to an average 
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of around 1.5 percent by 1991 and add some $ 3,000 million to annual 
Third World debt interest paymentSv" 
A report in Le Monde of September 20, 1990, disclosed that India 
faced the loss of workers' remittances from Iraq and Kuwait totalling 
$ 400 million, and would lose exports to Iraq and Kuwait worth around 
$ 185 million, while an oil price increase of $ 300 per barrel would 
add $ 1,700 million to its oil import bill." 
The US President George Bush expressed 'deep and growing 
concern' for Iraqi treatment of Kuwait and said that President Saddam 
Hussein's support for terrorism 'would indeed have serious 
consequences'. He said he would hold the Iraqi leader responsible for 
connections he might have with any terrorist acts against US interest. 
At the same time President Bush said he still hope to see a peaceful 
resolution of the Gulf crisis and he said he was determined to wait for 
the international economic sanctions to force an Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait.'* 
On September 23. 1990, Saddam Hussein said he would strike 
Israel and oil-fields in West Asia if Iraq felt its people were being stifled. 
The ruling Revolutionar\' Command Council and Baath party also said 
in a statement that the annexation of Kuwait was "irreversible and 
eternal" He repeated his demand that any discussion of a settlement in 
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the Gulf region must be linked with negotiations on the Palestinian 
issue.''' 
The Bangladesh President Hussein Mohammad Ershad, said that 
six Muslim countries of Asia were jointly working to resolve the Gulf 
crisis by trying to bring the concerned parties to a negotiating table. 
But this would be done only when Iraq withdrew completely from 
Kuwait and legitimacy returned in the oil-rich Gulf state, Ershad said 
after a meeting with the UAE President, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan-al-
Nahyan, in Abu Dhabi. He said that Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Maldives and Brunei were drafting a plan to find a peaceful 
solution to the problem.*" 
The Emir of UAE made an emotional appeal on September 27, 
1990, to United Nations to help free his country from Iraqi invaders 
and make it once again an 'oasis of peace and safety'. He said, 'we 
receive daily reports of massacres and continuing systematic armed 
looting and destruction of state assets and individual property' He made 
no specific call for action. But in a sign of Kuwaits gratitude for world 
support, he said the country would write off interest on loans to 
developing nations. The Kuwaiti leader, who fled to Saudi Arabia when 
Iraqi troops invaded on August 2, 1990 said 'rape, destruction, terror 
and torture are now the rule of the day in the once peaceful and tranquil 
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land of Kuwait'. He said an intense campaign of terror, torture and 
humiliation was continuing unabated.*' 
The Security Council which can decide punitive measures has 
already rallied to Kuwait's side by ordering sweeping economic 
sanctions, including a sea and air blockade.*^ 
There were few dramatic new developments during October, 1990 
in the Gulf crisis as such, the continuing build-up of the United States 
dominated military response taking place against a background of 
diplomatic activity, of which the most notable feature was an apparently 
unsuccessful Soviet attempt to find some basis for a peace initiative. 
Attention was shifted for much of the month to consideration of the 
repercussions of the heightened Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the 
killing of 17 Arabs in Jerusalem on October 8, 1990. The UN Security 
Council convened on October 8, 1990 to discuss the shooting and the 
next day the USA proposed a draft resolution condemning the Israeli 
action and welcoming a decision taken by Perez de Cuellar to send an 
investigative mission to Jerusalem. The US resolution was not supported 
by the PLO which had pressed for the dispatch of a mission reporting 
directly to the Security Council (i.e. not to the UN Secretary General).* '^ 
Eventually, on October 12, 1990, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted resolution 672, which essentially followed the US 
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draft, condemned the shootings and welcomed Perez de Cuellar's 
decision to send a mission to the area to 'recommend ways and means 
of ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian Civilians under 
Israeli occupation'." 
The Iraqi National Assembly on November 20, 1990, passed a bill 
introducing the death penalty for people convicted of hoarding cereals. 
With reports from western sources suggesting that UN sanctions against 
Iraq were working, the Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens claimed 
on November 18, 1990, that the effects were 'visible in the factories', 
where there was a 'growing lack of spare parts', although the shops 
in Baghdad are full of things brought from Kuwait". Reports from Iraqi 
army deserters crossing into Turkey indicated that sanction had not yet 
affected military weapons and equipments, but that food supplies were 
often inadequate.**' 
On Novermber, 25 1990 and November, 27 a Beirut-based 
dissident Shia Moslem group, the Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution of Iraq claimed that 4,500 opposition Moslem 
fundamentalists, mostly students, had been arrested for distributing 
leaflets and painting slogans criticizing the regime of Saddam Hussien. 
The reports added that the arrests had followed 'bloody clashes with 
knives and daggers on November 7 and 15, 1990 in Baghad'.^ * 
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The UN Security Council on November 29, 1990 approved 
resolution 678 authorizing member governments to use "all necessary 
means" to ensure Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait, if by a 
deadline of January 15, 1991, the Iraqis had not already done so and 
there by complied with the UN's previous resolutions. It was the first 
resolution since that of June 27, 1950, on Korea to authorize the use 
of force. " 
On December 19, 1990 the UN General Assembly passed by 144 
votes to one (Iraq) a resolution condemning Iraq for serious violations 
of human rights in Kuwait including torture, detention, summary 
execution and disappearances. The human rights organization Amnesty 
International claimed in a report published the same day that thousands 
of Kuwaitis had been tortured, raped and killed since the Iraqi invasion 
on August 2, 1990 and the ensuing occupation. Some 6,000-7,000 
Kuwaiti troops had been transferred to Iraq, it said, and thousands of 
people were held in Iraqi and Kuwaiti prisons, including children as 
young as 13.*"* 
Amnesty claimed to have "compelling evidence" confirming that 
Iraqi soldiers had looted incubators from three of the main hospitals in 
Kuwait city, thereby causing the deaths of premature babies, the number 
of such deaths being given by the Kuwaiti Red Crescent society as 300. 
The Times of December 11, 1990 however, had quoted an Icelandic doctor 
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who had headed the intensive care unit at the Mubarak al-Kabir hospital, 
who described as "not true" the reports that Iraqi looting had contributed 
to the deaths of premature babies, but said that some babies had died 
"because of lack of staff".''^  
Kuwaiti sources cited in the International Herald Tribune of 
December 17, 1990, suggested that at least 7,000 Kuwaitis had been 
killed and 25,000 arrested since the invasion.''" 
The Gulf War: 
At midnight, on January 13, 1991, the deadline for Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait under the famous UN Resolution 678 expired. 
The biggest and most powerful air attack in history was launched on 
17 January 1991, with wave upon wave of strikes on Iraq by the US-
led coalition. After about 18 hours of operations, allied military 
commanders claimed control of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti skies, crediting 
the encouraging achievement to the possible destruction of the Iraqi 
command and communication capability.'' 
Statesman reported, "'Baghadad is burning as war is Raging" 
18,000 tonnes explosives dropped in Baghdad chemical, missile and 
nuclear-sites destroyed, Iraq claimed shooting down of 76 warplanes. 
Business and Political Observers reported with the Headline 'Iraq is a 
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Thousand Hiroshimas'. Ironically, when the news of the attack came 
Non-Aligned Members of the UN Security Council were discussing the 
possibility of a raw peace initiative. Thick black headlines and round 
the clock broadcasts were telling the world of the US attack. 
President George Bush said the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear 
potential and chemical weapons facilities was one of the prime 
objectives of the attack which came 19 hours after the expiry of the 
United Nations deadline for Iraq to pull out its forces from Kuwait. Iraqi 
ambassador to Britain Dr.Azim al -Salihi, had said that his country 
would fight its enemies "until the last children".'^ 
To drag Israel into the crisis on January 18,1991, Iraq launched 
eight Scud missiles over Israel's Tel Aviv, Haifa and other cities.The 
probability of Israeli intervention, widening the conflict and having an 
adverse effect on the Arab members of the coalition was initially high. 
Israel wanted to launch a 100 plane counter strike against Iraq on 
January 19, 1991, followed by helicopter and commando raids through 
Saudi Arabian airspace. However, tremendous international political 
pressure was brought to bear on the Israel government to dissuade 
it from this action. In response the coalition sought to destroy Iraq's 
Scud capability and provided improved defences for Israel and Saudi 
Arabia. ^ "^  
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The US-led multinational forces launched an attack on Iraqi 
ground forces entrenched in Kuwait on January 20, 1991. In what was 
widely seen as a prelude to a full-scale land war, while widespread 
bombing on Iraq's military targets continued for the fourth day. 
However, the US and Britain agreed to hold back ground attacks 
on Iraq "for some time", and continued with air bombardments. The 
agreement came after the British Prime Minister John Major, and the 
US President, George Bush, reviewed the results of the first three day 
of fighting in the Gulf in a 20-minutes telephone conversation. 
Meanwhile, the supreme commander of the allied forces in the Gulf, 
General Norman Schwarzkopt, said that Iraq's nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons capability had been almost totally destroyed. In 
Baghdad, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq 
(SAIRI) strongly condemned the western air attacks on the holy sites 
of Karbala and Najaf and cautioned Turkey against involvement in war. 
Libyan leader Col. Gaddafi urged Arab countries to press Security 
Council to pass resolution to end Gulf war. 
On January 23, 1991 Israel agreed not to retaliate against Iraq's 
third Scud strike, while US-led multinational force Jets pounded the Iraqi 
port city of Basra. Iraq announced it would continue to attack Israel 
to liberate the Palestine and raided both Israel and Saudi Arabia.'^ 
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Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani on February 4, 1991 offered 
to hold talks with Baghdad and Washington for a solution to the Gulf 
War even as US led coalition warships began the naval shelling of key 
Iraqi positions in Kuwait. Iranian president had also talks with Pak 
President. Gulf War entered its 19th day and both Iraq and US led forces 
preferred for a ground offensive. Yet the first time since the 1979 Islamic 
revolution US and Iran talks started. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 
Belonoyo also felt for Teheran for talks with Iran's officials." 
Ground operations began about midday on February 23, 1991, 
when leading reconnaissance elements advanced into Iraq.The French 
Division attacked the following morning supported by a brigade of the 
US 82nd Airborne Division and an American artillery brigade. The attack 
was initially unopposed, but encountered an Iraqi brigade occupying 
fortifications on their initial objective.'** 
Meanwhile experts from the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) visited Baghadad at the invitation 
of the Iraqi government. They reported that all parts of the country were 
threatened with epidemic as a result of severe shortages of medicines 
and drinking water and lack of sanitation. The team found that the supply 
of fresh water for all purposes in Baghdad had fallen to between 5 and 
20 liters per person per day compared with 500 liters before the war, 
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and that diarrhoeal diseases among children had quadrupled. Conditions 
were much worse in rural areas and especially in the town of Basra. 
The report also confirmed that the lack of electricity had drastically 
impaired the quality of medical services. A report in the Guardian of 
February 19, 1991, had claimed that in Baghdad alone the lack of 
electricity was causing the death of 50 babies a day.''' 
Keeping in view deteriorating situation in Iraq, offers of assistance, 
especially of food and medical supplies, came from a number of countries 
and international institutions. On February 16, 1991, UNICEF confirmed 
that 50 tonnes of medical aid for the treatment of mothers and children 
had arrived in Baghdad. On February 19,1990 the UN Security Council 
authorized the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to make 
emergency deliveries of water purification equipment to reduce the risk 
of epidemics. The first convoy of medical supplies from Iran arrived 
on January 31, 1991, followed by a second on February 9, 1991, On 
February 10, 1991, Iran sent a further 16 tonnes of medical supplies 
under the supervision of the ICRC. On February 21, 1991, India also 
announced that it was sending medicine worth Rs. 10,000,000 while 
Algeria donated some 8 tonnes of food and medicines. On February 25, 
1991, medical teams left Jordan and Tunisia carrying consignments of 
medicines, medical supplies and baby food.'* 
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Kuwait was finally liberated on February 26, 1991, after 208 days 
of Iraqi occupation, had reportedly suffered severe shortages of essential 
supplies including food and medicines, and epidemics of cholera and 
dysentery.™ On 28 February, 1991, Iraq conveyed to the Security Council 
that it accepted and will comply fully with its resolutions. Iraq also 
announced the acceptance of 11 other Security Council Resolutions. 
The UN Security Council on March 2, 1991 passed resolution 686 
on a cease-fire in the Gulf War. A defacto cessation of hostilities had 
been observed by the US-led coalition force and Iraq from February 28, 
1991. The terms laid out in resolution 686 were accepted by Iraq on 
March 3,1991, as announced on Baghdad radio and conveyed in a letter 
to the UN from Tariq Aziz, then Iraqi foreign minister.*" 
After the liberation of Kuwait eight .Arab members of the anti Iraq 
coalition, meeting in Damascus on March 5-6, 1991, agreed to establish 
in Arab Peace Force as part of an ambitious regional security plan. 
The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Syria and 
the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). The only 
Arab member of the anti-Iraq coalition not in attendance was Morocco. 
The participants signed the 'Damascus declaration' on March 6, 1991, 
which called, among other things, for the formation of an Arab 
peacekeeping force to maintain Security in the Gulf. The declaration 
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indicated that the force would consist mainly of Syrian and Egyptian 
forces and would 'guarantee the security and peace of Arab countries 
in the Gulf region'.*' 
And in Kuwait later in March the Government announced that 
elections would take place within 6 to 12 months, following the return 
of Kuwaiti exiles and the compilation of a new electoral roll. The 
Government also declared its intention to reduce the number of foreign 
workers in Kuwait. On 20 March, 1991 the Council of Ministers resigned, 
apparently in response to public discontent at the Government failure 
to restore supplies of electricity, water and food.*' 
On April 3, 1991, the UN Security Council adopted its 
comprehensive resolution 687 on the terms of a full cease-fires in the 
Gulf. The passing of the resolution based on a United States draft, 
followed a week of intensive lobbying by the Bush administration. A 
separate resolution 689 on April 9 created a demilitarized zone between 
Iraq and Kuwait, monitored by an observer mission for which all five 
permanent security council members were prepared to provide military 
personnel. Resolution 687 was accepted on April 5, 1991, by Iraq's ruling 
revolutionary command council and on April 6, 1991, by the Iraqi 
National Assembly, after "extensive discussion", with 160 votes in 
favour and 31 against. Iraq's permanent representatives at the UN, Abdul 
Amir al-Anbari, conveyed on April 6, 1991, his governments formal 
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acceptance. On April 11, 1991, the UN Security Council, having 
meanwhile approved resolution 689 on a demilitarized zone between Iraq 
and Kuwait, notified the government that a cease-fires in the Gulf was 
formally in effect.*' 
In mid April 1991 the Amir of Kuwait announced that elections 
to restore the National Assembly, which had been dissolved in 1986, 
would be held in 1992 after the gradual return of the 400,000 Kuwaiti 
citizens who remained abroad. Illegal opposition groups, such as the 
Popular Islamic Congress, the Islamic Constitutional Movement, the 
National Islamic Coalition and Salafeen, responded to the Amir's 
announcement by demanding the cessation of the nepotism towards 
members of the Al-Sabah family; the legalization of political parties: 
the separation of the government and the Al-Sabah family; the restoration 
of the freedom of the press; and an independent judiciary.*^ 
On April 20, 1991 the formation of a new Council of Ministers 
by the crown Prince was announced. Although several technocrats were 
appointed to important positions with the council, the major portfolios-
foreign affairs, defence and the interior-were all retained by members 
of the Al-Sabah family. Members of opposition groups immediately 
denounced the new Council of Ministers as 'unrepresentative.*^ 
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Eight months of the Gulf crisis, in a way, acted as a catalyst for 
the emergence of a new regional and world order. Even before the Gulf 
crisis had erupted, the international environment was slowly changing. 
From being an essentially ideology based bipolar system with the USA 
and USSR acting as the leaders of the two blocks, we were now seem 
to be on the verge of a new detente. Unlike in the past, the basic of 
the new detente is not peaceful coexistence of opposing ideologies but 
the willingness of the socialist bloc to pursue a capitalist path of 
development and to seek the help of the erstwhile enemy in that 
process.*'^ 
The Gulf crisis also had ramifications outside the Gulf Though 
the coalition's strategy vis-a-vis the Gulf crisis was not formulated as 
a conscious part of its global strategy, the main thrust of its response 
did project the USA as the new leader of the North. That message was 
not only directed at the USSR, whose so-called peace initiatives were 
summarily dismissed by the US, but also at the dissent movements in 
Europe. While governments followed the US, the French Defence 
Minister and an Italian Admiral had to resign on the question of the 
extent of their country's support to the coalition's policy under US 
leadership. The Gulf crisis offered to the American administration an 
opportunit\ for projecting a high moral tone in justifying the use of the 
force in the Gulf President Bush, in a press conference on 5 February 
1991. said that the Gulf war would be America's last war. He said that 
86. K.R.Singh,"Power Without Greatness",&/;?//;«/; May 1991,New Delhi,p. 32. 
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there would be no need to fight another war because of the new world 
order.*' 
Earlier, in his State of the Union Message on January 29, 1991, 
President Bush had said that the US would bear a major share of 
leadership in the world's effort to bring about a new world order 'where 
brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective 
resistance.' He went on to add that among the nations of the world, 
only the USA had the moral standing and the means to back it. 'We're 
the only nation on this earth that could assemble the force of peace. 
This is the burden of leadership and the strength that has made America 
the beacon of freedom in a searching world'. The US economy could 
not have faced the heavy burden of the war on its own. It was promised 
a heavy subsidy amounting to $ 54.545 billion, the bulk of which came 
from Saudi Arabia ($ 54.545 billion, the bulk of which came from Saudi 
Arabia ($54,545 billion, Kuwait ($16.0 bn), Japan ($ 10.74 nb), 
Germany ($ 6.57 bn) and UAE ($ 3.0 bn). Of that amount, $ 25.642 
bn had already been contributed by the middle of March. Thus the Gulf 
war might even prove to be a massive RDF/CENTCOM exercise, with 
live ammunition and targets, founded by the friends of the USA in and 
outside the region, for the control of Gulf oil.** Thus, whatever the global 
response, the Gulf will, for some time to come, remain under the overall 
umbrella of the USA.^ " 
87. I hid., p. 34. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid., p. 35. 
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CHAPTER - III 
United Nations' Role in Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 
Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait with the apparent aim of acquiring that nation's large oil reserves. 
It is now clear that the 39-day relentless, round the clock aerial campaign 
of the US-led multinational force failed to subjugate Iraq. The focus 
thus shifted to their stated aim of evicting Iraq from Kuwait by a ground 
offensive. Hundred hours of a successful multipronged offensive resulted 
in a complete rout of the Iraqi army and its retreat from Kuwait. On 
August 3, 1990 the United Nations Security Council called for Iraq 
to withdraw from Kuwait, and on August 6, 1990 the council imposed 
a world wide ban on trade with Iraq. Iraq's invasion and the potential 
threat it now posed to Saudi Arabia prompted the United States and 
its Western European NATO allies to rush troops to Saudi Arabia to 
deter a possible attack, Egypt and several other Arab nations joined the 
anti-Iraq coalition and contributed forces to the military build up.' 
On November 29, 1990 the UN Security Council authorized the 
use of force against Iraq unless it withdrew from Kuwait by January 
15, 1991. By January 1991 the allied coalition against Saddam Hussein 
1. Robert, P. Gwinn (ed.). The New Encyclopaedia Britanica, Vol. 9, No. 1768, 
15th edition, Chicago, p. 309. 
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had reached a strength of 700,000 troops, including 540,000 US personnel 
and smaller numbers of British, French, Egyptians, Saudis, Syrians and 
several other national contingents. Saddam Hussein steadfastly refused 
to withdraw his force from Kuwait, however, which he mentioned would 
remain a province of Iraq (the latter had formally annexed Kuwait on 
August 8, 1990).2 
The Persian Gulf war began on January 16-17, 1991, with a massive 
US-led air offensive against Iraq that continued throughout the war. Over 
the next few weeks, this sustained aerial bombardment destroyed much 
of Iraq's command and communications infrastructure, power-generating 
capacity, air-fields and air defense network, and chemical weapons and 
nuclear-research facilities. By mid-February the allies had shifted their 
air attacks to Iraq's forward ground forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq, 
destroying fortifications, bunkers, weapons stockpiles and tanks and other 
armoured vehicles. A massive allied ground offensive was launched 
northward from north eastern Saudi Arabia into Kuwait and southern 
Iraq on February 24, 1991. and within three days the allies had retaken 
Kuwait city in the face of crumbling Iraqi resistance. Meanwhile, the 
main allied armoured thrust was taking place west of Kuwait, and by 
February 27, 1990, these forces had destroyed most of Iraq's elite 
Republican Guard units after the latter had tried to make a stand south 
of Basra in south-eastern Iraq. By that time the U.S. President George 
Bush had declared a cease-fire on February 28, 1991, Iraqi resistance 
I Ibid., p. 309. 
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had completely collapsed. In the aftermath of its defeat, Iraq was swept 
by popular uprisings against the government of Saddam Hussein, who 
managed to suppress them with some difficulty. Kuwait's independence 
was restored, but the UN-sanctioned trade embargo on Iraq remained 
in force even after the end of the war.^ 
The end of the Cold War has revitalized the United Nations' Security 
Council and has allowed it to begin to act in the way the authors of 
the UN Charter intended. In 1990 the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, an unusually 
clear and unambiguous case of aggression, provided the Security Council 
with a major challenge which was also the first full-scale test of collective 
action against aggression by the United Nations through a United Security 
Council. On this occasion the Security Council demonstrated the 
decisiveness and sense of urgency which had been notably absent on 
many previous occasions. Both the post-Cold War political climate and 
the stark clarity of the aggression itself contributed to this reaction, 
which was in dramatic contrast to the Security Council's pusillanimous 
response to Iraq's 1980 aggression against Iran. Between August 2 and 
November 29. 1990. the UN Security Council adopted 12 resolutions 
on the Iraq-Kuwait conflict."* 
The UN Response: 
The UN response to the crisis through a multilateral action under 
3. Ibid., p. 309. 
4. SIPRI Yearbook 1991. World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: 
Oxford Univesity Press. 1991) p. 617. 
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its centralized direction created a historical watershed as far as its 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security is concerned. 
The UN charter provides different methods for settling international 
disputes namely, diplomatic, judicial and coercive.^ The charter explicitly 
mentions in Article 1 that the purposes of United Nations are, inter-
alia to maintain peace and security and to that end take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to that peace, and 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and 
to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international judgement or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to breach of the peace.* The 
security council also empowered to determine the existence of any threat 
to peace, breach of peace, or an act of aggression^ and take such action 
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.* The charter of UN also provides for 
all members of UN in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace 
and security, undertake to make available to the security council, on 
its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary 
for the purpose of maintaining international peace.^ 
5. Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour. United Nation's Role in the Gulf Crisis (New 
Delhi: Lancers Books, 1992) p. 31. 
6. UN Charter, Article 1. 
7. UN Charter, Article 39. 
8. UN Charter, Article 42. 
9. UN Charter, Article 43. 
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Thus UN charter provides for both peaceful settlement of a dispute 
when referred to the UN under chapter VI, as well as active intervention 
under chapter VII of United Nation's charter. 
The Iraqi invasion on August 2, 1990 and its occupation of Kuwait 
represented a most blatant challenge to the body of rules governing 
inter-state behaviour, as laid down in the United Nations. This is not 
to say that invasion of Kuwait by Iraq is the first and only country to 
have committed a gross violation of UN charter principles. Indeed, Korea 
(1950-53), Hungary (1956), Suez (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), 
Afghanistan (1979-89). Panama (1989) and many others bear glaring 
testimony of such violations of UN charter. 
Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States 
called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council under Chapter 
VI, Article 35(1) which provided that any member of the UN may bring 
any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in the Article 
34, to the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly. In 
the meeting it was decided that the invasion as an unwarranted invasion 
by a sisterly country (Iraq) against a peace living country (Kuwait). The 
representative to the UN stated that if the security council could not 
enforce Iraqi withdrawal, "no country will be safe and the security, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state will be jeopardized".'° 
Whereas, Iraq attempted to justify the invasion on the invitation of the 
10. Security Council Official Records (Provisional), Verbatim, 2932 mgt., August 
2, 1990, p. 6. 
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provisional Free Government of Kuwait that was staging a coup d'etat 
in Kuwait. Iraq, then declared Kuwait as 19th province of Iraq claiming 
that the branch has returned to its origin." However, the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraqi forces was considered as wrong, brutal and illegal move, 
as occupying and annexing a country by use of force is not an option 
open to any country in the community of nation. 
There was an unprecedented response to this event within as well 
as outside the United Nations. The day August 2, 1990, the event took 
place. Security Council passed the Resolution 660 under the terms of 
Article 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of UN Charter, in which it condemned 
the Iraq's invasion and demanded the complete, immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal.'-It also called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin 
immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution if they have any 
differences over it. In the council, Ymen, the only Arab country on 
the Security Council as a non-permanent member, did not take any position. 
It is very interesting to note that it was for the first time, the United 
States and Soviet Union were in political consonance at the United Nations 
Security Council resolution despite Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship 
concluded in 1972. 
This was not the first time that the provisions of chapter VII of 
the charter were cited as the basis of resolution. At least two occasions 
11. The Times of India, New Delhi, Februan,' 28, 1991. 
12. UN DOC S/Res/660 (1990), August 2, 1990. 
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in the past, in 1948 in order K ^ ^ p i v e the CQO^rct in Palestine, and 
in 1987 to call for an end the Iran-Iraq war, the Security Council has 
acted under these powers. In this connection, Article 25, Chapter V, 
provides that the resolutions are binding on member states and their 
violation will result in imposition of sanctions. Iraq promptly rejected 
the Resolution 660 and called it iniquitous and unjust, taken without 
allowing itself sufficient time to comprehend the situation and to acquaint 
itself with the facts from the parties concerned.'^ 
( On the contrary, Kuwait, which welcomed the resolution, accused 
Iraq of plundering and looting its resources and called upon Security 
Council to ensure the wishes of international community by imposition 
of sanctions against Iraq for its refusal to withdraw from Kuwait. 
Indeed, the United States, the European community, Japan, Canada 
and the Soviet Union had already announced measures like freezing assets, 
ban on oil supplies, stoppage of export of arms etc., to widen out the 
net and seek collective endorsement of those unilateral measures. As 
a result the Iraqi representative vainly warned the Security Council that 
any move for economic sanctions, instead of helping resolution of the 
crisis, would excerbate it and might create a hea\ y, negative impact on 
the economies of the developing countries.'^ 
13. Letter from the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq to the 
Secretary General. UN DOC. S/21503. August 13. 1990. 
14. SCOR (Security Council Official Records) (Prov.j. Verbatim, 29, 2983 mtg., 
August 6, 1990 
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Therefore, on August 6, 1990 the Security Council adopted 
resolution 661. Acting under Chapter VII Article 51 of the Charter imposed 
mandatory sanctions against Iraqi and Kuwaiti trade, affecting all purchase 
or transshipment of oil and other commodities and products, banning 
new investment, and banning sale or supply of any products, including 
arms, but excepting medical supplies and foodstuffs "in humanitarian 
circumstances". A committee on compliance, set up with representatives 
of all 15 Security Council member countries, heard on August 28, that 
well over half of all UN member countries were committed to the embargo. 
Switzerland, although not a UN member, joined the embargo by banning 
oil imports and arms sales and freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets - the 
first time it had associated itself with UN sanctions.'^ 
Even in advance of the Security Council's August 6 resolution, 
the Soviet Union on August 2, 1990, and China on August 5, 1990 joined 
European countries in suspending arms sales to Iraq. Brazil, a significant 
trading partner of Iraq, joined the embargo but emphasised that this did 
not cover food for humanitarian use. Iran would also enforce the embargo, 
according to an announcement by President Rafsanjani on August 24, 
1990, despite the unexpected announcement by Saddam Hussein on August 
15, 1990 that Iraq would in effect accept Iran's terms for a peace 
settlement between two countires."'On 17 August, 1990 the UN Secretary 
General .Tavier Perez Decuellar, described the American naval blockade 
15. Keesing 's Record of World Events, August 1990, p. 37639. 
16. Ibid., p. 37639. 
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of Iraq as "a breach of the UN Charter".'^ This resolution had been 
passed by 13-0-2 with the abstention of Cuba and Yemen from Security 
Council. 
-Despite, severely criticising the Security Council resolution, Iraq 
formally annexed Kuwait on August 8. 1990 and claimed that it was 
a part of Iraq in the past. The Resolution 662 was therefore unanimously 
adopted by Security Council on August 9. 1990. It declared Iraqi annexation 
of Kuwait "null and void'" and demanded that Iraq rescind its declaration 
of merger. Called on all states and institutions not to recognize the 
annexation and to refrain from actions which might be interpreted as 
indirect recognition. Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by 
Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Kuwait. Determining also to restore the authority of the 
legitimate Government of Kuwait.'" 
> Iraq held that all the foreign nationals residing in Iraq and Kuwait 
into custody and confined them in strategic places thinking to be used 
as human shields. Again this action of Iraq unanimously led the Security 
Council to pass Resolution 664 on August 18, 1990. The resolution 
warned Iraq and demanded that Iraq must permit and facilitate the immediate 
departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and 
grant immediate and continuing access to consular officials of such 
17. Brech of UN Charter. The Times of India. New Delhi, August 20, 1990. 
18. Akhtar Majeed, The Gulf War 1991: Fads and Documents (Aligarh: Centre 
for Strategic Studies, AMU, 1991) p. 15. 
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nationals and also demanded that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the 
safety, security or health of such nationals. 
Re-affirming its decision in Resolution 662 (1990) that annexation 
of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore, demanded that the 
Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic 
and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity 
of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future.'^ 
Iraq accepted the resolution on some conditions but US and its allies 
had not agreed to those conditions which were placed by Saddam Hussein, 
and then nothing came out of this resolution and situation was still 
dangerous for both of them. 
Soon after Resolution 665 was passed by Security Council, on 
August 25, 1990, in 13-0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining and authorised 
that the measures as may be necessary including use of force to enforce 
the trade embargo against Iraq by member nations.^° The resolution also 
invited states to cooperate with minimum use of political and diplomatic 
measures to ensure compliance with the sanctions set by the council 
and requested the States concerned to co-ordinate the actions required, 
using "as appropriate" mechanisms of the Council's Military Staff 
Committee.^' 
19. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, October 1-7, 1990, p. 21373. 
20. UN Security Council Resolution 665. August 25, 1990. 
21. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, October 15-21, 1990, p. 21391. 
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China did not agree to the use of force in the name of United 
Nations. US was favouring these sanctions which were imposed against 
Iraq. Iraq pointed out that any use of force against a country could only 
be under Article 42 and other subsequent Articles, under the authority 
of the Security Council in cooperation with the Military Staff Committee. 
For the first time in 50 years, Japan joined the Soviet Union in calling 
on Iraq to release all the foreign hostages and vacate Kuwait if Iraq 
did not agree to permit food shipment to go directly, providing food 
and medicines to foreign nationals trapped in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. 
This situation led the Security Council to adopt another Resolution 666, 
on September 13, 1990. The resolution drawn upon the parameters for 
the delivery of food stuffs to Iraq and occupied Kuwait for Asian workers 
resident in these two countries.^^ On September 19, 1990, Prince Sadruddin 
Aga Khan, appointed by Perez de Cuellar to take charge of humanitarian 
aid, abandoned an attempt to assess the humanitarian needs of foreign 
refugees in Iraq and Kuwait, having been denied entry to Iraq.^^ The 
resolution was passed with vote of 13-2-0, while Cuba and Yemen voted 
against it. The members of the United Nations agreed that it was unfortunate 
that civilian population was suffering and blamed Iraq for causing suffering 
to civilian by its refusal to withdraw from Kuwait.^ "* 
22. UN Security Council Resolution 666, September 13, 1990. 
23. Keesing's Record of World Events, (London), September 1990, p. 37695. 
24. SCOR (Prov.). Verbatim, 2939th mtg., September 14, 1990. 
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When the Iraqi troops entered into the residence of Ambassador 
of France, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
667 on September 17, 1990 and condemned Iraq for the violation of 
the diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait and resolve to discuss 
measures to tighten the embargo on Iraq.-^ The resolution made a strong 
demand for immediate release of all foreign nationals. Iraqi National 
Assembly condemned Resolution and the Security Council has not, in 
the first place, tried to make sure the facts.^^ On September 20, 1990, 
Saddam Hussein warned that it would launch an all-out war against coalition 
forces, if it is convinced that the UN trade embargo was about to struggle 
the Iraqi people. Then, the Security Council passed another Resolution 
669 on September 24, 1990 in a meeting, defining the role of the sanction 
committee. The Resolution 669 calls that the sanctions committee is 
empowered to permit food, medicines or other humanitarian aid to be 
sent into Iraq or Kuwait.-' 
Despite above all these endeavours, Saddam Hussein continuously 
emphasised that Kuwait was a part of Iraq and said that "we will not 
give it up even if we have to fight for thousand years". Thereafter, Security 
Council adopted Resolution 670, by vote of 14-1, which confirmed that 
sanctions would apply to all means of transport, including all air cargo 
25. UN Security Council Resolution 667. Septemebr 17, 1990 and also see 
Keesing's Record of World Events, n. 23, p. 37695. 
26. Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghavour. n. 5, p. 37. 
27. UN Security Council Resolution 669. September 24. 1990. 
83 
traffic, except UN authorised humanitarian aid against Iraq and occupied 
Kuwait. The UN member states were directed to detain Iraqi shipping 
that may attempt to break the embargo, for the effective implementation 
of the resolution.^* The resolution condemned the treatment by Iraqi 
forces of Kuwait nationals, including measures to force them to leave 
their own country and mistreatment of persons and property in Kuwait 
in violation of international law^' and also condemned Iraq's "grave breaches" 
of the fourth Geneva Convention on the rules of war, a reference to 
its holding of foreign nationals as a "human shield" at key installations.^° 
All the member states voted in favour of the resolution while Cuba 
voted against it. 
The Resolution 674 which was passed on October 29, 1990 by 
Security Council held Iraq liable for the war damages, relating to invasion 
of Kuwait, including human rights violations. It also demanded that all 
western embassies be restocked with food, waters and protection of 
Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, it further demanded 
an immediate release of all hostages.^' The voting in the Security Council 
was 13-0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining. 
The Security Council also urged that Iraq must implement all the 
other resolutions immediately after the cease-fire, agree to an exchange 
28. UN Security Council Resolution 670, September 25, 1990. 
29. SIPRI Year Book, J991. p. 63\. 
30. Keesing Record of World Events, September 1990, p. 37695. 
31. Un Security Council Resolution 674, October 29, 1990. 
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of POWs of all nationalities, including Kuwaitis taken prisoner since 
August 2, 1990, arrange to locate the missing (Kuwait said it had a 
list of more than 8,000 Kuwaiti POWs and more than 20,000 missing), 
and pay full reparations to Kuwaitis and third-state nationals as specified 
by resolution 674 (1990). Iraq must abrogate all legislation concerning 
Kuwait's annexation as the nineteenth province of Iraq. Kuwait called 
on the Council to demand that Iraq immediately cease its escalation 
of inhuman practices, including torture and murder, against the defenceless 
people of Kuwait, cease committing crimes against Kuwait's economy 
and environment by setting fire to its oil wells and installations, and 
cease destroying what was left of its social and economic infrastructure." 
Iraq attributed the three-week delay in conveying the council after 
the meeting had first been requested to United States objections and 
claimed that resuming the meeting in private was aimed at denying some 
member States the opportunity to unmask the crimes being perpetuated 
in the name of the Council against the people of Iraq. It said that since 
the crisis began, the Council had become an American instrument 
representing American interests and that the United States would continue 
its aggression even if the Council were to adopt a resolution on a cease-
fire or on halting the rain of bombs on Iraq's defenceless civilians. 
It stated that in the first three weeks of the aggression against it, 45,000 
sorties dropped 85,000 tons of explosives, destroying hospitals, schools, 
32. UN Year Book -1991 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1991) p. 
169. 
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mosques and Iraq's cultural monuments and archaeological sites, nuclear 
and other industrial facilities for peaceful purposes, releasing radiation 
and other pollutants into the environment, killing many innocent civilians 
and perhaps causing deformities in future generations." 
While ignoring all the resolutions by Iraq, the Security Council 
passed the Resolution 677, on November 28, 1990 which directed 
Secretary General to take possession of Kuwaiti census and citizenship 
record for safe keeping.^"* 
Resolution 678 and Use of Force Against Iraq: 
Thus, all these resolutions passed by UN Security Council and 
sanctions imposed on Iraq by UN could not achieve any effective and 
desired end. Then, the most important and controversial Resolution 678 
was passed by UN Security Council under the Chapter VII authorizing 
the use of force to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait as an ultimate action. 
This resolution was passed with the voting 12-2-1 in which China, a 
permanent member, abstained and Cuba and Yemen were voted against 
it. The resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of UN paragraph 
1 demanded for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait as stated earlier in Security 
Council resolutions. Paragraph 2 of the resolution, authorized member 
states to cooperate with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or 
before January 15, 1991, fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 
33. Ibid., p. 169. 
34. UN Security Council Resolution 677, November 29, 1990. 
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1 above the foregoing resolution "to use all necessary means" to uphold 
and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent 
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in 
the area. Paragraph 3, requested all states to provide appropriate support 
for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of 678 (1990) 
resolution.^^ 
The words "use of force" did not obviously contain in the paragraph. 
The "use (oO all necessary means'* in Resolution 678 (1990) was 
interpreted by US and its allies as an authorization to use armed force 
against Iraq in order to compel it to withdraw from Kuwait and liberate 
all foreign detainees. This interpretation is, however against the established 
terms of interpretation. The Security Council could have use the term 
armed forces, if it intended so. Nevertheless, there can be any doubt 
that the words "all necessary means" denoted the use of force. The absence 
of these words in context of the charter of the UN and earlier resolutions 
of the Security Council means that it has in fact sanctioned use of all 
measures other than armed force.^^ The wordings of the Resolution 678 
were not so distinct that it was very difficult to determine whether the 
action against Iraq to be taken was to be under Chapter VII of the UN 
or not. The military action was to be directed by Security Council under 
35. UN Security Council Resolution 678. November 29, 1990. Also see UN 
DOCS/Res/678 (1990), November 29. 1990. 
36. UN DOC, S/22228, February 15, 1990. Also see Erskine B.Childres, "The 
Use and Abuse of UN in the Gulf Crisis", Middle Ea.st Report, Vol. XX , No. 
2, March-April 1991, pp. 507. 
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Article 46 and 47 by creating a military staff. In this connection the 
resolution just appeared as an excuse to give authority and legitimacy 
to any military action taken by members against Iraq on the pretext 
of assisting and giving help to Kuwait.^^ So, the nature of the resolution 
was vague and unclear under the Chapter VII of UN charter. 
Iraq immediately reacted to both the Resolution 678 (1990) and 
deadline of January 15, 1991 and said that "it is illegal and invalid". 
The Iraqi newspaper Al-Thawarh said the resolution was a blatant violation 
of all humanity, peace and legality and accused the Security Council 
members of having succumbed to pressures, threats and monetary aid 
to the tone of millions of dollars to comply with it.^ ^ 
The Security Council adopted the resolution under chapter VII 
of the UN charter which lays down the complete procedure in Article 
42 to 49 for the use of armed forces to restore and maintain international 
peace and security. The charter of the UN permits the use of armed 
force by one member state against another. But the entire charter prohibits 
the use of force. It is only the Security Council which is authorised 
to use of armed force against a member of the UN. It is also mentioned 
in the Chapter VII that all forces of the UN must be operated under 
the UN flag. 
However, conditions were not mentioned in resolution 678 (1990) 
nor these were carried out in the Gulf crisis. The coalition forces did 
37. Gazil Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, no. 5. p. 38. 
38. Iraq Reject Ultimatum, The Times of India, New Delhi. November 30, 1990. 
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not fight under UN flag, thus it could not legitimately be called a UN 
war.^' In the Gulf war all UN sanctions were the blatant violation of 
human rights and humanitarian laws and it brought the world on the edge 
of an environmental disaster. It made a dangerous atmosphere for the 
survival of mankind and UN charter prohibits any threat to the survival 
of mankind. Hence, the legitimacy and legality of Resolution 678 has 
been questioned on certain grounds:^^ 
1. It was in contravention with the spirit of the UN charter which 
promises to eliminate the scourge of war. 
2. The Resolution 678 made no mention on how long the application 
of "all necessary means" can continue and the type of amount 
of armed forces was to be used. 
3. The resolution ignored the provisions mentioned in Chapter VII 
of the charter which specifically empower the Security Council 
(not any member state of the UN) to involve in use of force and 
to conduct the operations under the military staff committee and 
under the UN fiag. 
4. It was also in contravention of Article 27(3) which says that an 
important resolution of the Security Council must have the 
concurrence of the five permanent members. Though China had 
abstained from Security Council, it implied that it did not concur 
39. Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, n. 5, pp. 40-41. 
40. Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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and as such meant that the Resolution 678 was not perfect and 
its action was not legitimate. 
5. It is pointed out that Resolution 678 was an imperfect legal form 
vis-a-vis the charter. The chapter VII of the charter includes, besides 
the provision of collective measures by the UN (Article 41 to 
42) provision of self defence (Article 51). 
But the use of armed forces against Iraq was called enforcement 
action and not collective self defence. For instance, the application of 
force will not be confined to defend or liberate Kuwait, but it would 
also include all measures to restore international peace and security 
in the region. Thus, the analysis of Resolution 678 vis-a-vis the UN 
charter revealed a vagueness in the framework of the charter which exposed 
it to conflicting interpretations. 
The Iraqi refusal to comply with the Security Council resolution 
by January 15, 1991 led the coalition countries to promptly avail the 
authority of Security Council under Resolution 678 (1990) to attack 
on Iraq on January 16. 1991 to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Thereafter the 
biggest and most powerful air attack in history was launched on January 
17, 1991 on Iraq by US-led coalition forces. The Gulf war was coded 
as Operation Desert Storm."' 
But, Persian Gulf war was not the UN war against Iraq, as it was 
observed by the then Secretary General Perez De Cuellar. The Secretary 
41. Jasjit Singh, "Private War Beyond UN Control", The Hindustan Times, New 
Delhi, January 22, 1991. 
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General had said that the war in Gulf was not UN war and the world 
body had no control over it. We were informed through Security Council 
about military operation but after it had taken place/^The coalition force 
did not fight under UN flag and the directions of Security Council, 
in fact, the war fought against Iraq, was the actually US action. Moreover, 
it was obviously clear from the war that the Security Council had very 
little control over the war authorized by it. 
During the war President Bush said that the objective of war was 
very clear. He further said that we want that Saddam's troops will leave 
Kuwait and the legitimate government of Kuwait will be independent 
and free. He added that the US and its coalition forces had operated 
under the UN resolution.''^ 
Cuba on the other hand, reacting on Security Council resolution, 
demanded an immediate cease-fires in the Gulf war. The Cuban Ambassador 
thus commented that "the Council members are obliged to do something 
to put an end to the war". He further added that "the role of UN was 
to promote peace and international security and not to authorize war".'*'* 
But as the war progressed and continued it was clear that the UN had 
no control over it, nor over the military operation against Iraq. The 
US was very much determined to knock out Iraqi military capability. 
42. Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, n. 5, p. 31. 
43. Ibid., p. 66. 
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Thus, the US real and clear aim was the complete destruction of Iraq 
and to overthrow of Saddam's regime. 
While the Gulf war was started against Iraq, Kuwait informed 
Security Council that it was exercising its right to self defence and 
to restoration of its right and cooperating with the forces of fraternal 
and friendly states which were equally determined to end Iraqi illegal 
and illegitimate occupation over i t / ' 
As the war progressed and continued with ups and down up to 
March 2, 1991, the Security Council held several informal consultations 
among the member states. Therefore, throughout the period of war, the 
Security Council did not discuss formally the situation except in a few 
close door meetings.''^ 
The Cease-fires: 
The Gulf war continued till March 2, 1991 when the Resolution 
686 was passed by the Security Council. In the mid night of February 
28, 1991, coalition forces were ordered to stop offensive operation 
by United States. Thus, military operations were suspended against Iraq 
and temporary cease-fires was declared and war was ended with destruction 
of Iraq and victory of coalition forces. After all Kuwait was liberated 
and was given to its previous government. Iraq declared that it would 
45. UN Chronicle, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, June 1991. 
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comply fully with all Security Council resolutions and announced that 
its all troops evacuated Kuwait. 
On March 2, 1991, an emergent meeting was convened to consider 
the US drafted resolution at the forum of United Nations. Then the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 686, setting the terms for cease-
fires. It was passed by 11-1-3 votes. Cuba voted against the resolution 
while China, Yemen and India were chosen abstention.''^ The resolution 
did not talk about cease-fires, but laid down pre-conditions namely Iraq's 
requirements to annul Kuwait annexation to accept liability for financial 
losses etc."^ It neither declared formal cease-fires nor did it order coalition 
forces out of Kuwait or lift sanctions against Iraq. It also could not 
provide even time-table for the withdrawal of external forces from Iraq. 
The resolution authorized the US-led coalition forces to use all necessary 
means to ensure Iraqi compliance with the UN resolutions and terms 
of the formal cease-fire. This was inadequate because it did not mention 
that the Security Council should play an important role in monitoring 
and arranging peace and cease-fires in the region. Instead, it authorized 
the use of force again to bring about formal cease-fire.^l^n March 
3, 1991, Iraq agreed to fulfill its obligations under the terms of Resolution 
686, by sending letters to Security Council President and the Secretary 
47. The Times of India. New Delhi, March 4, 1991. 
48. GSR Murthy, "Gulf War and Beyond : The United Nations", K.R. Singh (ed.), 
Post-War Gulf: Implications for India (New Delhi : Lancer Books, 1993) p. 
22. 
49 Gazi Ibdewi Abdul Ghafour, n. 5, p. 73. 
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General. On March 22, sanction committee decided to lift the embargo 
on civilian and humanitarian imports, and on March 24, UN announced 
to lift the ban on supply of food and fuel to Iraq. 
The Security Council adopted another Resolution 687 (1991), on 
April 3, 1991 by which the Gulf war would formally come to an end. 
The resolution was drafted very carefully in a document containing 36 
paragraphs. It was sponsored by Belgium, France, Romania, UK, US and 
Zair. The vote was 12-1-2.Cuba voted against and Ecuador and Yemen 
were abstained in this resolution. The resolution has nine sections which 
set out specific conditions thereby international peace and security would 
be restored in the Persian Gulf region. These nine parts of the resolution 
are as follows:'" 
A. asked Iraq and Kuwait to respect the inviolability of the 1963 
international boundary and called upon the Secretary General to 
help demarcate that boundary. 
B. requested a UN observer unit to monitor a demilitarized zone 
established under the resolution. 
C. Resolution 687 (Paragraph 7-14) addresses Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction and disposal, and the establishment of a monitoring system 
to ensure that they not be reintroduced to Iraq, either internally 
or from abroad. 
50. Ihid.. pp. 74-75. 
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Resolution 687 required Iraq to declare the location, amount and 
type of all items specified under paragraphs 8 and 12 within 15 days 
of adoption of the resolution. The item thus to be eliminated were all 
of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW), Biological Weapons (BW), Stocks 
of agents, related subsystem and components and all research, development 
support and manufacturing facilities. Also included were all ballistic 
missiles with a range greater than 150 km and related major parts, as 
well as repair and production facilities. Disposal was to be carried out 
under international supervision through destruction, rendering harmless 
or removal of the prescribed items. As regards Iraq's nuclear capability, 
the cease-fire resolution provided that nuclear weapons usable materials, 
any sub-systems or components and any research, development, support 
and manufacturing facilities related to nuclear weapons and 'nuclear-
weapons- usable material' shall be subject to destruction, removal or 
rendering harmless.^' These provisions in Part C of the resolution were 
linked to the economic sanctions against Iraq which were outlined in 
paragraphs 21 and 22, and the Security Council will make its decision 
to lift its embargo 'against the import of commodities and products 
originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions 
related thereto contained in resolution 661' , dependent upon Iraq's 
completion of the actions defined in Part C of Resolution 687. The 
resolution provided for future monitoring and verification that Iraq does 
not use. develop, construct or acquire anew, any items specified for 
51. SIPRI Year Book 1992 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 509. 
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elimination." 
D. asked the Secretary General the return of all Kuwait's properties 
by Iraq. 
E. reaffirming Iraq's liability under international law for any direct 
loss, damage or injury for foreign government, nationals and 
corporations, as a result of its occupation of Kuwait. Mechanism 
to be adopted for this was specified. 
F. stated that all prohibitions against sale or supply of food and other 
necessities for civilians were to be lifted and that other bans would 
be lifted methodically. 
G. called upon Iraq to extend all necessary cooperation to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to facilitate the 
repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals. 
H. called upon Iraq to inform the Security Council that it would not 
commit / support any act of international terrorism. 
I. declared that a formal cease-fires between Iraq-Kuwait and coalition 
countries would come into effect, when Iraq accepted Resolution 
687. 
Iraq sharply reacted to the resolution as it was expected. The Iraqi 
ambassador to the UN said these conditions imposed upon Iraq was very 
dangerous and would jeopardize its sovereignty and independence and 
52. Ibid., p. 509. 
96 
also would paralyse its economy. Iraq, by identical letters of April 6, 
1991 to the Secretary-General and the Council President, stated that 
it had no choice but to accept the resolution. In what it said were preliminary 
comments on the judicial and legal aspects of the resolution, Iraq variously 
characterized its provisions as biased, iniquitous and vengeful, an injustice, 
a severe assault on the Iraqi people's right to life and a flagrant denial 
of its inalienable rights to sovereignty and independence and to free 
choice. Iraq asserted that boundary issues were the subject of agreement 
between states, the only basis capable of guaranteeing the stability of 
frontiers. It reiterated that the Agreed Minutes between the state of 
Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the restoration of friendly 
relations, recognition and related matters, referred to in paragraph 2, 
had not been subjected to the constitutional procedures required for 
tis ratification by the legislative branch and Iraq's President, thus leaving 
the boundary question unresolved. Obliging Iraq to destroy its weapons 
could not but seriously endanger the regional balance; depriving it of 
the right to acquire weapons for defence directly contributed to the 
threat to its internal and external security.^^ 
Whereas the resolution provided mechanisms for obtaining redress 
from Iraq, it made no reference to Iraq's right to claim redress for 
the considerable losses it had sustained and the massive destruction 
inflicted on civilian installations and infrastructures as a result of the 
53. UN Year Book , 1991, p. 176. 
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abusive implementation of resolution 678 (1990). The progressive lifting 
of sanctions over an unspecified period left broad discretionary authority 
to certain council members. The lack of an explicit mention of the 
withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq despite the resolution's declaration 
of a formal cease-fire was tantamount to authorizing occupation of Iraqi 
territory in violation of Iraq's sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity, injustifiable by any provision of resolution 678 (1990). The 
stipulation for the deployment of United Nations observer force was 
inequitable, as were the numerous mechanisms for the resolutions, in 
which Iraq's participation was not at clear.^'' 
The National Assembly of Iraq, at its session on April 6,1991 
adopted a decision by which it agreed to resolution 678 (1991). The 
Security Council President, by a letter of April 11, 1991, to the Permanent 
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, acknowledged Iraq's 
communication of April 6. 1991 containing official notification of 
its acceptance irrevocable and without qualifying conditions, of resolution 
687 (1991), in accordance with paragraph 33 of that resolution. The 
Council President pointed to the Permanent Representative's confirmation 
to him at their meeting on April 8, 1991, that the communication 
constituted Iraq's irrevocable and unqualified acceptance of the resolution: 
and to further confirmation, in the name of Iraqi government, that the 
Resolution Command Council had used its constitutional powers to make 
the National Assembly's acceptance of the resolution legally binding 
54. Ibid., p. \76. 
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in Iraq. Accordingly, the Council President noted that the conditions 
established in paragraph 33 of resolution 687 (1991) had been met and 
that the formal cease-fire was therefore effective. 
Kuwait, on April 6, 1991, informed the Secretary-General that 
it welcomed resolution 687 (1991). It would scrupulously comply with 
its provisions and cooperate to ensure its implementation.^' 
The UN cease-fire resolution on the subject of Iraq confirmed 
the international ascendancy of United States. The US seemed to have 
exploited the Council and UN Charter as a tool for its foreign policy 
goals and the UN was an instrument in American hands. It is very clear 
that UN had no control over the course of military operation in Gulf 
war. It was USA which actually had control over whole military operation 
during war. As President Bush said that "we are going to make such 
an example for Saddam Hussein that no one else will ever dare again". 
At the UN, the US was confident of its ability to influence all the states. 
With the break up of the Soviet Union as an effective deterrent power 
to the US the latter emerged as supreme international actor in new 
international order. During the Gulf crisis the Security Council functioned 
under the US's will. Not even a single veto was cast by any permanent 
member to avoid incurring US ill will. In other words the Security Council 
functioned as an effective instrument of US foreign policy during Gulf 
crisis.'^ 
55 Ibid., pp. 176-177. 
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The whole world was clamouring against the shameful role of UN 
in the Gulf crisis. It was deaf and dumb, limp and lifeless - a rubber 
stamp in the hands of the major powers of the world." The military 
operation against Iraq was not UN war but a war by coalition of about 
27 states. There was no difference between UN resolutions and US 
initiatives. It was for the first time an individual state had been authorized 
to take military action against other state under the umbrella of UN. 
The US was a singular importance in this war as the sole surviving super 
power with the military superiority to conduct such a military operation 
even with little or no support of its allies.^^ 
UN on its own is an inadequate and ineffective institution to handle 
and resolve the dispute among the states. It is also true that the UN 
was made a scapegoat in the Gulf crisis. UN had to take the blame 
for unlawful acts, omissions and commissions of its member states. 
Hence, UN did not work as peace maker in Gulf crisis. 
In short, one can conclude that the role of United Nations during 
the Gulf crisis was ineffective and inadequate because it had not functioned 
according to its framework (UN Charter). The entire performance, in 
the Gulf crisis, the United Nations was the role of United States. Thus, 
the role of United Nations in the Gulf crisis was extremely formal but 
the actual and real role was played by the United States. 
57. Ehsanullah Khan, Gulf War (NewDelhi: Bait-al-Himah Trust, 1991) p. 24. 
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CHAPTER -IV 
Gulf Crisis and World's Response 
There had been a few surprises in the early stages of the war 
between the American-led multi-national forces and the Iraqi armed 
forces. As expected, the awesome airpower assembled by the allies 
dominated the skies over Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq responded by delivering 
missile attacks on Israel in an attempt to draw it into the conflict. The 
war was set to move sooner than later towards a great battle between 
the armies of the allies and Iraq on the Saudi-Kuwait border. 
Naturally, the United States brought to bear all its superiority in 
air power at the very beginning of the conflict. It had sought to pulverize 
the political will in Baghdad with almost continuous bombardment of 
Iraq. The prime targets of the American and allied bombing had been 
the military assets of Iraq such as air fields, command and communication 
centres, the fixed missile launching sites, the mobile missile launchers, 
nuclear and chemical weapon facilities and supply routes to Kuwait. 
After the first three days the allied bombing had also begun to focus 
on the troop concentrations of the Iraqi Army, particularly the elite 
division of the Republican Guards. The US had also targeted some high 
value economic targets such as refineries and power stations, and high 
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visible political targets like the Presidential Palace and the Ministry of 
Defence. 
Saddam Hussein's devastating defeat in the Gulf war has left in 
its wake a sense of America's obligation to help resolve some of the 
Middle East's long-standing problems. One problem high on president 
George Bush's list of priorities was the Arab-Israeli conflict. As he told 
a joint session of Congress on March 6, 1991, "the time has come to 
put an end to (the) Arab-Israeli conflict".' Nonetheless, the Gulf war 
was fought to liberate Kuwait, not to solve the Palestinian problem 
Although Iraq repeatedly attacked Israel with Scud missiles, Israel was 
not a belligerent in this war at American insistence. Moreover, Hussein's 
threats to destroy Israel and his attacks on the Jewish state were fully 
supported by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Palestinians 
in the occupied territories. This however, undermined what little trust 
had remained between Israelis and Palestinians. Nor has the war produced 
a new leadership on either side of the conflict capable of transforming 
the constituency-led politics of the past decade into the heroic politics 
of Anwar el-Sadat and Menachem Begin. It is therefore not clear that 
this war has made the Arab-Israeli conflict any more amenable to 
solution. The opportunities for peace must be defined before new ideas 
for advancing the process can be de% eloped.^ 
1. Martin Indyk, "Peace Without the PLO". Foreign Policy. No. 83, Summer 1991, p. 
30. 
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The defeat of Saddam Hussein represents the defeat of his world 
view. He had promoted the vision of a Hussein-led, Pan-Arab Super 
power to counter American dominance of the post-Cold War world. He 
tried to gi\ e new credibility to the pre-Sadat method of settling the Arab-
Israeli conflict by threatening to destroy Israel. The war had the 
important side-benefit of discrediting this approach. The war also shifted 
the balance of power in the Arab world decisively in favour of the 
Egyptian-Saudi coalition that fought along side the United States. Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia not only emerged from the crisis as winners, but also 
solidified their bilateral relations wit a new bargain whereby Egyptian 
troops would help provide security for the Gulf Arabs in return for 
money to stabilize the Egyptian economy.^ 
The end of the Cold War had cost Damascus its super power 
patron. The Soviet Union had only been prepared to supply weapons for 
"defensive sufficiency", and President Mikhail Gorbachev had also 
lectured Syrian leader Hafez-al-Asad on the need to make peace with 
Israel, warning that Moscow would not support any Syrian military 
efforts to resolve the conflict. At the same time, the Gulf Crisis had 
solidified U.S. - Israeli strategic ties, enhancing Israel's deterrent 
posture toward Syria. On the other hand, joining the coalition had already 
paid Syria dividends in the form of a free hand in Lebanon and Saudi 
financial aid. By enabling the coalition to engage in the peace process, 
3. Ibid., p. 30-31. 
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Damascus can ensure that it becomes the focus of American diplomacy. 
Indeed al-Asad's assessment of the United States as the dominant power 
in the Middle East requires him to approach the Bush administration with 
new flexibility. But the United States also needs Syrian cooperation on 
post war security arrangements and for a meaningful peace process. 
Syrian opposition to American efforts in either arena could complicate 
policy, providing al-Asad with some leverage in building the relationship 
he now seeks with Washington. These trends suggest that inter-Arab 
politics is likely to be dominated for the foreseeable future by the new 
axis of Egypt. Saudi Arabic and Syria, the largest, the richest, and the 
most nationalistic Arab states, respectively. This is an unassailable 
coalition should it decide to settle with Israel.'' 
American circumspection was most evident in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, whose conceptual parameters remained unchanged even as the 
protagonists stumbled on through what is wistfully termed "the peace 
process". Curiously, developments in that process were stimulated and 
sustained by the protagonists" expectation of genuine American interest 
and involvement in moving the process forward.^ 
The grounds for such expectations were not at all clear. It is true 
that Bush began with an important diplomatic inheritance - Reagan's 
decision in December 1988 to enter into a "substantive dialogue" with 
7. Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
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the Palestine Liberation Organization. That decision undoubtedly constituted 
a significant milepost in U.S. Policy, but it also appears to have been 
an isolated measure in response to statements by PLO Chairman Yasir 
Arafat that met long standing American terms for such contacts. While 
Bush was obviously involved in the decision and resisted subsequent 
pressures to break off the US-PLO dialogue, there was little to suggest 
that it formed an integral element of any coherent U.S. Strategy or vision 
for the future. Nor was there anything in his election campaign or in 
his early presidential declarations to indicate that the new President felt 
a pressing need to move aggressively on Middle-Eastern issues. On the 
contrary, the slow pace of U.S. appointments to the Middle East and 
the identity of those appointed reflected a view of the area that could 
be fairly summarized as "cautious continuity". 
Secretary of State James Baker defended the merits of "a more 
reasoned and measured approach" and Bush, when asked about Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's February 1989 tour through the 
region, pronounced himself unconcerned with the prospect of the Soviet 
Union seizing the initiative. Finally, the comprehensive Foreign policy 
review undertaken by the new administration appears to have left the 
Middle East fairly low down on any list of priorities.^ 
Arab's and Israeli's, however, found it difficult to take seriously 
the possibility that the United States might not be consumed with interest 
6. Ibid., pp. 153-154. 
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and intensely engaged in their problems. Captivated by the image of 
American power and ultimate willingness to use it, they felt compelled 
to undertake some actions themselves. Their actions were not necessarily 
intended to facilitate negotiations with adversaries; both sides believed 
that they could best promote their own objectives by persuading the 
American public and government of the rectitude of their respective 
causes. Even if Palestinians and Israelis were only responding preemptively 
to American activism that was not really planned, the effect was to create 
opportunities for progress that U.S. leaders could not easily resist. Thus, 
the United States was drawn into a magnetic field of diplomacy that often 
left local protagonists feeling distinctly uneasy about the implications 
of their own actions. In short, expectations about American policy 
became self-fulfilling prophecies that kept the engine of the peace 
process going the problem was getting out of first gear.^ 
/ R o l e of The United States : 
America had emerged from the Gulf war as the dominant power 
in the Middle East. All the powers in the region and all the interested 
parties outside the region were looking to Washington for leadership. 
The Arab Gulf states, in particular would likely to responsive to U.S. 
peace process requirements. Egypt wanted to play the role of strategic 
partner in the region. Syria was also keen to build relations with what 
it regarded as the only super power, and Israel sought coordination with 
7. Ibid., p. \54 
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Washington to craft a process that meets its requirements.* In these 
circumstances, the United States now had a stronger hand in influencing 
the peace process requirements than at any time since the disengagement 
agreements of the 1970s. And this influence was enhanced by Bush's 
tremendous authority, following what was seen in the region as his 
personal victory over Saddam Hussein. But expectations of the United 
States were as high as its new reputation. In particular, the Arab states 
had come to believe that if the United States could liberate Kuwait in 
such short order, it was equally capable of liberating Arab lands occupied 
by Israel. And Israel's restraint during the Gulf war was generally viewed 
by Arabs as the result of American pressure rather than as Israeli 
forbearance.'' 
The .Arab-Israeli dispute is so deeply rooted in both the historical 
and psychological senses that one should not expect it to be solved in 
a single short diplomatic move. With this realization in mind the 
participants in the Camp David accords agreed on a gradual approach. 
This in turn was translated to "partial agreement", in two different 
meanings. First Camp David accords signed on September 17, 1978, by 
the then President of the USA. Jimmy Carter, Anwar-al-Sadat of Egypt 
and Menachem Begin, the Prime Minister of Israel, revealed the 
"Framework for peace in the Middle East and framework for the 
conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel". The latter was 
8. Martin Indyk, n. 1. p. 34. 
9. Ibid., p. 35. 
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simple and straightforward and a treaty of peace and Friendship was 
concluded between the two countries and the terms of the treaty, 
however, were to be implemented in two to three years. "The Framework 
for Peace" seemed to be a more complex document because of the 
inclusion of the principles of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and a 
detailed plan for a final autonomous status of West Bank and Gaza.'° 
It was an interim agreement, defining a transitional period of five 
years, which would enable the parties to examine carefully the developments 
in the Middle East, in particular, those west of the Jordan river. The 
agreement was partial also in terms of substance. The parties were asked 
to seek agreement on the "Softer" issues, on which they could hopefully 
agree, while addressing the harder issues would be deferred to a later 
phase. It is understood that the hardest-to-solve point of contention was 
the final status of Samaria, Judea and the Gaza district." 
In short, the Arab states were tempted to sit back and wait while 
Washington orders Israel out of the territories. And there was a similar 
urge to return to business as usual in inter-Arab politics as each power 
sought to carve out new areas of influence in the Gulf an the PLO. 
Meanwhile, in the West Bank and Gaza, the cycle of Palestinian-Israeli 
violence could quickly sour the atmosphere between Israel and its Arab 
10. Ssee for details S.A.H. Haqqi, West Asia Since Camp David (Delhi: Mittal 
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neighbours. In the absence of clear leadership from Washington, the 
window of opportunity would probably close rapidly. 
Conversely, if the United States takes the lead, it cannot hope to 
impose a solution unilaterally, but it may well be able to get the process 
of negotiations started. But they will need strong encouragement from 
Washington to take these steps.'^ 
The United States carries major political baggage in the Middle 
East that will compromise any regional security regime in which America 
is the primary actor. Any future security regime must allow the Middle 
Eastern states to hold the United States at a distance. The American role 
must be supportive, but largely over the horizon. If the regional 
organization requires special teeth, it can request them from the U.N., 
the United States, or any other external power. Unless the Soviet Union 
(former) regresses to its old ideological approach to world politics, it 
too should be able to play a useful role in the region, as would Europe. 
But a special Pax American would be very short-lived.'^ 
Yet, the war which began on January 16, 1991, did not lay the 
foundation for a new world order. It, on the other hand, killed probably 
200,000 Iraqis-including civilians, victims of what has been described 
as "Collateral damage" and came close to wiping out Iraq as a viable 
state. The U.S-led Allied war had even caused a split in the European 
12. Martin Indyk, n. 1, pp. 35-36. 
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Community and strained America's relations with Germany and Japan. 
Also, relations with Russia, in spite of a U.S-Secured $ 3 billion 
(according to another estimate, $ 4 billion) loan from Saudi Arabia, have 
been strained, witnessed the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze in 
December 1990 in the face of Soviet military opposition to his 
concessions to the United States on the Gulf crisis and on disarmament. 
The current closeness between the two countries in the context of 
Russia's march to democracy is too uncertain to be of any long-term 
consideration.'* 
Reportedly the U.S. government had began talking of a Pax-
Americana instead of a new world order. However, as Davis Healey has 
observed, "the Pax-Americana.... Is an illusion", because the United 
States is unlikely to be able to "restore peace and security in the Gulf.'^ 
The US role in the Gulf war suggests that despite the changing 
international environment, the present international system still remain 
unjust as it poses constant threat to the security of small nations. No 
doubt, it was due to the end of the Cold War that the UN acted in an 
unusually speedy way in this crisis, yet it was neither the prevention 
of the crisis, nor the resolution of the problem in a peaceful way, nor 
it was a collective security action, rather it was a selective security 
action. In the Gulf war the US acted under the cover of UN which cannot 
14. See, India Quarterly, Vol XLVII. No. 1 -2, Jan-June 1991, pp. 45-46. 
15. Ibid., p. 46. 
no 
be justified on strategic, political or on moral grounds. The US action 
in the Gulf war illustrates how a modern western states uses the concept 
of just war to make its foreign policy acceptable to its public; the US 
action in the Gulf war was a clear indicator of its policy towards the 
Third World.'^ 
The key US objective in the Gulf war was not to restore order 
in the region by achieving Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait but "smash 
Saddam" or render him incapable for further aggression. Though the 
Allied action in the Gulf took place under the cover of UN, it appeared 
that President Bush was more involved in the entire UN decision making 
processes than the UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar.'^ 
Bush used his ability to set U.S. policies in the United Nations 
to pressure Congress for authorizing to go to war; once the UN Security 
Council had set an ultimatum for Iraqi withdrawal. Congress could not 
refuse to authorize force without badly undercutting U.S. credibility. 
Congress played almost no role in Persian Gulf deployments until Senate 
hearings in December 1990 engendered a public debate between proponents 
of continued economic sanctions and those who favoured using force 
soon after the January 15, 1991, UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal. 
Congress' major role came still later in its January 12, 1991 vote to 
16. Nirmal Jindal, US Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House, 1994) 
p. 170. 
17. Ibid., p.m. 
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authorize the use of force shortly before the UN deadline and months 
after the deployment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops.'* 
n the last days of war that hegemony emerged in its crudest form, 
when the US took control of 20,000 square miles of central Iraq, the 
ancient Mesopotamia, now transmodified into the latest western colony 
of Mesopotamia, a mere 90 minutes drive from the Shia shrine city of 
Najaf. Such a colonialist action makes clear that the real US war aim 
was the destruction of Iraq because Saddam Hussein's Iraq presented no 
threat, no danger to the US or to the UK or to Egypt or Saudi Arabia, 
if it had wanted to invade and capture part of Saudi Arabia it had the 
opportunity to do that on August 2 when that country lay wide open to 
the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Even the Iraqi threat to its traditional enemy, 
Syria was more theoretical.' ' 
/ T h e only country that was under real Iraqi threat was Israel, and 
it was because the Jewish state was (and still is) the local strategic ally 
of the US, its regional policeman, and also because the Israelis and the 
pro-Israel Zionist lobby in the US control that country's West Asian 
policy. And it is because Israel remains the enemy of the Palestinians 
and of the Arabs in general that there was so much more anger than 
before against the Americans. In the other parts of the world, especially 
18. -Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian 
Gulf War", International Organization, Winter, 1994, p. 51. 
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the Third World, the anger was directed at the American over kill, and 
also because the peace settlement that was envisaged almost demanded 
the removal of Saddam Hussein. A development that should have been 
left to the Iraqi people to decide on.-° 
Clearly the main gainer in this war has been Israel which by the 
clever tactic of first threatening to join the fighting and expanding the 
war and then claiming credit and material advantage for nor joining in. 
Israel was the only country in the world that was happy because of the 
war and which wanted it to continue.-' 
Clearly round one in the Gulf war went to the United States. 
America was using its air power to the hilt, had kept Israel out of the 
war, and the Arabs in. Iraq had surprised the world with its continuing 
defiance, had brought Israel and Saudi Arabia under missile attacks, but 
was yet to crack up the alliance. But American air power alone was not 
going to decide the outcome of the war. The American commander, 
Norman Schwarzkof's claim that the allies could perhaps win the war 
without the ground offensive may be a bit far-fetched. A ground war 
appeared inevitable, and its character and outcome were by no means 
predetermined. Bush pushed strong action from the start, consistently 
favouring the most ambitious military options under consideration in the 
National Security Council (NSC) in early August. He deployed two 
20. Ibid. 
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hundred thousand U.S. troops without a strong or united recommendation 
from his NSC. 
It is important to note that his approach and the subsequent 
decision to use force was not the only possible response. Judging by 
the speeches and writings of key figures in the Carter Administration, 
had the Democrats controlled the White House the response might have 
been quite different. There probably would not have been a massive 
military deployment in the Gulf or an international mobilization to defeat 
Saddam Hussein on the battlefield. Instead the approach would have been 
based on protecting Saudi Arabia and deterring further Iraqi expansion, 
not liberating Kuwait. Sanctions would have been given more time, with 
protests confined to the United Nations and overtures to seek concessions 
from Saddam Hussein linked to pressuring Israel to put the Palestinian 
issue on the bargaining table. In the final analysis force would have been 
avoided for domestic political reasons and for fear of triggering an anti-
American backlash in the Muslim world. But Bush was determined to 
use force. With patience and tact he skillfully forged the international 
coalition, rellied support at home, cultivated the Soviet Union's cooperation 
(a development that owed a great deal to the special relationship between 
Secretary Baker and then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze) 
and obtained strong U.N. Security Council resolutions that ultimately 
included the right to use force to ensure Iraqi compliance.^^ 
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Response of Former Soviet Union: 
For three months, though deploring the Iraqi aggression and 
agreeing to the imposition of sanctions, Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev had refused to approve the use of force. His personal adviser, 
Yevgeny Primakov, an Arabist, had held lengthy discussions with Saddam 
Hussein on a number of occasions to find a face-saving, non military 
way out of the crisis, one that would have maintained the Soviet-Iraqi 
relationship and Moscow's substantial stake in the country. Surprising, 
therefore, was Gorbachev's decision at the end of November 1990 to 
support U.N. Security Council resolution 678 authorizing the use of 
force, if necessary, to "restore international peace and security in the 
area". Gorbachev's support meant that the date for the final showdown 
could be fixed.-' 
Some Soviet commentators felt that the "USSR negative attitude 
towards Iraq's military campaign against Kuwait did not mean that we 
(i.e. USSR) were not prepared to undertake all measures to find a 
suitable way out from the crisis and to provide all possible assistance 
to the sides in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict". The tone of the commentary 
which appeared in Pravda suggested that there might have been some 
thinking in the Soviet official circles to play a mediatory role in the 
confiict.^^ 
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The Soviets, in keeping with their publicly declared stand, fully 
supported the UNSC resolutions No. 660 (August 2, 1990) which 
condemned the "Iraqi invasion of Kuwait" and demanded Iraqi withdrawal 
"immediately and unconditionally" to the positions as on August 1, 1990; 
No. 661 (August 6) imposing comprehensive trade and economic sanctions 
against Iraq and Kuwait (barring medical supplies, food stuffs; and No. 
662 (August 9) declaring the "annexation" of Kuwait by Iraq as null and 
void. Thus, the Soviets, by going along with the US sponsored resolutions 
in the Security Council were acting in accordance with the principles 
of tackling the regional conflicts laid down in the joint US-USSR 
statement of August 3.^ ^ Most Soviet observers have explained the Soviet 
response to the Gulf crisis in the light of the rapid normalisation of 
the Soviet-US relationship. 
Alexander Bovin, the veteran Izvestiya commentator, viewed that 
the "Kuwait test" would ultimately judge the soundness and stability of 
the US-USSR relations. He wrote, "Moscow and Washington have 
condemned Iraq's aggression in identical terms, demanded the restoration 
of the status-quo ante and supported the relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions. The Soviet Union has not objected to the transfer of US 
military units to Saudi Arabia or US naval ships to the Persian Gulf . 
While there was general satisfaction that the USSR was on the same 
side as the US on the Gulf crisis, several commentators also felt 
25. Ibid., p. 775. 
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apprehensive about the ultimate objectives of the US in the Gulf. There 
was also a feeling in some quarters that the Soviet Union, with its 
reduced influence on the Warsaw Pact, the Arab world, and as a country 
deep in domestic crisis, had found itself on the margins as far as the 
current crisis was concerned. Some Soviet observers had noted that 
despite the US-USSR convergence, the policies of the two countries in 
the Gulf could not be identical.^^ 
But Moscow's initial anti-Iraq position was not simply some 
sleight of hand by Shevardnadze, preempting broader consideration of 
Soviet interests in the crisis. A broad range of genuine Soviet interests 
were in fact at stake in adopting a common position with the United 
Nations and, indirectly, with the United States. Broad recognition by the 
Soviet Union of these factors would be of inestimable importance to 
the perpetuation of constructive Soviet (Russia) policies in international 
crisis in decades ahead. No serious Soviet policy specialist believes that 
the old days of Soviet isolation and economic autarchy are any longer 
in the country's best interests. If the Soviet Union was ever to prosper 
in a high-tech environment and globalized economy, it would have to 
deal as a full partner on the international scene. It was thus not in the 
Soviet interest to dissociate itself from a series of Security Council 
resolutions calling for the liberation of Kuwait that enjoyed broad 
international backing. The Security Council had both might and right on 
26. Ibid., pp. 782-783. 
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its side. To oppose such general formulations would have isolated the 
USSR and cast doubt on its expression of interest in broad international 
cooperation. 
Cooperation with the West involved more than mere principle, but 
economic interests as well. Continued credits from the West rest on 
the ongoing perception that the USSR was no longer fundamentally 
opposed to the Western political and economic order. Hence came 
President Bush's offer on September 6, before the U.S-Soviet Summit 
in Helsinki to provide international aid in return for Soviet cooperation 
in the Gulf. 
The Soviets were not only in a position to derive economic benefit 
from the West; the riches of Arabia were also a prize that glitters at 
the end of new policies in the Middle East. Past Soviet policy presupposed 
fairly correctly - that Soviet ties would have to gravitate toward radical 
Arab states, eliminating the opportunity for truly lucrative ties with 
wealthy conservative states such as Saudi Arabia and the gulf Sheikhdoms. 
The dynamic of the Iraq invasion could change all that standing in condemnation 
of Saddam Hussein and voting with the Security Council, the Soviet Union was 
able to dramatize the character of its new international orientation. The pay-
off was not for behind.-^ ^ 
The Soviet response to the crisis in the Gulf had been carefully 
worked out so as not to upset the gains of the US-USSR detente. This 
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explains the mild Soviet reaction to the US military build up in the Gulf. 
While the USSR favoured activisation of the UN, the problem of US 
dominance still remains. For the time being, the Russia would not like 
to be a seen in opposition to the US and the West on the key issues. 
The Russia's capacity to influence the developments in the Arab world 
seems to had declined. The former Soviet Union was also unlikely to 
gain significantly from the oil price hike as the Soviet oil industry was 
not in the best of health at that moment. It had become evident that the 
Soviet Union might also comprehensively review its ties with its allies 
in the Third World.^" 
Role of Britain : 
Britain's sole material contribution to the coalition was military; 
it made no purely economic contribution. In fact, Germany and Japan 
partially reimbursed Britain for the approximately $55 million a day 
British forces cost at the peak of the conflict. Those forces included 
forty-three thousand troops, seventy five warplanes, and fifteen ships, 
the largest European military contribution to the coalition and Britain's 
largest foreign deployment since world war II. Britain's diplomatic 
contribution was considerable. The then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
decided even before Bush that a strong response to the Iraqi invasion 
was needed. A week after the invasion occurred, British officials said 
that they chose to be the first country to join the United States in 
28. Arvind Gupta, n. 24, p. 785. 
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pledging troops to demonstrate support for Washington's stand. In early 
September Thatcher and Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd took a bolder 
public line than the United States, arguing that Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, on states' inherent right of self-defense, justified the use of 
force against Iraq without further Security Council authorization. Thatcher's 
position on this point endangered the broad support she had enjoyed on 
the issue upto the time from the opposition Labour and Liberal Democratic 
leaders. In late August she strongly condemned the tepid assistance other 
NATO members had given to Washington, saying that the United States 
could not police the world without help. Finally, John Major continued 
to offer such support after he succeeded Thatcher as Prime Minister.^^ 
The collective action hypothesis's expectation that Britain would 
try to ride free could not have been incorrect; in proportion to its size, 
Britain contributed roughly as much as the United States and just as 
early. Part of the reason was London's perception that Iraq threatened 
the Middle East and if able to keep Kuwait, would have encouraged 
international lawlessness.In August Thatcher warned Iraq that any threat 
to Turkey would in her mind invoke NATO's collective defence commitments 
against Baghdad. After the air war began, defense officials warned against 
ejecting Iraq from Kuwait without first destroying much of Iraq's forces. 
Prime Minister Thatcher even suggested that Iraq had returned to "the 
law of Jungle*" in invading Kuwait." 
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British dependence on the United States helps explain its contribution. 
On 24 August, Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd explained the British 
response in terms both of Britain's "place in the world" and the 
expectations Americans had of British support. Thatcher more than once 
"angrily" criticized those she felt had not sufficiently supported the 
coalition, especially Europeans who believed that "what happens in the 
rest of the world is someone else's business. In fact, some British 
pressure on other coalition members may have originated in the United 
States exert alliance leverage over France and other European countries.^' 
Role of West Asian Countries : 
The Second of August 1990 would be as important in Arab history 
as the November 2, 1917. the date of the proclamation of the Balfour 
Declaration providing for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. A large Arab 
country attacked, occupied and absorbed a smaller Arab country with 
which it had diplomatic relations. No Arab state endorsed the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. All Arab governments and the PLO demanded Iraqi 
withdrawal. Jordan. Yemen, Libya, Algeria, the Sudan and the PLO 
insisted that the problem could and must be settled by the Arab 
themselves." 
Others, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, thought outside help was 
required, and Riyadh invited American troops to Saudi Arabia to defend 
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the Kingdom, to liberate Kuwait and ultimately to destroy the army and 
the economic infrastructure of Iraq. This presented a problem; the United 
States had good relations with the GCC, but it was still the main 
supporter of Israel as well. American outrage at the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait was widely contrasted with its tranquil acceptance of Israel's 
defiance of a series of UN Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem, 
the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Lebanon. But all this was 
dismissed in the panic that followed Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney's 
convincing report to the Saudi's of an imminent Iraqi invasion of Saudi 
Arabia and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. Nonetheless, the Saudi 
invitation to the United States was extraordinary. Countries that had long 
opposed "imperialism" and Zionism turned to the primary western 
military power for protection against another Arab country. Jordan, 
Yemen and the PLO found this "solution" offensive and dangerous, and 
they condemned the subsequent American destruction of Iraq. Their 
principles have cost them dearly. Jordan's market in Iraq disappeared in 
the early days of the crisis. All subsidies from the Gulf Arabs to Jordan, 
Yemen and the PLO stopped; Saudi Arabia ceased delivery of oil to 
Jordan and stopped buying its agricultural produce. Altogether Jordan 
lost half of its gross domestic product." 
The damage to Yemen has been almost as severe. Some 800,000 
Yemenis who had been long-term residents of Saudi Arabia were 
33. Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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dispossessed and expelled. They had peaceful, even docile, residents of 
the kingdom; they had taken no action against their Saudi Arabia hosts; 
there were no demonstrations, no sabotage. Yet, they were forced to 
leave their homes on short notice, sell their business for small fractions 
of their value and drive to the Yemeni border where their vehicles and 
remaining possessions were confiscated. Their expulsion was ordered 
presumably because the Saudis disapproved of the position held by the 
government in Yemen - that Iraq could be persuaded or forced to leave 
Kuwait without war - and possibly because the Saudis believed that the 
Yemeni government was part of the infamous "plot".^"* 
The Secretary General of the GCC had said that the Gulf Arabs 
would "never forgive and never forget the betrayal" by the poor Arabs. 
It would also be a long time before the wounds inflicted on Jordanians, 
Yemenis and Palestinians are healed. The Koranic injunctions to forgive 
and show compassion have been temporarily suspended by all. Those who 
opposed the invitation to the Americans accused the GCC and its allies 
of treason to Arabism and to Islam, but in the GCC itself there was 
little opposition. In short, the invasion of Kuwait and the Arab reaction 
to it marked the end of the period when Arabs maintained the pretense 
that they were part of one great nation.^^ 
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, further added 
to the need of cooperation among the countries in the region. Besides 
34. Ibid., p. 39. 
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instability in the area, it was considered by Iran and Saudi Arabia to be 
a threat to the strategic importance of their territories. If Iraq had 
managed the annexation of Kuwaiti territory, it would have a larger 
coastline in the Persian Gulf. This process would have made Iraq yet 
another naval power in the Gulf besides Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iraq would 
have also enjoyed an added production and export of oil. This would 
have disturbed the balance of power in the OPEC. The success of Saddam 
Hussein's policies would have increased the possibility of Iraq becoming 
a leader of the Arab world which it had been trying for since long. No 
wonder both the states immediately condemned the Iraqi government for 
the occupation of Kuwait. In order to force Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait, the Kingdom shut off the vital Iraqi oil pipeline to the Red Sea 
outlet at Yanbu on August 7, 1990, and requested the US to despatch 
ground forces and warplanes to Saudi Arabia to deter any Iraqi aggression. 
In order to beef up its troops near the Saudi border and to ensure Iran's 
neutrality, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, nine days later, announced 
that he would accept all the peace conditions with Iran. In addition, he 
requested Iran to side with Iraq against the US "'imperialism"^^ 
The deployment of foreign forces in the Gulf increased by the 
day, provoking a growing anti-Western sentiment in Iran. The Iranian 
hard-liners were opposed to the presence of the US forces in the region, 
and wanted the government to actually combat it. But the government 
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did not want to side with Iraq. Instead of blaming Saudi Arabia, which 
was responsible for the entry of the foreign forces to the Gulf, it blamed 
Iraq. The vast expansion of defence capabilities in Saudi Arabia and its 
back-up by the US military hardware and personnel were considered by 
the Iranian government as a clear change in balance of power in the 
region in favour of Saudi Arabia in the future. Iran not only tried to 
stop the entry of foreign powers into the Gulf but also to maintain the 
military balance in the region by checking the expansion of Saudi forces. 
Although the Iranian government had proclaimed a neutral stand in the 
Gulf crisis." It perceives a pre-eminent role for itself in the Persian 
Gulf and will not allow others to undermine it. The inter-state and intra-
state politics of the Arab region of the Persian Gulf continue to make 
Iran still relevant to the region. And the Iranian's strategy and tactics 
to use Islam as a trump card to keep up their position have paid dividends 
so far. Already the Iranians were reported to have made a tactical move 
by agreeing to sell Iraqi crude (along with Turkey) to neutralise the 
effectiveness of extra regional powers" solutions to the region's problems.^* 
It tried through diplomatic channels, suggesting a coalition of 
forces made up of the Gulf states, to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 
Iran appealed to the GCC states to set up a joint security system in the 
region to contain Iraq and curb the entry of foreign powers. It did not 
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get any positive response from them. However, the confrontation of GCC 
states with Iraq was accompanied by a radical change in the climate of 
GCC relations with Iran. This change was evident in the 11th annual 
summit of the GCC which was held in Doha during 22-24 December, 
1990. The summit welcomed trends in Iran to improve and develop its 
relations with the GCC member states. It also appreciated Iran's stand 
on the Gulf crisis. During a press conference in Doha, the Qatari Foreign 
Minister indicated that Iran should be included in security arrangements 
of the region by virtue of its geographical location. The Iranian Foreign 
Minister, two days after the GCC summit, stated that Iran "welcomes 
the positive points in the latest communique and is willing to discuss 
with the Gulf states the principle of cooperation to guarantee the 
security of the region from any influence of the foreign powers. Saudi 
Arabia was not enthusiastic about this proposal.^' 
Response of France: 
France was the first to come out with proposals on long-term 
peace and security in the Middle East. Britain followed with its own. 
They all suffered from internal contradictions. Then there were differences 
among the allies on the proposal for an international conference on 
Middle East of which France was an ardent supporter but which was not 
favoured by America and Britain. In fact, Mitterrand of France had no 
hesitation in suggesting a linkage with the Arab-Israeli conflict, which 
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Saddam Hussein had sought to establish/" 
The fate of these or other proposals would depend on the political 
will of those who have taken the responsibility of organising Middle East 
with or without fundamental reforms and at a time when turbulence of 
peace threatens to last longer than the ferocity of war. '^ 
France made it clear that it would not be a party to a war in the 
Gulf and would veto any United Nations Security Council resolution 
approving the use of force to end the Gulf Crisis/^ 
French defence minister said that the decision was a direct result 
of UN resolution 678, which had set January 15 as the deadline for Iraq's 
withdrawal from Kuwait. French President Mitterrand announced on 
September 15 the dispatch of 4,000 ground troops to Saudi Arabia 
following an Iraqi raid on the French ambassador's residence in Kuwait. 
Naval units including an aircraft carrier joined two warships already in 
the gulf. He had also given orders to its 3.000 man naval force to use 
force if necessary to enforce the embargo. French army ground 
reconnaissance forces would be part of a troop contingent the government 
plans send to the Arabian Peninsula.^^ 
40. L.K. Sharma, "Crossing the other Gulf, The Times of India, March 3,1991. 
41. Ibid. 
42. "France Against use offeree to end Gulf Imbroglio", Indian Express, New Delhi, 
October 9, 1990. 
43. "World Acts Against Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait", Factsheet, Economic and Political 
Action, pp. 3-4. 
127 
Rocard had been quoted as telling a group of French Parliamentarians 
that "the role of the French troops sent to join the international force 
is limited to enforcing the international sanctions against Irqaq", according 
to a source quoted in a report carried by the 'Jourdan Times', Earlier 
reports said that the speaker of the French National Assembly had 
demanded that the government clarify Paris' position on the Gulf crisis. 
The 15 parliament members who met Rocard represent all parties in the 
Assembly according to the sources quoted by the "'Times". France, which 
had signalled an independent approach to the crisis in the initial days 
after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, reacted dramatically to 
reports of a Iraqi intrusion into the French Embassy in Kuwait and sent 
4,000 troops and armour to Saudi Arabia to join the multinational 
force/^ 
Earlier the French involvement was limited to naval forces in the 
Gulf. Iraq subsequently expressed regret over the embassy intrusion. The 
French president, Francois Mitterand, again signalled a shift in position 
by becoming the first western leader to link the Gulf crisis to other 
conflicts in West Asia, including the Palestinian and Labnanee problems. 
In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he outlined a four-
stages plan for comprehensive peace in the region. The plan was 
welcomed by Iraq, which said the proposal was positive and could be 
built upon. 
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Role of China: 
Since the Gulf war, there has been considerable scholarly interest 
in examining the decisions and actions of major players in world politics 
during the Gulf crisis and trying to determine their broader ramifications. 
In the case of China, the inquiry centers on why China voted in favour 
of the first 11 United Nations resolutions that condemned the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and abstained on the twelfth that is, resolution 678 
of November 29, 1990, which from the U.S. point of view was "historic" 
as it set the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal and authorized U.N. member 
nations to adopt the measures necessary to restore peace in the region 
if Iraq failed to meet that deadline.''^ 
Speaking at the general debate of the 45th UN General Assembly 
on September 29. 1990, Qian Qichen, China's Foreign Minister, described 
the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait as 'entirely impermissible" 
and called on Iraq to pull out its forces immediately. It should be noted 
that China was voted for most of the UN Security Council resolutions 
on the Gulf crisis while insisting that the dispute should be resolved 
through friendly consultations without resort to force. Although China 
voted for Security Council resolution 670 imposing an air embargo on 
Iraq, it abstained from voting on the subsequent resolution sanctioning 
the use of force if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15. 
By doing so China underlined its preference for a peaceful negotiated 
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settlement reached mainly through talks between the Arabs themselve 
and for securing a quick withdrawal of Western armed forces from Saudi 
Arabia/*^ 
China was a partner of western allies in the early stages of the 
Gulf crisis. When it abstained on Resolution 678, Western observers 
suddenly realized that China's support for the anti-Iraq coalition was not 
unconditional and that its position included the principle of "peaceful 
settlement" of crisis. China, in other words, would not support a western 
war effort in the Gulf. Its position and consequently its decision to 
abstain on Resolution 678, according to some commentators, reflected 
the desire of the Chinese to maintain "relative neutrality". Their motives 
were multiple: if the war went badly for the U.N. coalition forces, 
Beijing would bear no responsibility; if all went well, Beijing would be 
in a good position to play a role in a post-war Middle East settlement; 
and Beijing wanted to provide just enough support to the allies to bring 
itself back into favour with the west. Thus, in order to get the most 
out of the Gulf crisis while not paying a price for taking an anti-U.S. 
position. China abstained on, rather vetoed Resolution 678.'*^ 
During 1990, the Chinese apparently gave much thought to the 
general framework of the future world order. With regard to the current 
changes in international relations, they basically saw three existing or 
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developing conditions. First, the post-war bipolar system ceased to exist 
because of the profound changes in U.S.-Soviet relations. Second, world 
strategic patterns were following a path of multipolarization with new 
power centres emerging; however, the world was in a transitional period 
and a new order had not yet taken shape. Third, the post-Cold war world 
would be compressed by the hegemonic politics of the two super powers 
coming to the surface and even intensifying. On Sepetmber 29, 1990, 
the Chinese foreign minister presented China's vision of the new world 
order to the U.N. General Assembly. He said that normal international 
relations could be ensured only when all countries observed the five 
principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. China proposed 
that, in the meantime, the United Nations should play a major role in 
working out solutions to various international issues and problems, 
fostering a trend toward multipolarity and eventually a more reasonable 
world order. Throughout the Gulf crisis and the war, China urged a major 
role for the U.N. and settlement within the framework of U.N. resolutins.^* 
China appeared more sober in its assessment of the international 
situation after the Gulf war. Its policy makers began to worry that U.S. 
determination to settle the crisis by force would set an example for 
future foreign policy conduct among the western powers, and that 
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American victory in the war would make the United States "the unchallenged 
super power" supported by its allies in the post-cold war era. They now 
believe that in the long run the U.S. does not have the resources for 
world domination and that the concept of balance of power will be 
operative, but in the short-run, the world will have to experience a 
"unipolar moment". Also, the transitional period from bipolarity to 
multipolarity could take fairly long time, during which the U.S. and its 
allies would have the ability and the temptation to practice power politics 
by various means. However, a more sober outlook has not changed the 
orientation of post-cold war Chinese foreign policy, as by various 
leadership statements. For example, Qian Qichen asserted in March 1991 
that ""the use of force can in no way solve all problems and the Gulf war 
cannot be made a precedent for settling international issues.'*^ 
Role of Japan: 
Japan's response to the Gulf war was seen as increasingly defining 
moment for Tokyo in the post-cold war world order. That response so 
far had been marked by anguished debates about what Japan's role should 
be, with its action until now limited to some financial aid and the 
promise of more. But perhaps the most striking aspect of Japan's 
behaviour was the growing perception that its citizens saw little at stake 
for themselves in the war"s outcome, despite their dependence on West 
Asian Oil. On the surface, as usual, the arguments revolved around the 
49. Ibid., p. 272. 
132 
constraints arising from Tokyo's postwar pacifist tradition and its 
constitutional renunciation of the use of force. Constantly fearful of 
generating hostility among its Asian neighbours, Japan clings more 
tightly than ever to these pillars of its identity. Despite repeated U.S. 
requests for a direct role in the Gulf, Tokyo had shied away Prime 
Minister Kaifu's initial proposal to send 1,000 military men in non-
combat roles. He also ordered "preparations' for military planes to airlift 
refuges from the war zone,, but some officials doubted the initiative 
would get anywhere. Many in the government were afraid that if it did, 
opposition parties whose votes are needed in parliament would withdraw 
their support of the money package. Others feared Japanese businessmen 
and diplomats abroad would be subjected to terrorism. It had become 
increasingly evident that Japan's temporizing was serving its sense of 
self-interest. This, in turn, had dismayed many, including the US Ambassador, 
Michael H. Armacost. who reminded Japan that "impressions forged in 
a major international crisis like this one do tend to have a durable, lasting 
effect". Before war erupted, for instance, Japanese officials said that 
one thing they wanted to avoid was the impression that Japan was capable 
of acting only under US pressure. Then they broke out, and Japan became 
paralyzed over what to do. Tokyo sent finance minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, 
to ask the US what it wanted, and only then did Japan come up with 
a sum of aid to supply. No matter how hard they tried, the Japanese 
seemed to end up looking as if they were acting in response to pressure. 
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The idea that they did not see they had much at stake in the Gulf, 
other than preserving ties with the US, might seem to contradict the fact 
that Japan, more than any other country, depends on West Asian oil-for 
70 per cent of its supplies. But since the Iraqi invasion in August, 
Japanese had been hearing cautious but bullish reports from their 
economic mandarins about prospects for weathering the storm.^^ 
The Gulf crisis presented as the first major test to Japan's foreign 
policy and diplomacy. While there were some in Japan who saw the Gulf 
Crisis as a clear case where the use of force was absolutely necessary 
in order to maintain peace and order. As regards Japanese response to 
the Gulf crisis three things seemed to be possible areas where Japanese 
response could be conceived: dispatch of Security Defence Force (SDF) 
personnel, sharing the cost of the multinational forces, and provide 
financial support for those countries which suffered by participating in 
the economic sanctions against Iraq. But what appeared to be most 
critical for Japan was the issue of dispatching SDF personnel to the Gulf 
and demonstrating the nation's willingness to share not only financial 
burdens but hardship and risk with other countries. It was in this 
perspective, the participation of the SDF. if not in a combat role, was 
seen essential.^' 
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XLVII, No. 3, July-Sept 1991. p.7. 
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Japan imposed upon itself very strict constraints about the use of 
its military forces. It was definitely within the country's discretion to 
give up its inherent right. However^ to escape from its duty was not. 
It is the duty of a responsible modern state to contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and order of the world. When Prime Minister 
Kaifu announced the evening of August 29, 1990, his initial Persian Gulf 
package, which included no financial contribution to multinational forces 
there, he referred to it as the "maximum" effort his government could 
make. But less than 24 hours later, following a phone call from Kaifu 
to the US President George Bush which revealed that the US was 
unimpressed by Japan's weeks of soul-searching. The aid package to the 
forces jumped from zero to $1 billion. Given Japan primarily US-
oriented foreign policy, the government's reaction to a lack of American 
enthusiasm, could be considered typical. But the government's continuous 
failure to set its own international agenda, especially on the Gulf crisis 
seemed to have left both Japanese and foreign policy makers exceptionality 
Japanese and foreign policy makers exceptionally discouraged about that 
possibility of Japan's taking actions befitting its new found economic 
status.^' 
The Gulf crisis showed that unless Japan makes its own judgement 
on world issues and acts according to it, rather than to the American 
stance, the international community will not appreciate its efforts to 
52. Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
135 
assume more responsibility. The fact tiiat Japan was not consulted before 
the US sent troops to the Gulf was an example of how Japan's failure 
to set an international agenda and this is what puts strain on Japan-US 
bilateral relations. Opinions were advanced in Tokyo that if the US 
thought Japan was a country with its own opinion and could take its own 
stand on certain aspects of international developments like Germany, it 
would have consulted Tokyo before because it would have wanted to hear 
a good advice. But it did not feel it was necessary because it expected 
Japan just to follow the US position. If Japan sincerely wanted to make 
an international contribution suitable for an economic superpower, it 
must have realized that a global political role has become increasingly 
inescapable. Japan continues to be the lynchpin to stability in the pacific. 
Now the US emphasizes on developing its bilateral relationship with 
Japan into a global partnership. Japan is already a global power, not a 
regional power.-^ 
India's Response: 
Between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the allied powers' 
combined attack on Iraq to liberate Kuwait, there was a shift in power 
in India from the Janata Dal government headed by V.P. Singh to that 
of the Janata Dal (s) led by Chandra Sekhar. Chandra Sekhar's government 
was short lived because of its minority support. It remained in power 
quite precariously only for a little more than six months from November 
53. Ibid.,p.\0. 
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10, 1990 to May 1991. When the Sekhar government assumed power, 
there were serious dangers to India's unity and integrity, and its economy 
was in a shambles. The outbreak of the Gulf war further worsened India's 
economy, posing a serious challenge to the government. Moreoyer, the 
government was confronted with a dilemma with regard to its foreign 
policy. Whether to throw in its lot with the allied powers who appeared 
to be sure winners, or to stand by a good friend like Iraq which was 
sure to suffer defeat.^'' 
The Chandra Sekhar regime came to power on November 10, 1990 
and the coalition forces launched their air war against Iraq on January 
17, 1991-only two days after the expiry of the U.N. ultimatum on January 
15. The face-to-face dialogue between James Baker, U.S. Secretary of 
State, and Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Foreign Minister, and the talks between Perez 
de Cuellar, the U.N. Secretary-General and President Saddam Hussein 
at Baghadad failed. During these hectic days of diplomacy to resolve 
the Gulf crisis. New Delhi played a passive role. Although the Chandra 
Shekhar government claimed that it was in touch with other governments 
in this regard, the fact remained that it did not pursue active diplomacy 
to resolve the crisis. If anything, its pronouncements and other postures 
on the Gulf conflict generated an impression that it toed the U.S. line. 
While insisting on delinking the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the 
Palestine issue, Chandra Sekhar strongly hinted that it was President 
54. J.K. Baral & J.N. Maliant>. "India and the Gulf Crisis: The Response of a Minority 
Government", Pacific Affairs^ Vol. 65, No. 3, Fall 1992, p. 368. 
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Saddam Hussein who was primarily to blame for the Gulf crisis. He urged 
Iraq to vacate Kuwait in order to pave the way for peace. In response 
to the demand of the CPI (M) for the withdrawal of allied troops from 
the Gulf region, he asserted that the presence of these troops in the 
Gulf had U.N. sanctions." 
Quickly reacting to the outbreak of the war, the Janata Dal 
demanded an immediate cease-fire, followed by a negotiated settlement 
of the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait under the U.N. auspices, 
withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, and freedom of Arab territories 
from Israeli control. Both the Congress party and Janta Dal complained 
that economic sanctions were not given sufficient time to work and that 
there were differences between U.N. objectives and the U.S. They argued 
that while the U.N. sought to liberate Kuwait, the main objective of the 
U.S. was to obliterate Iraq. There was, however, one important difference 
between the two political parties. The Congress party became increasingly 
critical of the U.N. while the Janta Dal hesitated to criticize it openly." 
Only a few days before the outbreak of the war. Foreign Minister 
Shukla had shown his reluctance to launch any peace initiative. He said, 
•"such an initiative should be mooted only if it would be useful and 
possibly successful." However, within forty-eight hours of the outbreak 
of the war, India had embarked upon a peace move envisaging immediate 
55. /6/£/.,p. 371. 
56. Ibid., p. 372. 
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suspension of hostilities and withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait 
under a unit bound programme". The starting point of any peace plan 
has to be withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait- in principle and not 
unconditionally as was demanded by George Bush. The condition was 
that the Iraq-Kuwait border would be an open question but should be 
delineated by some international tribunal. 
The next issue was to work out what sort of regime would replace 
that of the Al-Sahab family.^^ Both the South Block and India's U.N. 
mission became active for the purpose. Foreign Minister Shukla left for 
Belgrade while his deputy, Digvijay Singh visited Zimbabwe, Algeria and 
Jordan. But India's diplomatic initiative to stop the war yielded no result; 
its peace was not taken seriously either by the U.S. or by Iraq.^^ 
View from Pakistan: 
The apparent failure of the nearly seven hours of talks between 
the Foreign Minister of Iraq and the United States on January 9. 1991 
had fuelled speculation regarding the inevitability of a military conflict 
between the two protagonists after the expiry of the January 15 deadline. 
Both sides seemed to be sticking to their respective positions. The 
Americans calling for an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait and the Iraqis seeking a linkage of the Gulf crisis with the 
57. Ihid.. p. 373. 
58. G.H. Jansen, "India Remain Unmoved on Gulf Crisis", The Times of India, New 
Delhi, Oct. 6.1990. 
59. J.K. Baral & J.N. Mohanty, n. 54, p. 373. 
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Palestinian issue. As the deadline approached, fears regarding a conflict 
being "Imminent" was widely circulated. Concurrent with the Iraqi-
American talks in Geneva, there was the visit to Tehran of the highest 
ranking Iraqi official since the Islamic Revolution, namely the Vice-
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim. In the 
meantime, there was interesting Gulf-related developments in Pakistan 
as well which clearly indicated that Pakistan was certainly not a 
disinterested party to the crisis in its vicinity. There had, for instance, 
been two public rallies in support of Saddam Hussein in Peshawar and 
Quetta reflective of a growing public opinion in the country that saw 
the defiance of Saddam to the American military might in a positive light. 
These rallies followed the publication of the latest public opinion survey 
indicating that popular support for Iraq in Pakistan had doubled since 
August and there had been a corresponding increase in Pakistani opinion 
to opposition to the American forces in the Gulf. At the same time Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif had announced the dispatch of another Brigade 
of Pakistani troops to Saudi Arabia "to defend the Holy Places". This 
Brigade was to supplement the earlier 5000 Pakistani military presence 
in Saudi Arabia close to the Yemeni border since the Gulf crisis and 
it was now total more than 10.000 after the Brigade had been sent. This 
Armoured Brigade was likely to be stationed in Tabuk, the point in Saudi 
Arabia close to the Jordanian border. The United States embassy had also 
started preparing contingent plans for the voluntary evacuation of all 
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non-essential official Americans as well as dependents of diplomats 
stationed in Pakistan. 
In another reflection of the strong public opinion in Pakistan 
against the US military presence in the Gulf, the Federal Minister of 
Local Government and Rural Development, Maulana Abul Sattar Khan 
Niazi, in a January 8, 1991 statement, publicly criticised the United 
States for its refusal to link the Gulf crisis with the Palestine issue, 
a statement at variance with the official stand of the Pakistan government. 
While efforts of European, Arab and UN leaders were continuing to 
prevent a war, it was clear that both sides were basing their respective 
strategy on certain assumption. 
The eight day of the war made it clear that this was patent 
dissimulation-a mere alibi to further step up the barbarous assault on 
a Third World nation. A brutal number of air sorties perhaps 3,000-were 
conducted on that day. And even the minnows of the Western alliance 
like Canada, eagerly joined the fray, while France shed its early 
inhibitions about attacking targets inside Iraq.^° 
The typical public reaction had been that western fury, though 
perhaps disproportionate to Iraq's offence, had been justified; that in 
seeking to erase an autonomous nation-state off the maps of the world. 
Iraq transgressed grievously against all the norms of peaceful coexistence 
60. Sukumar Murlidharan, "Arab Identity Versus Pax Anglo-Americana", Economic and 
Political Weekly, March 30, 1991, p. 837. 
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that make the preservation of world order possible. This however was 
an over simplification, perhaps even a half truth. Hostilities against Iraq 
did not commence with that country's invasion of Kuwait. G.H. Jansen, 
one of India's most perceptive observers of Arab affairs, had pointed 
out that the military offensive against Iraq had been preceded by a 
propaganda war, dating from at least March 1990.^' 
The US war in the Gulf was in its deepest sense a means of 
changing the rules of global power, of subordinating economic competitors 
to military power, of transforming economic competitors into docile 
bankers of US military conquests, of converting economic resources 
from markets towards war subsidies; of disaggregating European alliances 
in favour of US centred coalitions; of trading Third World debt payments 
for military contingents under US command." 
61. Ibid. 
62. James Petras, "Gulf War and the new World Order", Economic and Political Weekly, 
March 2-9,1991, p. 482. 
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CHAPTER -V 
Iraq and Economic Sanctions 
Ever since its mistake of invading Kuwait on August 2, 1990 Iraq 
is not only facing the severest of economic sanctions ever imposed in 
its history but also ire of sole super power, the USA. Although is nearly 
a decade since the Persian Gulf War ended, the UN economic sanctions 
against Iraq continue to remain in force today, causing an unprecedented 
human toll and suffering. The UN sanctions, stringently pursued by the 
United States and European countries have proved to be extremely 
disastrous for all sections and layers of the society. Those who have 
suffered more from sanctions are vulnerable: women, children and those 
heavily dependent on the societal "safety net" provided by international 
relief agencies. 
The negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions have 
outweighed their intended political benefits.' These concerns have led 
many to question the very instrumentality of sanctions. In his January 
1995 report, Supplemnet to an Agenda for Peace, former U.N. Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros Ghali asked "whether suffering inflicted on 
1. See Thomas G. Weiss et al.. eds., Political Gain and Civilian Pain: The 
Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanction (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1997) especially chapters 1 and 7. 
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vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting 
pressure on political leaders?"^ Current UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
has also expressed concern that "the hardship imposed on the civilian 
population is greatly disproportionate to the likely impact of sanctions 
on the behaviour of the protagonists."^ 
Although the instrument of sanctions as a means to uphold and 
enforce the international norms, is not new. But it became a focus of 
world attention and of an academic debate after the UN Security Council 
imposed comprehensive sanctions against Iraq following the Gulf War 
of 1991. Since then it has become a controversial episode in international 
relations. There are some who justify the sanctions against Iraq. But 
there are others also who consider sanctions as unethical and deterimental 
to the population of Iraq. 
Since the end of the Cold War, economic coercion has become 
a popular response to myriad threats to international peace and security. 
The Iraqi challenge was the first major threat to international law and 
order to take place after the mechanism of international peace keeping, 
long deadlocked by US-Soviet rivalry, had been unshackled. Actions against 
Iraq demonstrated that the end of the cold war had made possible an 
unprecedented degree of consensus and cooperation among the major 
2. Boutras Boutras Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, U.N. Doc. A/50/ 
60 (New York: United Nations, January 3, 1995) pp. 17-18. 
3. Kofi .'\nnan. The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace 
and Sustainable Development in Africa (New York: United Nations, April 16, 
1998) p. 25. 
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powers." 
During the cold war the enforcement powers of the United Nations 
Security Council were hardly used. The main exception was the Korean 
war, when the Security Council was able to authorize assistance to South 
Korea because the Soviet Union was boycotting its meetings. Apart from 
this exception, the only enforcement actions under chapter VII of the 
UN charter adopted by the Security Council were a mandatory embargo 
of the white breakaway regime of Rhodesia in 1966 and a mandatory 
arms embargo declared against South Africa in 1977. But with the radical 
shift in Soviet Policy or rather with the demise of Soviet Union sanctions 
have become a frequent instrument of United Nations authority.^ Sanction 
are no longer the virtual dead letter of the UN Charter. The UN Security 
Council has currently imposed partial or comprehensive multilateral 
sanctions against Iraq (1990), the former Yugoslavia (1991), Libya (1992), 
Liberia (1992). Somalia (1992), Haiti (1993), parts of Angola (1993), 
Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996), Sierra Leone (1997) and most recently 
against Afghanistan. Sanctions have also become very popular in the United 
States' Policy tool of choice. A 1997 study by the National Associations 
of Manufacturers listed 35 countries targeted by new American sanctions 
4. Man Dowty. "Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order" The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1994, p. 179. 
5. While in the UN's first four decades the Security Council could impose economic 
sanction only t\\ ice it has invoked them over dozen times in present decade. See 
James C.Ngobi " The United Nations Experience with Sanctions'" in David 
Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds.. Economic Sanctions: Panacea or 
Peacebuilding in a Post Cold War World. ? (Boulder, Colo: Westview. 1995) 
pp. 17-18. 
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from 1993 to 1996. What is noteworthy, however, is not just the frequency 
with which sanctions are used but their centrality; economic sanctions 
are increasingly at the core of US foreign policy.^ 
Sanctions have long been used in international politics not only 
as means to uphold international norms but also as instruments to secure 
political advantage and maintain indirect control. But all too frequent 
use of sanctions in the recent years and the same on the behest of 
one member of the Security Council has raised many doubts about their 
intention. The end of the cold war has transformed the Security Council 
as one of the department of the US government. In many cases the United 
States has hijacked the proceedings of the council to serve narrow national 
purposes, as has been the case with sanctions against Iraq.^ The role of 
sanctions as an instrument of the mighty is troubling. This is especially 
true when the United States labels certain countries "rogue states" and 
subjects them to unilateral punitive pressure. Such policies have little 
or nothing to do with global justice and the enforcement of international 
norms, which are often used as pretext by the United States while imposing 
sanctions on states which either refuses to toe the US line on particular 
international issue or challenges its hegemony in certain regions. The 
misuse of sanction instrument by Washington is troubling particularly 
6. Richard N. Haass, "Sanctioning Madness", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 
1997, p. 74. 
7. See Lisa Martin. Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic 
Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) Martin's analysis 
confirms the role of the United States in pressuring other states to cooperate with 
sanction. 
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with the US, fiercely asserting its self- appointed role of omnipotent 
global cop bent on instant retribution to errant nation. All these foster 
resentment and skepticism. 
Conceptualizing Economic Sanctions: 
According to Oxford dictionary the literal meaning of sanction is 
an "action taken by a country to penalize and coerce a country or organisation 
that is considered to have violated a law or code of practice or basic 
human rights". Webster's dictionary defines the term as "coercive measures 
applied to a nation taking a course of action disapproved by others". Or 
"motive for obedience to any moral or religious law". Galtung offers 
a useful general definition of sanctions. They are "actions initiated by 
one or more international actors (the senders) against one or more others 
(the receivers) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers 
by depriving them of some value and/or to make receivers comply with 
certain norms the senders deem important."* 
In 1938 the British Royal Institute of International Affairs defined 
sanctions as an "action taken by the members of international community, 
against an infringement, actual or threatened, of the law"' These sanctions 
include the rupture of diplomatic relations, cultural and sports boycotts. 
8. Johan Galtung "On the Effects of Intemational Economic Sanctions: With 
Examples from the Case of Rhodesia", World Politics, Vol. XIX, No. 3, April 
1967, p. 379. 
9. C. Lloyed Brown John, Multilateral Sanctions in International Law: A 
Comprehensive Analysis (New York: Praegar, 1975), p. 5. 
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commercial sanctions both on exports and imports, and naval blockades. 
Of all these measures, the most widely used are economic sanctions. 
Lloyed Brown John says that economic sanctions may be grouped 
into three types-embargoes, boycotts and blockades.'" Daoudi and Dajani 
have defined that embargo means a ban on export of goods to any sanctioned 
country by one or more countries. Boycotts on the other hand have been 
defined by them as sanction imposed by one or more countries to stop 
the importation of some or all goods from the sanctioned country." 
Finally, blockade means the closure of territorial waters of the target 
country to deprive it from imports and exports facilities. 
Robert A Pape writes that states use economic pressure against 
other state for a variety of political purposes. There are two main categories 
of international economic weapons - trade restrictions and financial 
restrictions - each of which can be employed with varying intensity and 
scope. For example trade may be suspended completely or tariffs merely 
raised slightly; financial flows may be wholly or partially blocked or 
assets seized; the entire opposing economy may be targeted or just one 
critical sector. Although the same economic weapons can be employed 
in support of different political goals, different political purposes yield 
different strategies. There are three main strategies of international 
economic pressure: economic sanctions, trade wars, and economic warfare. 
10. Ibid,pA6. 
11. Daoudi and Dajani, quoted in D.J. Venter, South Africa Sanctions and the 
Multinationals (Sussex: Cardin Publications 1989), p. 57. 
148 
Although Robert A Pape makes distinction among these strategies, there 
are many who use the term "economic sanctions" to apply to all three 
strategies.'^ Recently Baldwin has argued that concept of economic sanctions 
should be broadened to encompass all aspects of "economic statecraft" 
including not only economic coercion for political purposes (the traditional 
understanding of sanctions), but also coercion of economic goals (trade 
disputers) as well as goals other than changing the target state's behaviour, 
such as engaging in economic warfare, rallying domestic political support, 
demonstrating resolve to third party audiences, or simply inflicting 
punishment.'^ 
Economic sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare 
of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the 
target government to change its political behaviour. Sanctions can coerce 
either directly, by persuading target government that the issues at stake 
are worth price, or indirectly, by inducing popular pressure to force the 
government to concede, or by inducing a popular revolt that overthrows 
the government, resulting in the establishment of a government that will 
make the concessions.'^ Although coercers may suspend trade either 
comprehensively or partially, economic sanctions characteristically aim 
12. Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work", International 
Security, Vol. 22, No. 2. Fall 1997, p. 93. 
13. David A. Baldwin. Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 1989) p. 32. 
14. John Galtung. n. 8. pp. 380-81. Also See Donald L. Losman, International 
Economic Sanctions: The Case of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1979) p. 1. 
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to impose costs on the economy as a whole. Partial trade suspensions 
are generally adopted either as a part of a calculated strategy to signal 
the potential of still worse pain to come if the target fails to comply, 
or as a second best measure because more pressing domestic or 
international political constrains rule out comprehensive pressure. 
In each cases in which sanctions have been applied there appear 
at first sight to be clear objectives relating to changes in the behaviour 
of the government against whom they are directed. It is these objectives 
which are emphasised by those imposing the sanctions. But the study 
of particular cases of sanctions makes clear that the objectives for which 
sanctions are imposed are far from simple or straightforward. The objectives 
pursued can broadly be divided into three categories. There are "primary 
objectives" which are concerned with the actions and behaviour of the 
state or regime against whom the sanctions are directed-the 'target state'. 
There are 'secondary objectives' relating to the status, behaviour and 
expectations of the governments imposing the sanctions-the 'imposing 
state'. And there are 'tertiary objectives' concerned with broader 
international considerations relating either to the structure and operation 
of the international system as whole or those part of it which are regarded 
as important by the imposing states.'^ 
It is these primar} objectives which have received the most attention 
in the studies of sanctions and tend to be given the most emphasis in 
15. James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument", International 
Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 3. July 1979, pp. 368-69. 
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the imposing state. However, these primary objectives are themselves 
diverse. They may include attempts to induce internal political change 
within the target state-sometimes to topple the target regime, as the United 
States is currently seeking to do in Iraq. They may be directed to forcing 
an erring member of a regional alliance back into the fold, as Russians 
tried to achieve with Yugoslavia. They may be designed to deter the target 
state from some action beyond its borders. They may seek to weaken 
or punish the target state or they may be intended to force a target 
state to accept broadly agreed international norms.'^ 
Thomas G. Weiss finds a change in the pattern of sanctions. He 
says that the new pattern distinguishes itself from the old not only by 
the frequency with which sanctions have been imposed, but also by the 
wide range of purposes they serve, the centerpiece of efforts to repel 
aggression, restore democracy, condemn human rights violations and 
punish regimes harboring terrorists and international war criminals.'^The 
United States for more than any country, uses sanctions to discourage 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, 
promote human rights, end support for terrorism, thwart drug trafficking, 
discourage armed aggression, protect the en\ ironment and oust governments. 
To accomplish these ends, sanctions may take the form of arms embargoes, 
foreign assistance reduction and cutoffs, export and import limitations, 
16. Ibid, p. 373. 
17. Thomas G. Weiss, "Sanctions as a Foriegn Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian 
Impulses" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1999, p. 499. 
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asset freezes, tariff increases, import quota decreases, revocation of 
most favoured nation (MFN) trade status, votes in international 
organisations, withdrawal of diplomatic relations, visa denials, cancellation 
of air links, and credit financing, and investment prohibitions.'* 
Although increasingly popular especially after the end of the cold 
war and the demise of the Soviet Union, efficacy of economic sanctions 
has always been doubtful. Study after study shows their questionable utility. 
For example Galtung in his study of sanctions against Rhodesia concludes 
that the probable effectiveness of economic sanctions is generally 
negative." Doxey summing of her analysis of the UN and southern Africa 
concedes that the deterrent and coercive force of sanctions is weak on 
almost every count.^° Another scholar Adler-Karssom says that "it is hard 
to avoid the overall conclusion that the described embargo policy has 
been a failure."-' Another influential study concludes from analysis of 
more than 100 cases that economic sanctions have worked to some extent 
about a third of the time.^^ 
18. Richard N. Haass, n.6, p. 74. 
19. Galtung, n.8, p. 409. 
20. Margaret P. Doxey, "International Sactions: A Framework for Analysis With 
Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa", International 
Organization, Summer 1972, p. 547. 
21. Adler-Karssom, Western Economic Warfare (Stockholm: Almqvist and 
Wiksell, 1968)p.9. 
22. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic 
Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington: 
Institute for Intemational Economics, 1990) Also see Robert A Pape, n. 12, pp. 
90-136. 
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In many cases sanctions have even proved counter productive and 
resulted in unintended and undesirable consequences. Generally proponents 
of economic sanctions argue that negative humanitarian impact of sanctions 
would encourage the people to revolt against the incumbent regime. But 
in many cases things have been totally reverse. Assumptions of political 
collapse following economic disaster in the target state have proved to 
be unfounded. Contrary to belief economic sanctions generally have 
opposite effect of creating a sense of community and solidarity in the 
target state. Sanctions have also generated the feeling of staunch 
nationalism which often makes states willing to endure considerable 
punishment rather than abandon their national interests. States involved 
in coercive disputes often accept high costs, including civilian suffering 
to achieve their objectives. Even in the weakest and most fractured 
states, external pressure is more likely to enhance the nationalist legitimacy 
of rulers than undermine it.^ ^ The best example is Iraq, which has been 
subjected to the most extreme sanctions in history but it has not buckled. 
Economic hardship and suffering of Iraqis continue without causing its 
population to rise up against Saddam Hussein. 
But this is not that sanctions have not worked altogether. Haass 
writes that under the right circumstances, sanctions can achieve, or help 
achieve, various goals ranging from modest to the fairly significant. Although 
sanctions alone have seldom brought about major policy changes, they 
23. Robert A. Pape, n. 12, p. 107. 
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may make a difference when blended with other international actions. 
It is mistake to expect economic sanctions alone to achieve the desired 
primary objectives.^'' Sanctions infact, should be implemented as a flexible 
component of a wider diplomatic strategy rather than as the main policy 
toward a target country, and that should seek to persuade rather than punish. 
To be effective sanctions must be combined with incentives, as a part 
of a carrot and stick diplomacy designed to resolve conflict and bring 
about a negotiated solution. This strategy requires that the imposing 
authority establish clear and consistent standards for the lifting of sanctions. 
This logic of instrument also demands that steps toward compliance by 
the target be rewarded with an easing of coercive pressure. The easing 
of sanctions will work as incentive for further compliance by the target 
state. But in case of Iraq the Security Council has adopted an unyielding 
posture and refused to reciprocate Baghdad's occasional concessions and 
cooperation. 
Sanctions may also prove counter-productive when the imposing 
body does not provide or properly administers humanitarian exemption 
and other measures to protect the innocent. The severe economic and 
social hardships which are inevitable consequence of sanctions have been 
a point of intense controversy and debate. Considered as an alternative 
to the use of military force, sanctions may still cause economic and 
social hardships equivalent to those caused by war. For example in Iraq 
24. James Barber, n. 15, p. 374. 
154 
more and more people have died as a direct result of sanctions in 
comparison to number of casualties caused by Gulf War and subsequent 
US bombings. In some cases, the negative humanitarian consequences 
of sanctions arguably outM^eigh whatever political objective may have 
been accomplished. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has pointed 
out that economic sanctions are "too often a blunt instrument", and has 
called for measures to mitigate their adverse humanitarian impacts. He 
has also noted that sanctions pose a dilemma for the United Nations' 
dual mandate to preserve peace and protect human needs.^' 
Despite the fact that sanctions have imposed hardship on vulnerable 
sections of the society many argue that they may be ethically justified 
if carried out for a higher political and moral purposes such as halting 
aggression or preventing repression.^* However, in even that case the degree 
of pain caused by sanction must not exceed to the point that drive living 
standards below subsistence levels. A US policy analyst has argued that 
while a certain level of civilian hardship is unavoidable, sanctions must 
not deprive people of the basic right to life and survival. Nations imposing 
sanctions have a responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance to 
vulnerable populations. The principle of civilian immunity applies no less 
in the imposition of sanctions than in the conduct of war. The sanctioning 
25. Kofi Annan, Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the 
Organization (New York: United Nations, August 27, 1998) p. 64. 
26. Lori Fisler Damroch, "The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions" in Lori Fisler, 
ed.. Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993) pp. 281-82. 
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authorities cannot be exonerated from the fundamental responsibility of 
mitigating humanitarian impacts within target countries. They must also 
ensure that the measures enacted to uphold international norms do not 
cause suffering disproportionate to the ends served. 
Impact of UN Sanctions on the Iraqis: 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 stimulated an 
immediate international response. In the changed political scenario of 
the post-cold war world order Iraq was exposed to an international consensus 
of unusual strength. The result was the most extensive use ever of the 
Security Council's powers. The Security Council through its myriad of 
resolutions imposed the most comprehensive and severest economic 
sanctions on Iraq ever enacted in its history. With near total support 
sanctions were implemented with the most effective enforcement ever 
put in place. The Council linked their lifting to Iraq's unconditional 
compliance with all of its resolutions. 
On August 6, 1990 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
661, the first of the sanctions resolutions. The resolution called upon 
a total ban on trade and trans-border financial transaction with Iraq and 
occupied Kuwait. Supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, 
in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs were exempted. The resolution 
also established a committee, consisting of all members of the Security 
Council, to monitor the implementation of these economic measures, 
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known informally as the "Sanction Committee"." On 9 August President 
Bush issued further executive orders to strengthen US sanctions in response 
to UN Resolution 661. President Bush, with a stroke of pen, was in 
a position to affect the patterns of world trade. The European Economic 
Community through its regulation No. 2340/90, issued on August 8, 
reaffirmed the 661 embargo conditions. 
Over 300 items were included on the 'red list' of banned goods 
compiled by the Sanctions Committee, ranging from light bulbs, socks, 
and wrist watches to oven, sewing machines, needles, nails and refrigerators. 
The banning of some of the items had a clear strategic rationale: for 
example, the bans on pesticides, seed, fertilizer, and spare parts for 
agricultural machinery were clearly designed to have an impact on agricultural 
production. But, as Eric Rouleau, a former French ambassador to Turkey, 
noted that, the logic of including some items was not always clear: apparently 
pencils were included because the graphite used in lead has military value.^^ 
As experts generally urge, sanctions were imposed quickly and 
comprehensively, with effective enforcement from early days. Given a 
well disposed international constellation at the time, international support 
was overwhelming; more than 150 nations had, as required, reported to 
27. S/RES/661, August 6, 1990, Paras 3, 4 and 6: U.N., Iraq-Kuwait Conflict. 
Doc.7, p. 168. 
28. Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq" Foreign Affairs, Jan/ 
Feb 1995, pp. 63-64. 
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the UN Sanctions Committee on their compliance with sanctions.^' 
Secondary enforcement was more effective than in any previous case; 
compensation was paid to states for losses incurred by complying with 
embargo, and international financial institutions made available low-cost 
loans. Other oil producing states, Saudi Arabia in particular, increased 
oil production to compensate for lost Iraqi oil and to drive down oil 
prices after a temporary jumps. The impact of these measures was infact 
unprecedented. 
On August 25, 1990 the five permanent members of the Security 
Council agreed on a framework for the use of force to support the embargo 
in case of established and clear violations of sanctions. A key section 
of Resolution 665 declares that the Security Council "calls upon those 
member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait which are 
deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate 
to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority 
of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping 
in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure 
strict implementation or the provision related to such shipping laid down 
in Resolution 661" The wording of the resolution was highly significant. 
"Such measures ...as may be necessary" made it plain that force was not 
prohibited.^" 
29. Christopher C. Joyner, "Sanctions, Compliance and Internaitonal Law: 
Reflections on the United Sates Experience against Iraq" Virginial Journal of 
International Law, Fall! 991, pp. 16-18. 
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From the outset, the sanctions regime had to grapple with the 
problem of food. Iraq was net importer of food and the tight sanctions 
net maintained by naval forces provided by the coalition assembled by 
the US President George Bush proved to be very effective. Indeed, so 
effective was the blockade that by September 1990 the Security Council 
felt it necessary to instruct the Sanctions Committee to monitor the 
availability of food in Iraq and prepare for the possibility of supplying 
food in order to relieve 'human suffering'. Resolution 666, adopted on 
September 13, 1990, sought to ensure that food reached the civilian 
population. The resolution also made specific mention of groups likely 
to be more affected than others: "Particular attention will be paid to 
such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children 
under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and 
elderly".^" 
In March 1991, the Security Council Sanctions Committee determined 
that 'humanitarian circumstances apply with respect to the entire civilian 
population of Iraq, and that food and medical supplies should be allowed 
immediately'. Subsequently on April3, 1991 the Security Council passed 
resolution 687 which formally exempted food stuffs and medical supplies 
from the sanctions regime." Further efforts were made by the Security 
Council to conclude an agreement with Iraq under which Iraqi oil could 
31. S/RES/666 (1990), September 13,1990 in UN, Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, doc. 12, 
p. 173. 
32. For full text of Resolution 687, see Geoff Simons, n. 30, pp. 259-67. 
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be sold and revenue from these sales used for 'humanitarian' purchases 
of food, medicines, and other clearly civilian goods and services. However, 
it was not until May 20, 1996 that Iraq accepted the terms of Resolution 
986 of April 14, 1995, which outlined the terms of the 'food-for-oil' 
arrangement, and not until December 1996 that the first oil flowed to 
Turkey." 
While measuring the impact of sanctions on Iraqis one has to grapple 
with many challenges. First, the evidence of the effects of sanctions in 
Iraq is primarily anecdotal, consisting mainly of impressions gathered 
by UN officials. Journalists, public health workers, and peace activists. 
Reliable official government data is nonexistent. And whatever information 
the Iraqi government does provide about the effects of the international 
sanctions must be viewed with considerable scepticism, since the Saddam 
Hussain has a deep interest in protraying conditions in Iraq as grim terms 
as possible in order to generate sympathy abroad, and a rally round the 
flag effect at home. Thus it is difficult to assess the effects of sanctions 
on aggregate measures such as gross domestic product (GDP) or formal 
employment, leaving one to rely on estimates. 
Second, assessing causality for condition of the Iraqi economy in 
the early and mid-1990s is complicated by the fact that a great deal of 
damage was caused by the eight year Iran-Iraq war, the two months of 
military attacks by the coalition during the Gulf-war, and the civil wars 
33. Ibid, pp. 279-83. 
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within Iraq after 1991. However, according to a study team dispatched 
to Iraq in June 1991 by the Secretary General of the United Nations 
Boutras Ghali, sanctions played an important part in causing economic 
damage. The team concluded that 'the impact of sanctions had been, and 
remains, very substantial on the economy and the living conditions of 
its civilian population.' 
And finally there is problem of assessing the responsibility. Who 
should assume responsibility for the consequences of sanctions? Critics 
see the suffering occasioned by Security Council decisions as the 
responsibility of member states. They argue that if sanctions had not 
been imposed, and normal patterns of economic intercourse had been 
allowed to prevail, people would not have experienced such an extreme 
form of suffering and hardships. Proponents, in contrast, blame reprobate 
regime which did not change its objectionable policies and bring the 
sanctions to an end. They argue that Iraqi children are dying not because 
sanctions have curtailed financial and commercial transfers, but because 
Saddam Hussein has poured resources into opulent palaces, rebuild his 
military, and continued to develop weapons of mass-destruction. Baghdad 
publishes appalling statistics on child mortality but lets food and medicines 
rot in warehouses and postpones purchasing vital goods permitted through 
limited oil sales.^" However this study does not try to solve the vex question 
that who should be held responsible, but feels that both Iraq and the 
34. Thomas G. Weiss, n. 17, p. 505. 
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Security Council should take their share of responsibility so far as suffering 
of Iraqis are concerned. There may be differences about assuming 
responsibility but all agree whether proponents or critics of sanctions 
that they have caused severe hardships in Iraq. 
Although sanctions have severely affected and still continue to affect 
almost all sections of Iraqi society but those who have been hit more 
are the vulnerable: women and children. Similarly at institutional level 
four sections have been affected most seriously by the sanctions and 
have long term consequences are health, food supply, eduction and sanitation. 
Sanctions have devastating impact on entire Iraqi economy-an economy 
that in previous decades had advanced into the front ranks of the developing 
world is rapidly backtracking to a pre-industrial state. Never before has 
a country faced such prolonged economic strangulation, with the value 
of lost revenues from prohibited oil exports amounting to more than 
$ 130 billion, industrial output dropping by 50 percent, inflation rising 
by more than 5,000 per cent and per capita income plummeting to levels 
equivalent to those found in the poorest nation.^* The social cost of sanctions 
has been enormous. Children have been forced to work, to beg and engage 
in crime. Young women have been forced into prostitution by the destitution 
of their families.^* 
35. Anthonny H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997) p. 127 
36. Denis J. Halliday, "Iraq and the UN's \\eapons of Mass Destruction," Current 
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The impact of sanctions has been well documented over the years. 
All the reports from journalists, oil agencies, UN officials and others 
convey a consensual picture of a civilian population facing unprecedented 
catastrophe. A report from an UN agency confirms that continued sanctions 
since August 1990, against Iraq have virtually paralyzed the whole economy 
and generated persistent deprivation, chronic hunger, endemic undernutrition, 
massive unemployment and widespread human suffering. A vast majority 
of the Iraqi population is living under the most deplorable conditions 
and is simply engaged in a struggle for survivals but with increasing numbers 
losing out in the struggle, every day a grave humanitarian tragedy is 
unfolding.^^ 
Sanctions have maximized human suffering in all manifestations. 
They have resulted in dramatic increase in child and maternal deaths, 
malnutrition, polluted water, shortage of basic human needs and medicines, 
deterioration in educational standard, unemployment, diseases and de-
industrialization of Iraq. Sanctions ha\e proved to be the most suicidal 
and destructive instrument to the human beings. 
Informations about plight of children in Iraq are more shocking. 
The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported in 1996 that 45,000 
children under the age of five dying every month in Iraq as a result of 
sanctions-induced starvation and disease. A more recent report, noting 
37. FAO'WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Iraq, Special Alert 
No.237, Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and World Food 
Programme (WFP), Rome, July 1993. p. 1. 
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pre-sanctions mortality for the under fives at 540 a month, stated that 
the figure for May 1997 was around 56000 a month and still rising. 
One of the most alarming reports appeared in a December 2, 1995 letter 
to Lancet, the journal of the British Medical Association, in which members 
of a 1995 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) team asserted that 
sanctions were responsible for the deaths of 567,000 Iraqi children. This 
figure, generally rounded to 600,000 has been the most frequently cited 
number. Critics claim that more Iraqi children have died as a result of 
sanctions than the combined total of two atomic bombs on Japan and 
the recent scourge of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.^* The 
surviving Iraqi children-typically malnourished, sick and facing premature 
death-inevitably suffered in other ways as well. 
To the catastrophic impact of war and sanctions on the physical 
health of Iraqi children was added the traumatic devastation of their 
psychological condition. A substantial research has revealed a highly 
disturbed child population characterised by intrusive thoughts about the 
war and various patterns of 'avoidance' behaviour. Around two-third of 
the children surveyed, were experiencing sleep problem and about a half 
were worried that they might not live to become adult. Moreover, there 
were suggestions that psychological problems were worsening. For a whole 
generation of Iraqi children, the world is not a safe place anymore, anything 
can happen, and it can literally happen out of the blue. A majority of 
38. George A Lopez and David Cortright, "Pain and Promise" The Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, May/June 1998, p. 4L 
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the children felt 'more alone inside': they had lost all sense of security 
and optimism.'' 
Women have been hit more and they suffer in unique ways, due 
to sanctions and resultant economic strangulation. Only the desperately 
hungry pregnant women can experience the anguish of knowing that her 
foetus is already malnourished, that her baby will stand a greater chance 
of being born disabled or dead, and that if it survives it is destined to 
suck in vain on shrivelled breasts. Sanctions have a direct impact upon 
the roles that have been traditionally assigned to women in Iraqi society 
and culture. Bearing in mind the status of women in Iraq, as in many 
third world countries, one expects that women have borne and are still 
bearing the brunt of recent upheavals in family, economy and society. 
Iraqi women, having lost husbands, sons and brothers in war, have been 
forced to shoulder an immense burden. Many of the women who are the 
sole earners in their families have great difficulties feeding their children. 
Economic sanctions have produced greater unemployment, making it 
difficult for women to earn the money not being provided by war maimed 
or absent husbands. So many women in Iraq today are driven to take up 
humiliating ways of earning in order to assure the survival of their 
dependents. They have had to compromise with the traditional notions 
of hounour and shame. Women can be seen begging at street corners, 
hidden completely in the anonymity of the abya (the traditional black 
39. Cited in Geoff Simon, n. 30, p. 124. 
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garment covering the entire body). Because of poverty many women now 
turn to prostitution in order to be able to make a living. Women typically 
go hungry to provide for their children and elderly relatives.'*" 
According to one survey nearly two-third women in Iraq are suffering 
from such psychological problems as depression, anxiety, headache and 
insomnia. They are also suffering from severe malnutrition, increase 
susceptibility to disease, menstrual irregularity and breast feeding 
difficulties. The 1991, long before the full impact of sanctions was being 
felt, Sadruddin Agha Khan report estimated that about a third of all pregnant 
and lactating women were under-nourished and in need of nutritional 
support.^' Dr. Abed-al-Amir, head of the Babylon Paediatric and Maternity 
Hospital, has stated that the much increased incidence of miscarriages, 
premature labour and low-birth weight babies has been caused by the 
mounting physical and psychological pressures on women , the lack of 
medicines and pre-natal care, and the difficulty in reaching hospitals because 
of transportation problem."^ 
Dr. Al-Amir also commented that the lack of contraception facilities, 
a further consequence of war and sanctions, was having various adverse 
consequences. Now contraceptives were only being made available to women 
40. Ibid, p. 132. 
41. Report to the Secretary General on Humanitarian Needs in Iraq, Mission led 
by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive Delegate of the Secretary General for a UN 
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for medical reasons and in rare cases to older women with large families. 
The researchers for the International Study Team encountered one women, 
anaemic and weak, who had two caesarian operations in one year because 
of lack of contraception. Aid workers were soon to report caesarian 
operations taking place without anaesthetics-yet another consequence of 
sanction A teenage girl was cited who had bleeding problems that could 
only be countered by the birth control pill, which at that time had become 
unavailable. Another consequence, reported by a women gynaecologist 
from Hilla, was an increase in the incidence of illegal abortions and 
a related increase in the number of maternal deaths. A large number of 
women were now testifying that they or their daughters were now suffering 
from irregular menstruations, excessive bleeding and severe pains; with 
an increase in the incidence of hair loss, skin complaints, weight loss, 
insomnia and other problems."^ 
With the progressive collapse of the medical infrastructure, the 
Iraqi women are now forced to take on the burden of health caretakers. 
This in turn put mounting stress on women, already struggling to find 
food and water, and usually unable to feed their families properly. Many 
women take their sick children to health centres and hospitals, only to 
find that the sanctions have blocked the medical access to drugs and 
to the spare parts necessary to keep medical equipment working. The 
women then stay with their dying children in hospital wards denuded of 
effective medical care provisions. 
43. Ibid, pp. 44-45. 
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Sanctions have drastically changed the women's domestic roles. 
Almost all Iraqi women claim that their lives have changed since the 
sanctions were imposed. Now they have extra-domestic responsibilities 
due to the destruction of infrastructure, such as water supply and electricity 
and because of fuel shortages."* Water is major worry for most of the 
Iraqi women. While in some rural areas women are used to fetching water 
form wells or rivers, many Iraqi villagers are in fact equipped with water 
pipes, fetching water become an added responsibility for many women 
after supply of piped water were disrupted. Most of the women interviewed 
by the International Study Team indicated that their household duties had 
increased since the onset of crisis, even though their husbands had in 
many cases lost their jobs because of the collapse of the economy. Free 
men in Iraq do not assist women in household works because it is treated 
as degradation of manhood.^-
The sanctions imposed on Iraq has badly affected the marriage 
prospects of the Iraqi women. In particular it has become increasingly 
difficult to put together the mahar-the traditional bride-price or dowry 
of cash, gold and jewellery provided by the husband's family to the wife 
as a result of the collapse of the Dinar and the widespread practice of 
selling the family's gold for food. And women, particularly the mothers 
of marriage-age daughters, are reportedly unwilling to forgo the mahar. 
44. Ibid, p. 46. 
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expressing concern about not only their daughter's good standing with 
their prospective in-laws, but also their daughter's security. The gold 
jewellery was traditionally the way in which married women ensured their 
financial stability or secured a voice in family decision making."^ 
In short, the evidence presented in International Study Team, 
newspaper accounts, the work of many scholars and UN reports speak 
volumes about miserable conditions of the Iraqi women caused by prolonged 
UN economic sanctions. The vast majority of the Iraqi women contend 
with a variety of problems; more difficult roles, a greatly reduced ability 
to feed their families, an increased chance of unemployment, general 
impoverishment, lack of medical care and of an hygenic environment, 
anxiety and psychological trauma, marital collapse and family breakdown, 
increased problems in pregnancy and childbirth, an increased likelihood 
of sickness and disability.'*' 
The health sector in Iraq has totally collapsed. Nearly all medicines 
are in short supply, increase in the incidence of disease, no anesthetics 
to operate, no ambulance, power failure in the middle of emergency heart 
operation, a high infant mortality rate and high rates of morbidity and 
mortality in general, rising rates of preventable disease caused by 
malnutrition and unsanitary conditions, closure of hospitals and community 
health centres due to shortage of medicines, staff and equipments. These 
facts depict an appalling humanitarian tragedy. 
46. Sana-at-Khayyat, Honour and Shame: Women in Modern Iraq, (London: 
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In late 1991 it was estimated that, following the imposition of 
sanctions and the destruction of medical facilities in the war, less than 
one thirtieth of Iraq's medicine requirements were being met. Iraq had 
been accustomed to importing medicines on a massive scale, a practice 
that was almost totally blocked by the embargo. This meant that soon 
all medicines-including medicated milk for infants, vaccines, drugs (for 
diabetes, asthma, angina, tuberculosis, etc), anaesthetics and antibiotics 
were in short and diminishing supply. In the same way all other medical 
supplies (such as syringes, intravenous fluids, surgical supplies, new medical 
equipment and spare parts for X-ray machines, incubators etc.) were rapidly 
becoming unavailable, either deliberately blocked by the Sanctions 
Committee or mischievously delayed by cumbersome and bureaucratic 
procedures. In addition the collapse of the infrastructure -power supplies, 
clean water, transportation, etc. meant that many of the formerly 
sophisticated health provisions could no longer operate, substantially 
reducing the access to health care.'** 
According to Agha Khan Mission 2.5 million Iraqis were without 
access to potable water in summer 1991, and access had been cut to 
a quarter of pre-war capacity for a further 14.6 million. By November 
1992, the situation had not much improved, according to some reports 
a liter of drinkable water cost more than a liter of petrol.'*' The unavailability 
48. Ibid, pp. 150-51. 
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of clean water has led to gastroenteritis epidemics with thousands of 
deaths. With the water and sewage systems repeatedly attacked by allied 
bombers, the World Health Organisation estimated that the Baghadad water 
supply was down to 5 percent of its pre war level, which meant that 
people were forced to take drinking water from heavily polluted rivers. 
As a result, diarrhoeal diseases have spread because of raw sewage in 
streets and in many rivers. In conjunction with the inability to provide 
adequate immunization, and the collapse of health services, these poor 
sanitary conditions have prompted outbreaks of poliomyelitis, measles 
and tetanus, all of which were previously uncommon. The breakdown in 
the clean water supplies has made the populace vulnerable to an epidemic 
of typhoid. 
Throughout Iraq there is acute shortage of medicines even life saving 
one are simply not available. Even if some medicines are supplied they 
do not come with the required combinations and frequency. According 
to a UN worker, "The medicine part is the most depressing. If a person 
has less food, he still survives but he cannot do without medicine". When 
the UN workers go around the smaller towns, people come up to them 
with prescription and empty vials and ask when is this medicine going 
to come? Before the war the Iraqi Ministry of Health was moving 1,500 
tons of medical supplies around the country every month using large 
trucks and trailers with 35-ton capacity in the immediate post-war period 
about 90 per-cent the Ministry vehicle fleet had been immobilised.^" Many 
50. Iraq Situation Report for SCF (UK), Save the Children Fund, London, March 
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drugs required by the Iraqi Ministry of Health are produced only by specialist 
companies in the United States and Britain and governments in these 
countries are effectively blocking all exports to Iraq. The London based 
charity Medical Aid for Iraq (MAI) reported that in Baghdad pharmacies 
a constant stream of people with prescriptions was arriving only to be 
turned away. Some pharmacists were turning away 90 per-cent of people, 
elsewhere only 1-2 per-cent of people were being served. 
Eric Hoskin, a doctor who was the medical coordinator for the 
Gulf Peace Team has reported on the collapse of health care infrastructure, 
claiming that hospitals had been reduced to 'reservoirs of infection' as 
a result of the lack of medicines, the closure of laboratories and operating 
theatres.^' In Kirkuk Hospital a physician described how she had just 
performed an emergency cesarian section with flies swarming over the 
incision because operating room windows had been shattered during bomb 
blasts' and the sanctions regime would not allow their replacement." 
The Revel report for the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, has noted that Iraq which had formerly enjoyed 
a very well developed health care system with sophisticated health care 
facilities nearly free of charge, was now seeing massive deterioration 
51. Eric Hoskins, "The Truth Behind Economic Sanctions: a Report on the Embargo 
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in its health provisions." In Februry 1993 the aid charity Medicine for 
Peace (MFP-New York) noted that it was quite clear that the functional 
embargo of medicines and biologicals (vaccines), hospital and laboratory 
equipments and most critically, spare parts for medical equipment had 
resulted in a complete collapse of the health delivery system.^'* The 
government's warehouses for medicine have reportedly run out of such 
basics as bandages, and there is acute shortage of syringes. The equipment 
the hospitals lacks ranges from simple sutures to blood filters, from 
bags to incubators. Another alarming fact about Iraqi hospitals: most 
have gone back to the old system of glass boiled syringe. This is due 
to fact that Iraq's disposable syringe factory in Babel was destroyed by 
the Americans during the war. All over the world this method was 
discontinued because of the danger of hepatitis and other cross infections. 
It is also significant to note that Iraq has relied mostly upon 
sophisticated medical technology imported from around the world; and 
that now Iraq is prohibited by the sanctions regime from importing such 
equipments and necessary spare parts for equipment already in Iraq. Iraq 
is no longer allowed to acquire X-ray plates, laboratory scanners, spare 
parts for incubators and intensive care units, inks, paper and much else 
53. Willem C. Smit and Jean Pierre Revel, Report of the Assessment Mission to 
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for which there is a clear medical need. Due to lack of paper prescriptions 
are being written on scraps of cardboard. One doctor in Iraq reported: 
'we have lost patients because we didn't have any instruments. Either we 
have run out of spare parts or laboratory kits. We have radiological 
equipment, but no X-ray paper. We can't monitor cardiac patients because 
the monitor don't work." 
The ongoing sanctions against Iraq have had a devastating effect 
on Iraqi people and society. Once a prosperous nation with western tastes 
and secular outlook, most of the country now live in a state of severe 
poverty. The people of Iraq are fighting a daily battle against the hardship 
imposed upon them by sanctions. The sanctions have completely ruined 
the economy of Iraq. Since the war earnings have not increased for 
most people, while the prices of basic commodities have increased 
drastically. As a result, the purchasing power of Iraqi households has 
dramatically declined. The average food basket purchased by a family 
of six used to cost about 66 dinars, soon after the war the same costs 
more than 100 dinars. Before the embargo, a cartoon of 30 eggs used 
to cost 400 Iraqi fils or less than half a dinar. Now the same cartoon 
costs 3000 dinars. The same goes for basic food stuffs such as sugar, 
rice, wheat, tea and cooking oi l" One of the main causes of hardship 
is the rocketing prices of many food stuffs, an inevitable consequence 
55. Diane Weathers, "Life under Sanctions", WFP Journal, World Food 
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of the shortages caused by sanctions. The massive price escalation that 
occurred in the first year of sanctions continued in subsequent years. 
In addition there has also been sharp decline in the value of the 
Iraqi dinar. In 1990 one Iraqi dinar was equal to 3.5 US dollar but 
now two dollar is equal to 4000 dinars. Both per capita income of Iraqis 
and salaries of personnel are in worst condition beyond our imagination. 
A university Professor in Iraq hardly gets even one hundred US dollar 
as monthly salary. Most households in Iraq today earn an income well 
below what is needed to satisfy elementary needs. Iraq's economy is facing 
one of the most serious resource crisis in the history with increasing 
debt burden. Iraqi government is finding it very difficult to built peace, 
to meet the rising expectations and to implement the rehabilitation and 
reconstruction programmes on which its political legitimacy is hinging 
upon. 
There have been major changes in the lives of ordinary people of 
Iraq. Day to day existence has become a struggle for survival. The Iraqi 
people have been plunged into poverty, an affliction with many faces-
hunger being one of them. Hasar, as the sanctions are known in Arabic 
is now a household term and are perceived by the Iraqis as to be the 
root causes of their plight. In the last few decades Iraq had made rapid 
progress in development and public services. This was reflected in the 
standards of living of the people and the fact that very few people were 
below the poverty line. Those who were in the 'destitute' category were 
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provided with a pension of 54 dinars. Presently very few people are above 
this destitution line. These same people, for whom acquiring bread did 
not pose any significant problem before the war, now regard it as a major 
preoccupation. 
War and sanctions have led to a sharp deterioration in formal 
employment. During the war and the internal conflict that followed, most 
sources of employment came to standstill. In the aftermath of the war 
the destruction of industries, power and telecommunications system in 
the coalition bombings and shortages of spare parts due to the economic 
blockade have prevented a speedy recovery from taking place. A visit 
to a factory shows evidence of this-row upon row of idle machines. The 
condition of these machines gives an idea of the predicament that their 
operators must be in. A large percentage of the industrial workers have 
lost their jobs. Government employers fared better only to the extent 
that they had stable jobs. However, the worth of their salaries (unchanged 
in money terms) has been greatly reduced by price increase. The condition 
of casual labourers is no better. Even though their daily wages have increased 
a little in money terms, their work opportunities have been reduced by 
about 50 per cent. A large number of families in Iraq seem to be surviving 
on pensions. There are different categories of pensions for retired 
government employees, war widows, parents of soldiers killed or missing 
in war, and the destitute. 
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In the state of near total collapse of real income from wage 
employment and pension many people have started finding ways and means 
of being self employed. Many government employees can be seen selling 
cigarettes, sweets, news paper or anything which would allow them to 
make some extra money.^' In Baghdad one can see series of stalls with 
young people (often educated and unemployed) selling various home 
cooked food items like vegetable and lentil stews. There were hardly 
any roadside stalls in the pre-sanctions days. While travelling from Baghdad 
to nearby down, one is struck by the number of small children who should 
have been in school but instead are selling cans of soft drinks and mineral 
water. What is more ironical that they sell mineral water to make a 
little money to help their families but they themselves drink unpurified 
water due to the scarsity of chlorine (essential for purification) which 
is embargoed as a chemical. 
Sanctions have created serious financial crises for Iraqis. Many 
have incurred debts and sold gold and other household items such as 
refrigerators, televisions as a result of economic need. Indeed Iraqis have 
sold everything even the kitchen sink in some cases - to survive the 
international embargo. Many of those who did not sell any household 
items were among those who had nothing to sell. The ongoing sell of 
household items is a telling indication of the extent of poverty in the 
household. Besides meeting basic needs the distress sales are also made 
57. The Pioneer, New Delhil, March 5, 1999. 
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in order to raise capital to assist the setting of petty trade or business 
of relatives demobilized from the army, prisoners of war who have returned, 
or those who are seeking to be self employed. 
Perhaps the most pervasive and negative effects of the sanctions 
involved the availability of food. Though technically exempted from the 
sanctions imposed on Iraq, from the outset of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, 
the availability of food to the population was affected because of the 
ripple effects of the sanctions, decline in export revenues, particularly 
from oil, led to a steep drop in purchasing power. Even before the outbreak 
of the war in January 1991 there were reports of sharp decline in the 
amount of food people were able to purchase,^* after the war, there were 
further drops of 5-7 per cent of the pre-war levels. However, food prices 
continued to spiral, jumping by over 650 per cent is 1994 alone; wages, 
particularly in the public sector, simply did not keep up.^' 
The draconian economic sanctions have created deepening food crisis 
in Iraq. The position is deteriorating rapidly in virtually all parts of the 
country. Now food has become the main preoccupation of the most of 
the Iraqi families, for whom managing two times meal had never been 
a problem. With around 70 per cent of Iraq's food imported, the sanctions 
have resulted a massive decline in the amount of food available. The 
58. Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraq's Food Rations are Reduced as Trade Embargo Cuts 
Supplies" New Yorks Times, January 2, 1991. 
59. Eric Rouleau estimates that for a mid-level official a month's salary would be 
required to purchase a kilo of meat, two months' for a pair of shoo. See Eric 
Rouleau, n. 28, p. 65. 
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systematic bombing of Iraq's infrastructure has also helped to erode 
the civilian access to food: food processing plant has been destroyed, 
refrigeration facilities has no electricity, and the normal mechanisms 
for food distribution (roads, bridges, transport) have been totally disrupted. 
The food crisis, a direct result of the economic sanctions, was 
further exacerbated by denying Iraq the opportunity to reconstruct its 
own devastated agricultural sector: sanctions apply not only to foodstuffs 
but also to seed, pesticides, agricultural machinery and plant, and the 
spare parts that would have allowed the repair of existing equipment. 
The bombing of the power stations has dramatically affected the agricultural 
sector, as like others. The collapse of the power system has resulted 
in the long-term flooding of much agricultural land and increased salt 
concentrations in the soil. With spare parts for damaged pumps no longer 
available, large areas of agricultural land have been lost.^° There has also 
been sharp decline in the yield of grain crops (wheat, barley, grain, corn 
and rice). For example, the wheat yield was 900 Kg/donum (1 hectare 
= 4 donums) in 1989. but only 165 kg/donum in 1994, barley saw a 
similar decline, from 830 kg/donum to 195 Kg/donum over the same 
period. Thus sanctions have two way impact: food imports were blocked 
and domestic production was collapsing. 
The deepening food crisis in Iraq has increased the people's 
dependence on the public distribution system (PDS) which has become 
60. Soul Bloom, J.M. Miller, James Warner and Philippa Winkler (eds). Hidden 
Casualties (London: Earthscan Publications, 1994) pp. 156-157. 
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the life line of majority of the Iraqi families. Many families have become 
totally dependent on ration and charity for survival. The rationing system 
was established in September, 1990 a few weeks after the imposition 
of the sanctions regime. Ration cards were issued by the Iraqi government 
to each family without any kind of discrimination. Under this scheme 
each family member was entitled to identical monthly rations of basic 
food items including wheat flour, rice, sugar, tea and cooking oil. Besides, 
a few other items like lentils, dairy products, razor blades etc. were 
occasionally distributed. The main purpose of the rationing system was 
to ensure that every citizen received at least a certain secure food 
allocation, which if purchased on the open market, would cost 20 to 
30 times as much. 
Although the public distribution system was being administered 
very efficiently and effectively but it was felt to be insufficiently to 
meet out the needs of the Iraqis.^' The rations provided enough food 
to feed an average family for fifteen days each month; the rest of the 
month was the responsibility of the individual or family. The rationing 
system remained in place in subsequent years, though it became increasingly 
inadequate with time. The government rationing system according to one 
estimate, could provide only about one third of the typical family's food 
needs, resulting in a strikingly low level of dietary intake. The situation 
was particularly alarming with respect to the nutritional status of children, 
61. "Food Supply Situation and Crop Outlook in Iraq", in Food Outlook, Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) Rome, July 1993, pp. 22-26. 
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pregnant and lactating mothers as well as households especially headed 
by widows, divorced and deserted women. In consequence, large numbers 
of Iraqis have now food intakes lower than those of the populations 
in the disaster stricken African countries." The situation was to further 
deteriorate with the passage of time: by early 1996, the World Health 
Organization was reporting that 'the vast majority of Iraqis continue to 
survive on a semi starvation diet.' 
The food consumption pattern of the Iraqi families has also been 
severely affected due to sanctions. Most families now subsist on bread 
and occasionally seasoned vegetables such as okra, tomatoes, potatoes 
and eggplants. Iraqis are known for favouring meat in most of their meals 
including breakfast. But due to the hike in the most of their meals including 
breakfast. But due to the hike in meat prices it has become beyond their 
reach. The consumption of meat, for many formerly eaten once or twice 
weekly has ceased altogether. 
Thus sanctions have caused 'persistent deprivation' severe hunger 
and malnutrition for a vast majority of the Iraqi population, particularly 
the vulnerable groups-children under five, expectant/nursing women, widows, 
orphans, the sick, the elderly and disabled. To continue the sanctions 
in their present form would only serve to aggravate the already grave 
food supply situation. 
62. Ibid. 
181 
The effect of sanctions is much more than economic. Deprivation 
and a deep sense of isolation has triggered a host of social changes that 
are changing the faces of Iraqi society. Family values have been damaged, 
children have been forced to work, to become street kids, to beg and 
engage in crime. Young women have been forced into prostitution by 
the destitution of their families. Fathers have abandoned their families. 
Crimes are in rise. Thefts, burglaries and armed holdups are multiplying. 
So called Islamic measures taken by the government - the amputation 
of thieves' hands, the banning of alcohol in public place among others 
have not reduced crime or halted the decomposition of society.*^ 
Since the President Saddam Hussein's ruling Bath Party came to 
power following a coup in 1968, the secularism and socialism have been 
the ideological pillars of the regime. Now a religious revival is sweeping 
over country. Iraqis who plunged from a middle class life-style the depths 
of despair are embracing religion. One indication of the new religious 
observance is mosque attendance. Ten years ago only a trickle of people 
heeded the call of the Muezzin, these days Friday prayers are making 
a comeback. At the same time an increasing number of Iraqi women are 
honouring the Muslim dress code, at least in Public. More Shiaite women 
have taken up the all in one abaya like their counterparts in neighbouring 
Iran. Many Sunni women have adopted the simple head scarf, which was 
until recently, the trademark of Palestinian women in Iraq. It is not only 
63. Eric Rouleau, n. 28, p. 65. 
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Muslims who are moving closer to religion. Iraq's one million Christians 
have also rediscovered the Church*". 
This new adherence to religion is not in itself cause of alarm. 
But there is no telling what kind of influence it will have on the political 
culture when Saddam Hussein either dies or is ousted from power. During 
19 years of dictatorship, political challenges have been routinely crushed 
so there fs little chance that a formidable fundamentalist movement will 
emerge just yet. However, a vibrant Islamic political force, backed by 
the country's majority Shiaite population and supported from the outside 
by the Islamic Republic of Iran, is entirely possible in the post-Saddam 
period." 
The embargo has also badly hit the educational system which are 
considered to be backbone for the development of any country. Although 
sanctions have terribly affected entire educational system the worst affected 
have been the primary and secondary education. Thousands of schools 
have been destroyed or damaged by bombing and that now they are in 
bad need of repair. Basic items such as chalk, pencils, erasers, notebooks, 
textbooks, papers and blackboards are either absent or in short supply.** 
Many of the surviving schools are without electrical supply, water or 
sanitation facilities. There has been massive increase in drop out rates. 
64. Gale Cardozo, "A Slow but Steady Decline" The Middle East, August 1998, p. 
46. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid 
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According to the UN Children's Fund, two children out of five have dropped 
out of school. As a result the rate of illiteracy is on the rise. 
Higher education is also suffering. Most universities are barely 
limping along and students themselves are hardly interested in earning 
an advanced degree, since these days a college graduate can expect to 
take home the equivalent of $ 2 a month. Many educated young people 
have left their academic studies to work in services, taking menial jobs 
such as taxi drivers and mechanics. Intellectuals, writers and professors 
in search of a better life have left Iraq for Libya, yemen and other Arab 
states where they have found relatively high paying jobs in schools and 
universities. Naturally the education system has been hit hardest by this 
'brain drain'^' 
A New Iraq Policy: 
The impact of sanctions has been wpll documented over the years. 
The destructive potential of economic sanctions can be seen most clearly, 
albeit in an extreme form in Iraq. No one knows with any precision, 
how many Iraqi civilians have died as a result, but various agencies of 
the United Nations, which oversees the sanctions have estimated that they 
have contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths. By 1998 Iraqi infant 
mortality had reportedly risen from the pre-Gulf war rate of 3.7 per cent 
to 12 percent. Inadequate food and medical supplies, as well as breakdown 
in sewage and sanitation system and in the electrical power system needed 
67. Ibid 
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to run them, reportedly cause an increase of 40,000 deaths annually 
of children and of 50,000 deaths annually of older Iraqis. If the UN 
estimates of the human damage in Iraq are even roughly correct, therefore, 
it would appear that in a so far futile effort to remove Saddam Hussein 
from power-economic sanctions may well have been a necessary cause 
of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-
called weapons of mass destruction throughout history. 
Study after study shows that sanctions almost always fail to achieve 
their stated objectives. They tend to miss a country's leadership and hit 
the innocent. They impact most on democratic societies, but fail to impress 
the dictatorial regimes whose leaders often remain untouched and whose 
civilian pay the price. They are in toto notoriously unsuccessful. World 
community should realize that the sanctions would only hurt the innocent 
Iraqi people not weaken Saddam Hussein whose removal has always been 
sought by the United States as main political goal of the sanctions. But 
unfortunately sanctions have missed the target. It is not a prudent policy 
to target helpless people for the sins of their leader. Continuation of 
sanctions are tantamount to shooting down a plane full of innocent people 
because there are hijackers aboard. One should not forget that sanctions 
are as much a violation of the rights of the Iraqi people as the brutal 
tactics used by Saddam. 
The suffering of the Iraqi people has reached a point where it 
can no longer be overlooked or ignored because it now threatens to bring 
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upon the society as a whole a horrendous disaster that may lead to its 
collapse. Iraq's younger generation of professionals, the political leadership 
of the future-bitter angry, isolated and dangerously alienated from the 
world is maturing in an environment not dissimilar to that found in Germany 
under the conditions set by the Versailles treaty. An entire people have 
been stripped of their pride and dignity; they are humiliated and angry, 
and may find it difficult to move forward, to collaborate with other 
nations in the gulf-indeed with the entire international community. We 
need to worry about the longer term social and political impact of sanctions 
together with today's death and despair. 
With this distressing situations we need to find a compromise to 
address the plight of Iraq. The current sanctions policy toward Iraq is 
rigid and increasingly counter productive. Members of the Security Council 
must sit together and evolve fresh initiative not only to defuse the rising 
tension but strive for a ultimate solution to end misery on Iraq. For more 
than ten years, injustice has been done to the Iraqi people for none of 
their faults and embargo has caused deaths of hundreds of thousands people. 
How long will they be denied justice? Any further extension of embargo 
in present form would further violate international laws and human rights 
in Iraq. Any further move to suppress Iraq would be mockery of the UN 
and international watchdogs. 
Let us retain all possible control over arms manufacture and sales 
of arms to Iraq. Let us retain the capacity to monitor and observe. Remove 
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economic sanctions now and sustain the capacity to prohibit military renewal 
and the development of weapons of mass destruction. Let us give up 
the UN weapons of mass destruction: economic sanctions. Let us risk 
a new approach. In other words accept the early success of UNSCOM 
and reject the continuing and politically motivated search of needles in 
the military capacity haystacks of Iraq Let us restrict ourselves to the 
wording and intent of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. 
Avoid add-ons of toppling the Iraqi leadership, of assassinating Saddam 
Hussein, these calls will simply enhance the president not only in Iraq 
but throughout the Arab and Islamic world. Let us adopt a-genuinely 
evenhanded approach to the pursuit of peace and disarmament throughout 
the entire middle east. 
Furthermore, Security Council deliberations, and resulting outcomes 
that grossly neglect improper behaviour of some member states while 
authorizing retaliatory enforcement on others, are noted with great bitterness 
in the Arab-Islamic world and beyond. Not only are the reputation and 
glaringly undemocratic workings of the council severely threatened, but 
the credibility and the very integrity of the United Nations itself widely 
questioned. Finally, let us take the United Nations back to the legal and 
moral high ground on which it belongs. 
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CHAPTER-VI 
Iraq And Weapons Inspection Imbroglio 
The history of forced disarmament in general has been a sorry 
one. With the exception of Germany and Japan, who following World 
War II were subjected as defeated powers to successful military limitations, 
the efforts made by major powers since then in this respect have failed 
to achieve their desired objectives. Whether in the form of comprehensive 
or partial arms control or disarmament, conducted within or outside the 
framework of the United Nations, all members have inevitably been 
circumvented by the complexity of enforcing such measures and preventing 
states from finding ways of getting around the measures and manipulating 
them to their individual geo-political interests. 
In recent times, no case has illustrated this so starkly as that of 
Iraq. The failure of the UN to enforce a coercive process of disarmament 
of Iraq following the Gulf War of 1991 has not only caused immeasurable 
suffering of the Iraqi people,' but also led to a long period of tension 
and conflict between Iraq and the UN, or more specifically, between two 
of its powerful members, the United States and Britain. It has also generated 
a major split between the five permanent members of the UN Security 
1. On suffering of the Iraqi people see Denis J. Halliday, "Iraq and the UN's 
Weapons of Mass Destruction", Current History, February 1999, pp. 65-68. 
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Council. The process has now reached a worrisome impasse, setting Iraq, 
the US and Britain and for that matter, the UN, on a prolonged course 
of military confrontation, at the cost of making the region more 
unpredictable and volatile than has been the case historically, and imperilling 
the chances of creating a stable post-cold war world order.^ 
Disarming Iraq: 
The impasse over lifting of sanction and the weapons inspection^ 
still continues. Despite a decade of hard work of inspecting every nook 
and corner of Iraq in search of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
the UN team has failed to give a certificate, so that sanction could be 
lifted. The team has solely blamed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein for 
not cooperating with the team and creating obstacles in their task of 
inspection. The military strikes in December 1998 by the USA and the 
UK finally ended any hope of returning of UN's inspection team and 
thus has put the task in limbo and prolonged the suffering of Iraqis. 
It has now become evidently clear that the USA and its allies have 
taken refuge in the Security Council resolution 687 for legitimizing all 
their misdeeds, which they are perpetuating from very beginning of the 
Gulf War. As per the Security Council resolution 687, the lifting of sanctions 
if linked to Iraq's destruction of all its weapons of mass destruction-
2. Amin Saikal, "Iraq, UNSCOM and the US: A UN Debacle", Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999, p. 283. 
3. For recent work on the weapons inspection see Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secret: The 
Hunt For Iraq's Hidden Weapons (London: Harper Collins, 1999). 
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nuclear, chemical and biological under international supervision and 
monitoring; and furthermore to pay the UN for costs and expenditures 
incurred by it due to the invasion. According to another resolution (715), 
under the supervision of the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iraq 
is required to accept the installation of a UN Weapons Inspection 
Monitoring System in its territory to make sure that it would not cheat 
in the production of weapons in the future. Furthermore, Iraq is required 
to grant UN inspectors unconditional access to any place in the country 
for surprise inspection of its weapons facilities or weapons related 
documents. So lifting of sanctions is linked to a full compliance of all 
these conditions by Iraq.'' Besides, the USA has added its own condition 
by linking the lifting of sanctions to Saddam Hussein's removal, which 
has nothing to do with any of the Security Council resolutions. By adding 
its own condition the USA has only contributed to complicating the already 
complex situation. 
These resolutions are so punitive and humiliating that any slight 
attempt to evade them by Saddam Hussein had led air attacks and bombings 
by the US and its allies, several times. Now it has become almost a 
routine feature. The frequent air strikes have caused massive destruction 
to men and materials. For instance, on January 13, 1993 only a week 
before leaving his office, the US President Bush ordered more than a 
4. For texts of these resolutions see Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq (New 
York: St. Martins, 1996), pp. 222-236. 
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hundred US and allied warplanes to attack Iraq in retaliation for its alleged 
intrusion into Kuwait and for refusal to cooperate with the UNSCOM 
headed by Rolf Ekeus who resigned in July 1997.^ And barely after 5 
months, on June 20, 1993 President Clinton ordered a cruise missile 
attack against the Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters in Baghdad for 
the alleged plot to assassinate Bush when he visited Kuwait.* Citing 
"compelling evidence that there was infact a plot to assassinate former 
President Bush", President Clinton said that the attack was aimed at crippling 
"Iraq's capacity to support violence against the United States and other 
nations". Clinton further said the cruise missile barrage was intended 
to "send a message to those who engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, 
to deter further violence against our people and to affirm the expectation 
of civilized behaviour among nations".' However, Seymour Hersh, a reputed 
investigative Journalist is skeptical of the authenticity of the plot against 
Bush.« 
Iraq while condemning the US missile attack, in which scores of 
Iraqis were killed, said that story of plot to kill Bush was fabricated 
by Kuwait's vile rulers - working with the agencies of the US Administration. 
It described the attack as "unjust and cowardly aggression against Iraq".' 
5. Bush in a statement had said that it did not matter that bombing came just one 
week before he leaves office. See, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 15, 
1993. 
6. The Hindustan Times, June 28, 1993. 
7. The Hindustan Times, June 28, 1993. 
8. Seymour Hersh, "A Case not closed", The New Yorker, November 1,1993, pp. 
80-86. 
9. The Hindustan Times, June 28, 1993. 
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Most interestingly the United States invoked the UN provision of self-
defence to justify its attack, though there was no any direct threat to 
its security. It was nothing but misuse of Art. 51 of the UN charter which 
provides for individual or collective self-defence. The right to self-defence 
permitted to member states by Art. 51 of the UN Charter is only against 
actual armed attack.'" In 1986, President Reagan had similarly ordered 
an air strike against Libya for the terrorist bombing of a German discotheque 
in which a US serviceman had been killed. 
These punitive measures by the US and the continued pressures 
of embargo consequently left before Saddam Hussein no other options 
but to agree to comply resolution 715. The decision taken in this regard 
on November 26, 1993 by the Iraqi government paved the way for the 
UN to start its weapons inspection and monitoring work as provided in 
the resolution 715. Subsequently, the UN inspection team entered Iraq 
and reportedly by 1994 they had established an elaborate monitoring system 
at 200 industrial and military installations throughout Iraq. It was hoped 
that the UN inspection team might submit a favourable report on the 
success of deployed monitoring system so as to enable to council to 
consider the lifting of sanctions. The two permanent Security Council 
members France and China also favoured early lifting of sanctions. But 
the USA and Britain were wehmentally opposed to any such move until 
Iraq had renounced its claims to Kuwait and recognized the Iraq-Kuwait 
border in accordance with the Security Council resolution 833. 
10. See J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law (New Delhi: Aditya Books, 
1994), p. 28. 
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Frustrated with being unsuccessful on the front of getting sanctions 
lifted, the mercurial and unpredictable Saddam on October 5, 1994 shot 
himself in the foot again by moving 80,000 Republican Guard troops 
to positions close to the Kuwaiti border presumably to pressurize the 
Security Council to end sanctions. It was the biggest troops movement 
ever since end of Gulf War arousing fears of a repeat of the August 
1990 invasion of Kuwait, which had led to Gulf War. But as one could 
have easily guessed, his gamble backfired. President Clinton immediately 
responded by assembling a 34,000 member force in the Gulf region 
to repel him from any potential attack on Kuwait. In the face of a US 
threat of a preemptive attack, the Iraqi leader blinked and turned his troops 
back from the Kuwaiti border," Realising that he had blundered, Saddam 
Hussein made efforts to regain the sympathy of the Council members. 
As a conciliatory move he renounced Iraq's claims over Kuwait and 
recognised the Iraqi-Kuwait border. But Saddam's efforts did not yield 
desired results. He could not convince council's members about desirability 
of lifting of sanctions against his country. The US categorically said that 
Iraq's recognition of Kuwaiti sovereignty and border was not enough to 
achieve a lifting of UN sanctions against Baghdad. A State Department 
spokesman reacted: "border recognition would meet only one of a number 
of requirements to which Iraqi has not complied and would not in itself 
establish Iraq's peaceful intentions which were called into question by 
11. The Hindustan Times, October 15, 1994. 
193 
its provocation in October".'^ Even Russia, France and China who were 
previously sympathetic to Saddam, joined the US and Britain in deciding 
to stick to the embargo. 
However, moved by horrifying conditions in Iraq due to sanctions, 
Russia and France made the Security Council to pass Resolution 986 
in April 1995, allowing Iraq to export $1 billion worth of oil (oil-for-
food) to be renewed every three months. A quarter of those revenues, 
however, were to be used to compensate victims of the invasion and to 
finance the UN disarmament mission in Iraq.'^ But this offer was too 
little to be accepted by Iraq which had already rejected the similar offer 
made by the Council in October 1991 as part of its resolution 715. The 
council once again made a similar offer in October 1995. But like in 
the past Saddam rejected the offer again. Saddam Hussein; however, could 
not stick to this position for long time. The impact of sanctions had 
now started showing its uglier face. The USA and Britain had also made 
it clear that they were not going to soften their position on sanctions. 
All these factors compelled Saddam to compromise with the situation 
and consequently on May 20, 1996 he decided to accept the UN offer 
of oil-for-food programme. Iraq agreed that it would sell oil worth $2 
billion for a six-month period to be renewable by the Council. As noted 
above, under the formula, about 30 per cent of the money would go to 
12. The Hindustan Times, November 10, 1994. 
13. For text of the resolution and for the food-for-oil arrangement see, UN Chronicle, 
Vol. 33 No. 4, 1996, p. 71. 
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Kuwait to compensate victims of the invasion; about five percent would 
be used to cover the costs of UN operations in Iraq, and 15 per cent 
would be used for the kurds, and reminder half of the amount would 
be used by Iraq to buy food and medicines under UN supervision. 
Howsoever humiliating might have been the deal, it certainly provided 
Iraq an opportunity to manage foods for hungry/dying masses and to 
restructure its economy which had been totally crippled due to prolonged 
sanctions and frequent US attacks which had destroyed its infrastructure 
completely including public utility services like water and electricity 
system deliberately in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
and its additional protocols of 1977.''* But even this minimum offer fell 
through until December 10 1996, as the Security Council had delayed 
its immediate implementation at the insistence of the US and Britain, 
following Saddam Hussein's intervention in early September 1996 in 
Northern Iraq. This time again the USA unilaterally without the approval 
of the Security Council launched 44 satellite guided Cruise and Tomahawk 
missiles at the Iraqi military command and control facilities in Southern 
Iraq in response to Hussein's "Violence and aggression" against the kurd.'^ 
It also, without the Security Council's approval, extended the no fly zone 
in the South to the 32nd parallel which is close to the outskirts of Baghdad. 
This was a clear violation of Iraq's sovereignty. These actions, however, 
14. For discussion of the Geneva Conventions, see Gerhard Von Glahn, Law Among 
Nations (New York : Macmillan, 1992) pp. 696-711. 
15. The Hindustan Times, September 7, 1996. 
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forced Iraq to withdraw from the kurdish North. The US and Britain 
subsequently permitted oil sales to go through in December only after 
they were satisfied with the monitoring mechanism put in place by the 
UN. 
Although by April 1997, the IAEA reported that its Nuclear 
Monitoring Group had conducted 850 inspections in Iraq at more than 
65 facilities, the UNSCOM had repeatedly complained of Iraq's refusal 
to permit it to check any suspected weapons installations it had wanted 
to inspect unconditionally and therefore called for the continuation of 
sanctions. It became a never-ending hides and seek game between the 
UNSCOM and the Iraq. Surprisingly despite Iraq's reported compliance 
of many of the Security Council's resolutions, the Council insisted on 
continuing with the draconian sanctions. Infact Council should have 
reciprocated Iraq's partial concessions in terms of easing sanctions.'* 
Thus refusal to ease sanctions, UNSCOM's failure to submit a favourable 
report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and the US-British obsession 
to get rid of Saddam Hussein in the face of horrendous suffering by 
the Iraqis have led to recurring stand-off between the Security Council 
and Iraq. 
The crisis over the UN weapons inspection took a dangerous turn 
with Richard Butler, the head of the UNSCOM, pulling out all UN weapons 
inspectors in response to the expulsion of the US inspectors from Iraqi 
16. George Lopez and David Cortright,"Pain and Promise", The Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54 No. 3, May/June 1998, p. 42. 
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territory. On October 29, 1997, Iraq accused three American inspectors 
as being spies and gave them a week to leave Baghdad. Iraq, however, 
had stressed that other inspectors were free to remain and Butler could 
have easily continued the inspection process until the problems over the 
US presence were resolved. But Butler adopted confrontationist approach 
and decided to pull out all members of the UNSCOM. Iraq had accused 
UNSCOM of being a tool of the US and having too many Americans 
in key position and deliberately delaying completion of its weapons work. 
Infact long and comprehensive sanctions had suffocated the Iraqi economy 
and had thrown its health, education, and sanitation services into acute 
crisis and now Baghdad wanted UN to set a short time-frame for lifting 
sanctions. Iraq having fed up with the prolonged inspection process asked 
the United Nations not to use the US reconnaissance planes to supervise 
Iraqi compliance in eliminating weapons of mass destruction, even it 
threatened to shoot down U-2 spy planes flying over Iraq. Iraq charged 
that the US was utilising the U-2 spy plane to map out areas it wanted 
to bomb.'^ 
In response to Iraq's continued non-cooperation with the US weapons 
inspectors, the Security Council on 13th November 1997 slapped a travel 
ban on Iraqi officials. The unanimous decision by the 15 member Security 
Council to impose the travel ban came after the United States and Britain 
agreed to delete paragraphs from the draft resolution threatening Iraq 
with military action or serious consequences. The resolution, however, 
17. The Hindustan Times, November 9, 1997. 
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warned Iraq of unspecified "further measures" if it failed to rescind its 
October 29 order excluding Americans from the inspection team. But 
Russia, France, Egypt and other nation stressed that any further measures 
would have to be discussed by the Council again and that the vote did 
not authorise the use of force.'* The Council, however, condemned the 
continued violations by Iraq of its obligation under the resolutions and 
asked it to cooperate "fully and unconditionally" with arms inspectors. 
Interestingly such new sanction (travel ban) failed to gather support in 
the Security Council three weeks ago, but the real possibility of an 
American military strike, which few other nations were willing to back, 
appeared to had brought the Security Council together to condemn Iraq 
unanimously. 
The escalating stand-off between Baghdad and the UN eased somewhat 
on November 16, 1997 with Iraq offering a plan to allow expelled US 
weapons inspectors to return. And finally on 19th of November in Moscow, 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, following a meeting between 
President Boris Yeltsin and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, 
announced compromised formula to allow the UN inspectors to return 
along with their American colleagues. According to this plan the UN 
inspection teams' search for chemical, nuclear and biological weapons 
should not be open ended but should reach a speedy conclusion so that 
the ending of the debilitating sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf 
18. The Hindustan Times, November 14, 1997. 
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War could be considered. "Primkov's diplomatic foray had the backing 
of Washington which was hopeful that he could find a face-saving formula 
for Saddam Hussein to step back from the brink. 
Although Primkov's intervention had temporarily defused the crisis 
but Clinton Administration was still skeptical of Hussein's willingness 
to abide by the Security Council resolution and felt that a strict inspection 
regime must continue. Russia called for an emergency meeting of UNSCOM 
in order to follow up on Primkov's pledge to Baghdad to expedite the 
work of the inspection teams and the eventual lifting of at least some 
of the sanctions. But the meeting did not leave the Russians or Iraqis 
anything to cheer about. The Russian argument was that the inspection 
had demonstrated Iraqi compliance with the Security Council orders to 
end nuclear weapons and missile development, thus justifying a partial 
lifting of the sanctions. But President Clinton had a contrary view. He 
said that not enough has been done and more verification were needed 
especially with regard to biological and chemical weapons.^" 
The new crisis was simmering with the UNSCOM insistence on 
inspection of some areas, which Baghdad had claimed were out of bounds 
on the ground of national security. These so-called sensitive sites included 
78 reported places of Saddam Hussein which Iraq's had described as 
"symbol of national sovereignty". Immediately after Iraqi refusal, the US 
19. The Hindustan Times, November 20, 1997. 
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Defence Secretary William Cohen warned th^t unless Iraq allow the weapons 
inspectors to inspect these sites which it has defined as Presidential 
palaces and has declared off-limits, it could face stricter sanctions or 
as a last resort, a military attack.^' Iraq on the other hand accused the 
US of pushing UN arms inspectors into a fresh crisis by insisting on 
access to Presidential sites. However, Iraq had showed some of these 
controversial sites to foreign reporters and arms experts to prove its 
point that there was nothing to hide and its refusal was a principle of 
national honour. Meanwhile the USA deployed some 30 fighters and 
bombers in Bahrain to keep up the military presence. And to demonstrate 
its solidarity with the USA, Britain dispatched an air craft carrier to 
the Persian Gulf. 
The ongoing stand-off involving Iraq, the United States and the United 
Nations took a fresh twist with Baghdad demanding lifting of the UN 
sanctions within six months, failing which it would seriously reconsider 
continuation of thfe two billion dollar oil-for-food deal it had agreed 
in 1996. Saddam Hussein infact believed that no matter what he did, the 
US and the UK would keep attaching new conditions each one extraneous 
to the Security Council resolution 687 of April 1991. He said that two 
allies would try to shift the goal posts to deprive Baghdad of its right 
under clause 22 of Resolution 687 to have the sanctions lifted fully.^^ 
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Meanwhile on December 5, 1997 the Security Council unanimously voted 
to extend a plan enabling Iraq to sell limited amount of oil to by food 
and medicine for its people suffering under sanctions. The plan began 
a year ago and needed to be renewed on December 5, 1997. But this 
time the plan provoked more controversy than in the past. UN officials, 
Iraq and most Security Council members said that this programme was 
mal-functioning, was inefficient and had too many delays.^' And to great 
relief to Iraq, the difference between permanent members of the Security 
Council over ongoing sanctions against Iraq came to the fore again. During 
consultation for extension of oil-for-food programme Russia and France 
demanded a stronger commitment by the Council to increase the amount 
of oil Iraq can sell once the Secretary General make a recommendation. 
France also floated a proposal that the Council should put an end to 
the embargo and institute a new weapons monitoring programme. The 
proposal circulated on January 14, 1998 said that the oil embargo could 
no longer be defended as it hurts the people of Iraq and keeps them 
hostages of their authorities. "The embargo has become the wrong tool 
to achieve the goals of the Security Council" it said.^ "* China and Russia 
had also been expressing the view that the UNSCOM in its present form 
had outlived its usefulness. 
With ultimatum and counter-ultimatum flying between Iraq and the 
US, the situation was once again hotting up, with an imminent threat of 
23. The Hindustan Times, December 6, 1997. 
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an unilateral military strike by American forces. The US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright on January 30, 1998 said that Saddam Hussein 
should realise that "we have all but exhausted the diplomatic options".^' 
The Secretary flew to Europe to urge the French and the Russian Foreign 
Ministers of the need for unity in the UN Security Council on the issue 
of inspection of Iraqi sites. What Ms Albright was saying, in effect, was 
that if the threat of force did not induce Saddam Hussein to comply, 
the US and Britain were ready to use force, despite any hesitation on 
the part of Paris and Moscow. As tension intensified, the Iraqi government 
began register men of fighting age to train them as "volunteer army" 
to defend their country against the possible US attack. Men from their 
teens to their 70s were seen forming ragged lines, chanting anti-American 
slogans and learning how to stand at attention.^^ 
In the meanwhile, recognising the deprivation that international 
sanctions had inflicted on Iraqi people, on February 1, 1998 the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan recommended in a report to the Security Council 
that the present limits of $2 billion worth of Iraqi-oil sales every six 
months be raised to $5.2 billion for the next six month, in order to 
pay for more food and medicine and to repair Iraq's deteriorating 
infrastructure. "Under present conditions'". Annan warned "the rate of 
deterioration will continue to increase and, with it, the threat of a complete 
breakdown of the network. The humanitarian consequences of such 
25. The Hindustan Times, January 31, 1998. 
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development could potentially dwarf all other difficulties endured by the 
Iraqi people"." The Council with reluctant support of the United States, 
subsequently approved Annan's recommendation to which Iraq reluctantly 
agreed. 
The efforts to resolve the crisis through diplomacy continued even 
as the US appeared to be inching closer to a sustained and devastating 
air attack on Iraq, which somewhat mellowed down Baghdad's position 
and as a result Iraq offered on February 4, 1998 to open eight so-called 
controversial Presidential sites for inspection by the UNSCOM, suspected 
of concealing weapons of mass destruction. But to a major setback to 
diplomatic efforts the US administration rejected the offer. White House 
spokesman M. Mc Curry said that the offer fell short of the US demand 
for "unfettered access". Dismissing Iraqi proposal, the US Under Secretary 
of State Thomas Pickering reacted that "to be effective, inspections and 
monitoring can be limited neither by dictating the composition of the 
teams nor by restricting access to certain sites, nor by limiting the 
number of visits, nor limiting the visits to a certain period of times''.^* 
As a military strike by the US appeared to be imminent the UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan cancelled his proposed West Asia trip to concentrate 
on ever more urgent negotiations at the UN headquarters. He urged all 
parties to be more flexible in finding a peaceful solution. 
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In order to strengthen its case and to muster support for military 
attack, the Clinton administration, meanwhile, began publicizing that Iraq 
was still hiding scud missiles with chemical and biological warheads. 
The missiles which Pentagon believed were hidden at sites that Iraq had 
declared off the limits to the UN weapons inspectors, could represent 
a major threat to US forces in the region and to neighbouring nations 
because of Iraq's covert chemical and biological weapons capabilities. 
Ignoring Russia's plea to wait for a diplomatic solution. Bill Clinton 
on February 14, 1998 issued a fresh warning to Iraq saying that the United 
States could not walk away from its obligation to stop Baghdad from 
developing weapons of mass destruction as the Pentagon made a detailed 
plan to strike Iraq with cruise missiles and bombs. He said that diplomacy 
had almost run its course and he would launch a strike against Iraq unless 
Saddam Hussein agrees unconditionally to allow the UN inspectors free 
and unfettered access to its weapons sites.^' However, annoyed with the 
US threat to use force against Iraq, the Russian President Yeltsin warned 
that any attack on Iraq would affect Russia's "vital interest" and could 
lead to a wider war. Moscow insisted that the crisis must be solved by 
peaceful methods but could not broker a negotiated settlement. France 
also insisted that alTdiplomatic avenues must be exhausted before force 
applied. 
29. The Hindustan Times, February 15, 1998. 
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Kofi Annan's Mission to Baghdad: 
In the midst of sabre rattling, on February 20, 1998, persuaded 
by Third Word countries, the Arab League and the Security Council, invited 
by Iraqi leadership with initial US opposition, Annan went to Iraq as a 
last ditch effort to find a diplomatic solution. Annan's trip was seen by 
many as the last real chance for preventing a flare-up. Annan was quite 
optimistic about his last moment peace mission to Iraq. His optimism 
was equally shared by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. However, 
Annan's arrival was paralleled by Clinton's television message beamed 
to Arab nations. Clinton said "nobody wants to use force. But if Saddam 
refuses to keep his commitments to the international community, we 
must be prepared to deal directly with the threat these weapons pose 
to the Iraqi people, to Iraq's neighbours, and to rest of the world. Either 
Saddam acts or we will have to". Clinton also said that the US had no 
quarrel with the Iraqi people and said it would tr\' to avoid harming innocent 
people in the event of military action. ^^  
After several rounds of intensive talks with Iraqi team led by Tariq 
Aziz and meeting with Saddam Hussein, Annan clinched a deal with Iraq 
paving way for the full implementation of the UN Security Council 
resolutions and most likely preventing possible US military strikes against 
the Baghdad, which had become imminent. The Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by Aziz and Annan, stipulated that: (1) Iraq will 
30. The Hindustan Times, February 22, 1998. 
205 
cooperate with UNSCOM, (2) UN member states will respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, (3) Iraq will allow UNSCOM 
and IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access in conformity 
with the Security Council resolutions 687 and 715, and (4) UNSCOM 
will intensify its efforts in order to complete its mandate so as to enable 
the Security Council to lift the sanctions. '^ 
As far as was known, one of the face-saving concessions made 
to Saddam Hussein was the part of the agreement that stipulated that 
senior diplomats appointed by the Secretary General will accompany the 
UNSCOM experts as they inspect the restricted sites, including the eight 
so called controversial Presidential sites. The scheme provided for the 
selection of a pool of about a hundred 'senior diplomats' to be nominated 
by countries with mission in Baghdad or the surrounding region. No fewer 
than two such diplomats would be assigned to every arms inspection teams. 
The US officials however, expressed their concern that induction of 
diplomats into the inspection teams might adversely affect the 
professionalism of the monitoring process. But the UNSCOM chief Butler 
said that he had no objection since professional inspectors' form UNSCOM 
and IAEA would lead the team. 
While the deal was welcomed by Arab states, Russia, France and 
China, Clinton the US President was skeptical about it. Clinton made 
it clear that "what really matter is Iraq's compliance, not its stated 
31. For full txt of the agremeent see The Hindustan Times, February 25,1998. 
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commitments, not what Iraq says but what it does". He said that if Baghdad 
did not keep its word this time, everyone would understand that the US 
and hopefully all of our allies would have the unilateral right to respond 
at a time, place and manner of our own choosing".^^ However, Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz pledged that Iraq would honour the arms 
inspection deal with the UN chief Kofi Annan. "It will keep its promises 
properly and seriously" Aziz said. 
Although it would be naive to say that Annan's brokered deal had 
syllogistically signalled a lasting peace in the region. But that should 
not detract any from Annan's consummate diplomacy, he certainly deserved 
a cheer or two for nudging a bigoted Baghdad to the negotiating table, 
and staying what would have been a debilitating air strike on an enervated 
Iraqi populace. In other words, while the Secretary General's successful 
mission appeared to had staved off an impending attack, the crisis in 
respect of Iraq was yet to be finally resolved. Annan's diplomatic coup 
was all the more remarkable since the Iraqi leadership's hospitality record 
for UN chiefs had always been anything but disarming. In 1991, just before 
the allied "Operation Desert Storm" was unleashed on Iraq, Javier Perez 
d Cuellar had flown to Baghdad to try and prevail upon President Saddam 
Hussein. But latter kept De Cuellar waiting for nail-biting six hours, offered 
him nothing, and sent him home a humiliated man. Contrary to his 
predecessor Annan's diplomatic skill and style earned him the praise of 
32. The Hindustan rimes, February 25, 1998. 
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Iraqi leadership and cheers from the crowds in Baghdad.^' 
Remarkably there was considerable goodwill for Annan in Iraq. The 
Iraqi government appreciated the fact that although the Secretary General 
had talked tough on the weapons inspection issue, he had also repeatedly 
stressed that any solution must take into account the "dignity of Iraq". 
Baghdad has all along been insisting that its sovereignty is being undermined 
by the UNSCOM. Furthermore, by sending a team of experts form Vienna 
to prepare a map of the eight Presidential sites and placing them under 
the direction of Staffan de Mistura - a former UN humanitarian coordinator 
in Baghdad and a man seen as sympathetic to Iraqi concerns about the 
human impact of sanctions - Annan had already conceded the need for 
no-UNSCOM inspection machinery.^'' Annan also appointed two 
internationally respected diplomats to keep watchful eyes on the weapons 
inspectors to make sure that they would conduct their inspection of 
Presidential sites according to the procedure agreed to between Annan 
and Iraq. The one was Jayantha Dhanapala, as commissioner of the special 
team to accompany UNSCOM, the other was well known Indian diplomat 
Prakash Shah former Indian permanent representative to the UN as his 
special political envoy to help him coordinate the large UN operations 
in Iraq and keep an open communication with the leadership there.^ ^ Annan 
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said in his letter appointing Shah that he would help prevent problems 
from developing into full fledged crisis threatening to international peace 
and security in the area. Thus successful Baghdad venture made Kofi 
Annan a diplomatic leader of substance - not a surrogate for the US 
but a substitute. 
Even after successful Baghdad mission's of Annan the Security 
Council remained divided on how to deal with the crisis and this very 
fact brought great comfort to Iraqi officials. Despite several days of 
carefully calibrated war mongering, Washington was no where closer to 
winning international support for the use of force against Iraq. The US 
Secretary of State Ms Madeleine Albright shuttled between Europe and 
Arab capitals with hysterical message about the threat to peace posed 
by Saddam Hussein but few had heeded her. Apart from Israel and Kuwait 
no country in the region had shown any enthusiasm for the US line. And 
elsewhere in the world only Britain had decided to stand by "Big Brother". 
Russia, France and China, on the other hand, had stated their categorical 
opposition to the use of force. President Boris Yeltsin had even gone 
to the extant of warning that a US attack on Iraq might spark off a 
world war. 
Whether they state or not "getting rid of Saddam Hussein" has 
always been one of the most important military objectives' in Iraq, inspite 
of the fact that American law forbids assassination of foreign leaders.^^ 
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Those who steer America's foreign policy doctrine believe that as long 
as Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq, long term peace could not 
be ensured in the region. To achieve this objective America has employed 
various options from targeting Saddam to supporting opposition parties.^' 
During the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath, Baghdad was full of 
stories about how the President would never sleep in the same site twice 
or even had to sleep with ordinary folk and adopted all manner of 
surreptitious moves and stealthy diversions to elude American Jets and 
missiles.^* Recently increased aid to a fractured Iraqi opposition, was 
in news. It is revealing to note that Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National 
Congress finds himself being courted by senior officials in Washington. 
Then there is motley group of Iraqi National Accord (INA) comprising 
exiled Iraqi military and political figures who have received substantial 
funding from US intelligence sources.^^ However, toppling Hussein is 
simply incompatible with international law and cannot be a valid military, 
strategic diplomatic-objective. One could imagine the howls of protest 
that would go up if Libya's Gaddafi talks of setting a team to assassinate 
the US President.'"' 
What was more interesting that many senior US officials had 
proclaimed that they would prefer to deal with a successor regime in 
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Iraq because Saddam Hussein was a dictator who oppressed his own people. 
Sen Bob Kerry, a Nebraska Democrat, also said that; "I think we have 
got to change the objective and say that our nation is going to be on 
the side of liberating the people of Iraq from their prisons or from the 
terror of his dictatorship".'" But the question is that what is guarantee 
that a new Iraqi leader will respect human rights and will have the milk 
of human kindness flowing through his veins. There is also no guarantee 
that the new regime would respect the international norms imposed on 
it and would not acquire the weapons of mass destruction. And most 
importantly, in any case is Saddam Hussein all that different from many 
deadly third world dictators, past and present, to whom the US has supported? 
As agreed upon between UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and 
Iraq, the UN team led by controversial American Scott Ritter whom Iraq 
called a 'spy' began its task of inspecting the sites, which Iraq had placed 
off-limits. This was first inspection, since the crisis that had brought 
the nation to the brink of war in February. The UN team started their 
task of inspection of 8 controversial Presidential palaces in Baghdad on 
March 23, 1998, supervised by the UN special envoy Prakash Shah and 
the UN Under Secretary General for disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala. 
Inspite of some initial deadlock the UN team successfully completed 
the first search on April 3. Dhanapala expressed that the successful 
implementation of the accord in the first round would certainly help improve 
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relations between Iraq and the United Nations. "The February 23 accord", 
Dhanapala said "has stood the test" of cooperating with the inspections 
of eight so called Presidential sites that were at the heart of the stand 
off with the UN. The work of the UNSCOM inspectors were completed 
ten days ahead of time and Dhanapala said, it was because things worked 
out better."^ The other diplomats who accompanied the inspection also 
praised Iraqi cooperation with the team. German diplomat Horst Holthoff 
described Iraqi cooperation as fantastic and absolutely positive. But the 
chief of the UNSCOM, Butler had a different view. He indicated that 
Iraq was still no closer to meeting to requirements for lifting of sanctions. 
Meanwhile a new row cropped up between the United States and 
Iraq following a discovery on June 24, 1998 by US army laboratory that 
Iraqi missile warheads had carried traces of deadly nerve gas VX. The 
examination was done at the request of the United Nations' Commission 
charged with elimination of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Iraq, however, 
rejected the results contending that it had never filled any kind of munitions 
with VX gas. It also indicated that the US might have fabricated the results 
or the testing might have been defective and demanded its examination 
in a neutral country. It also said that the samples were taken individually 
without giving Baghdad equivalent samples as agreed upon for comparison 
and discussion.'*^ As a result of so called discovery of VX gas, the UN 
Security Council which was already due to meet on June 25 to consider 
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American demand for extension of sanctions against Iraq, decided to continue 
curbs against Iraq/^ 
Before final show down of December 1998, another important irritant 
had developed on Baghdad's refusal to accept the "Road map" for accelerated 
inspection offered by chief weapons inspector Richard Butler. Butler's 
plan had spelled out specific measures including release of additional 
documents - that Iraq must take before the UNSCOM could certify that 
Iraq has destroyed all illegal weapons. Butler had presented his inspection 
plan, which he called, a "road map to disarmament" to the Security Council 
in a two day briefing which ended on June 24, 1998. This new plan had 
generated immense opposition in Iraq. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 
Aziz accused Butler of playing "tricks and games" at the bidding of the 
United States."' Earlier Foreign Minister Saeed Sahhaf had noted that 
although Iraq had complied with UN resolutions, UNSCOM would not 
recommend lifting of sanctions. He said that the UN inspectors kept 
insisting on the same non-starter approach of casting doubts, building 
their understanding on assumptions, suspicions and not on facts and figures. 
The ongoing friction between Iraq and UNSCOM flared up on August 
5, 1998 when Iraq finally declared that it was ending its cooperation 
with UN inspectors and demanded the dismissal of Butler and restructuring 
of the commission on the ground that it was riddled with American and 
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Israeli spies, and that Butler was working for American political objectives 
and therefore deliberately prolonging the work of UNSCOM and the UN 
sanctions against Iraq. In retaliation to Iraqi non-cooperation the Security 
Council on September 9, passed an unanimous resolution depriving Iraq 
of any hope of lifting sanctions until it resumes cooperation with UNSCOM. 
The council also decided not to review the sanctions issue periodically, 
which it used to do after every six months. It was also decided by UNSCOM 
that it would withdraw its weapons inspectors from Iraq. This move came 
amid reports that the US was preparing to launch a military strike against 
Iraq in a bid to force Baghdad to back down from its August five decision 
to freeze all cooperation with the UN inspectors. Meanwhile, Russia called 
for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, saying Washington should work 
with the UN rather than go it alone with military strikes. The UN Secretary 
General, in order to defuse the crisis urged Saddam Hussein to take a 
"wise decision" and resume cooperation with inspectors before it is too 
late. With the reported movement of powerful force of US bombers, warships 
and troops, the war had become almost near to break out. Clinton announced 
that inaction in the face of continuing provocation by Baghdad would 
permanently damage the credibility of the UN."* 
However, acting in its old fashion Iraq once again blinked on 
November 14, and offered an unconditional cooperation with UNSCOM 
when the US strikes had become imminent. Consequently military action 
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was averted and the UN weapons inspectors had resumed their monitoring 
of suspected arms sites on November 18. But this was not all end of 
drama and within few days a new controversy was generated over some 
secret documents relating to Iraq's prohibited weapons programme. These 
documents were demanded by Butler but was soon rejected by Iraqi 
government saying that many were already destroyed and that all other 
documents like personal diaries were either irrelevant or had already been 
reviewed by arms inspectors. Fresh clouds had started hovering over the 
Gulf region after UNSCOM charged with dismantling Iraq's base of weapons 
of mass destruction withdrew from Iraq on December 16 alleging non-
cooperation from Iraqis. Chief weapons inspector Butler in a special report 
to the Security Council accused about Iraqi non-cooperation over the 
inspection restored on November 14. He said that Iraq did not provide 
the full cooperation, which it had promised. Butler's negative report days 
before a crucial review of UN sanctions on Iraq had drawn sharp reaction 
from Britain and US. They termed it as a very serious matter and threatened 
to launch sudden air strikes to quell Baghdad's defiance. Butler's report, 
which was eagerly awaited by Washington, marked a turning point in the 
whole UN process of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. 
It's damning condemnation of Iraq for its lack of cooperation and disclosure 
of information about its WMD provided the trigger for the US, supported 
strongly by UK, to launch a massive air campaign against Iraq little more 
than one month later/^ 
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Operation Desert Fox: 
Military action was averted in November 1998, but only narrowly. 
American and British forces were just minutes away from air strikes 
against Iraq when Baghdad signalled its willingness to yield to UN Security 
Council demand and allowed the unconditional resumption of weapons 
inspection. However, Iraqi acquiescence proved short-lived. On December 
15, 1998 a critical report by the UNSCOM said that its work continued 
to be blocked by Baghdad. In response, Washington and London launched 
military strikes against Iraqi targets.'** The intense campaign lasting 4 
days began on December 17 and ended on December 20 on the first 
day of Ramadan. The US President Bill Clinton said that he ordered 
the strikes on the military and security targets for Iraq's defiance of 
the UNSCOM. He said "Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten 
his neighbours with nuclear weapons, poison gas or biological weapons".'*^ 
The campaign was called 'Operation Desert Fox" which reportedly caused 
a large scale physical destruction and death of scores of civilian. 
Bill Clinton declared the strikes on Iraq a success and said, "I 
am confident we have achieved our mission. We have inflicted significant 
damage on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programmes, on the 
command structures that direct and protect that capability and on his 
military and security infrastructure....So long as Saddam remains in power, 
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he will remain a threat to his people, his region and the world".^° He 
further warned that the US and Britain would strike Iraq again if Saddam 
Hussein made any move to rebuild its weapons programme or threatened 
his neighbours. 
Throughout the four day campaign, there were wakes of strikes 
against targets selected after careful study - command centres, missile 
factories and airfields. Also hit was an oil refinery in the southern Iraqi 
city of Basra which was allegedly being used to make clandestine oil 
exports in order to avoid UN sanctions. A special target was the headquarters 
and bases of the Republican Guard - the elite force that helped Saddam 
Hussein to maintain his grip on power. The idea basically was to demolish 
that support so as to encourage dissidents to be bolder in their challenge 
to the Iraqi regime. The missiles also hit half a dozen of Saddam's 
Presidential palaces. The headquarters of the reigning Baath party was 
also attacked and badly damaged. The building was targeted because Baghdad 
had refused to allow UN weapons inspectors to inspect it. The Pentagon 
announced that 100 Iraqi targets were struck with about 450 sea and air 
launched cruise missiles as well as 650 air sorties. The damage assessment 
this time was more optimistic - out of 74 targets whose damage had 
been surveyed by spy plane or satellite photographs, 28 had been destroyed 
or severely damaged, and others had been partially destroyed. But that 
still left 18 of 74 targets with little or no damage.^' 
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The massive military campaign had sparked widespread 
condemnations. Recalling his US Ambassador in protest, Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin charged that "the United States and Britain have crudely 
violated the UN character and generally accepted principle of international 
law". Yeltsin said that "the air strikes should be considered a blow to 
the whole system of international security. The central link of which 
is the United Nations and is Security Council."" China had charged that 
the US did not receive permission from the Security Council for the 
military strike and had acted unilaterally, and presumably in violation 
of the UN charter. French President Jacques Chirac called for a 
"Fundamental review" of the UN approach to Baghdad to try to put an 
end to eight years of tensions between Iraq and the international community. 
The UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, who was able to broker a 
last minute peace accord in February 1998 when similar war clouds had 
been looming, did not get a chance this time. Annan described it a "sad 
day" for the UN. It was reported in the Observer that the aerial blitz 
by the United States and Britain on Iraq was against the wishes of Annan 
who wanted to give Baghdad more time before any military action was 
initiated. When a major divergence occurred between Annan and Anglo-
American coalition leaders on their approach to tackle the Iraqi crisis, 
an American Security Council delegate reportedly "tore" up Annan's letter 
suggesting Iraq be given more time before any military action. Annan 
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had also favoured a phased lifting of sanctions, probably through a 
comprehensive review of the Iraqi regime." 
More interestingly in the USA the timing of the strike against Iraq 
had assumed more importance than the actual strike, with many Republican 
leaders accusing President Clinton of exploiting the crisis to divert attention 
from his impeachment imbroglio. Since Clinton had ordered the attack 
on Iraq just 24 hours before the full house was scheduled to debate his 
impeachment. Republican conservatives erupted a vociferous protest. They 
charged that the President was playing for time since he knew that Congress 
would not debate such wrenching issue when the nation was at war.^ '* 
However, in an opinion poll a two third majority of American people 
had supported the strike on Iraq and did not believed that Clinton had 
launched it to save his own skin. 
To what extent the United States and Britain were successful in 
their mission to "degrade and diminish" Iraq's military capabilities may 
be a matter of debate but the most unfortunate part of this campaign 
was that the UNSCOM itself became one of the victims of the four day 
bombing. The UNSCOM can no longer now hope to return and carry 
on its task normally. Iraq in unequivocal terms declared that UNSCOM 
under present leadership would not be welcomed and inspectors entry 
into her country would be conditional on lifting of sanctions. The air 
assault fmallv destroyed the prospects of the UNSCOM operations in 
53. The Hindustan Times. December 24, 1998. 
54. N.C. Menon. "The tyranny of timing" The Hindustan Times, Dec. 21,1998. 
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Iraq, which after all did eliminate more banned weapons in Iraq than were 
destroyed during the six weeks of Desert Storm and four days of Desert 
Fox. The inspection regime had kept Saddam Hussein contained and gradually 
whittling down his military power. At present since no party is ready 
to budge from their stand the region seems to have entered into another 
stand-off between Iraq on one hand and the US and UN on the other 
hand. 
During Operation Desert Fox, the way the Security Council was 
misused to carry on the wishes of one of its members and the manner 
in which other members were ignored put a very serious question mark 
before the UN. The recent revelation that the US had used the UNSCOM 
to spy on the most secret communications of the Iraqi regime by using 
intelligence devices to undermine it has severely questioned the credibility 
of the organisation. The question is who gave deadbeat America, which 
has consistently failed to pay over 1.5 billion dollar in UN dues, the 
right to assume the role of global gendarme and go over the head of 
the world body to enforce its will by firing missiles worth an estimated 
170 million dollars a day at a nation that has already been brought to 
its knees by some of the most stringent sanctions ever levied ? " 
The role of the UNSCOM chief Richard Butler also needs a careful 
scrutiny because his way of handling the situation is also responsible 
for crisis in Iraq. Some members of the Security Council had for long 
55. The Hindustan Times, December, 21, 1998.. 
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been critical for Butler of being closer to Washington than the world 
body for which he was working. Baghdad had been passionate in accusing 
Butler of lacking integrity and impartiality and Secretary General Kofi 
Annan had occasion to deplore his confrontational approach. Throughout 
his tenure, he stumbled from one crisis to another with the Iraqis. He 
was never trusted by Baghdad, which accused him of doing Washington's 
bidding and turning UNSCOM into a nest of American and Israeli spies. 
By his own admission, Butler has functioned as little more than amanuensis 
to US officials. It has also now become amply clear that his decision 
to withdraw UN inspectors from Iraq - a move criticised by the Security 
Council - was taken solely on the advice of Peter Burleigh, the deputy 
US ambassador to the UN. Butler was also wrong in handing over an 
important report to the US and not to the Secretary General of the UN. 
Ritter has even claimed that what Butler did in the report was a 'set 
up' between him and Washington to justify the latter's bombing campaign.^^ 
Butler's report which triggered the US-British massive air campaign against 
Iraq, can also be contested on the ground that Iraq's attitude towards 
UNSCOM should have been judged against 300 successful inspection 
undertaken by the latter since it resumed operation on November 18 rather 
than 5 instances of non-cooperation listed by Butler in his report. It 
has become evidently clear that it was Butler who complicated the problem 
with a deliberately biased report and by assuming a political role for 
the UN Security Council itself, instead of abiding with the task assigned 
56. Scott Ritter, "Butler's UNSCOM report a "set-up" New York Post, Dec. 18, 
1998, quoted in Amin Baikal No. 2, p. 242. 
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to him of certifying Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions. Although 
Butler cannot be entirely blamed for the downfall of UNSCOM, but his 
confrontational approach and oversights almost certainly played a critical 
role in bringing about the commission's early demise." 
It is also pertinent to examine here whether Butler's report was 
a suitable and sufficient ground to carry on a massive air strike without 
the recommendation of the UN Security Council? The United States has 
recently been arguing that it has the right to take military action against 
Iraq without further Security Council authorization on the ground that 
"existing resolutions" particularly Resolution 67 8 of November 1990 
already provide such authorization, although only one of the other four 
permanent members of the Security Council the UK, has supported this 
point of view. However, it is important to note that any action in response 
to a violation of a provision of a Security Council resolution comes 
within the authority of the Security Council, not of Washington and London. 
But in this case other three members of the council were not consulted 
at all.^* Even if we accept the authorization under resolution 678, it was 
only the Security Council which was authorised to take action against 
Iraq . Neither any single member of the Security Council or any group 
of members of the World organization acting outside the framework 
of the body was authorised to take such action. The fact that one member 
57. Amin Saikal,/Z)/(/., p. 292. 
58. See Jules Lobel and Michael Ratner, "Bypassing the Security Council", Americal 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 93 No. 1, 1999, pp. 124-154. 
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of the United Nations may be in violation of an agreement, a Security 
Council resolution or any other legally binding rules does not make it 
legal for other members to carry out an armed attack against it.^' The 
manner in which the Security Council was made to feel so sorry, shows 
nothing but the utter helplessness of the world body. If the things move 
in the same direction, infact the world will doubt the role of UN as 
a peace keeping organization. 
Although the US-UK December 1998 military campaign technically 
lasted for four days but the bombing missions by American planes have 
never really stopped. Almost on daily basis the US and British planes 
still continue to operate from their base in Kuwait or Turkey or from 
aircraft carriers to pound Iraqi missiles and anti-aircraft installations in 
which civilian casualities also take place. The ostensible reason for the 
raids is to protect American pilots operating in the "no fly zone" from 
any attack from Iraqi defence establishment, but the claim of acting in 
self-defence is "only part of the story". Infact, the US is really engaged 
in is a "low grade war fashioned by the military and administration". With 
the objective of destabilizing Saddam Hussein. The non-fly zone imposed 
by Washington above the 36th and below the 33rd parallel to the north 
and south of Iraq itself is one of the most blatant violations of national 
sovereignty anywhere in the world. It makes a mockery of the UN Charter. 
What is most surprising, however, is that the rest of the world has shown 
59. Glenn E. Perry, "Attacking Iraq and International Law", Arab Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 20 No. 3, Summer 1998, p. 8. 
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little interest in these brazen acts of aggression. Neither the UN nor 
any other organisation has considered it necessary to focus attention on 
what is clearly a violation of a sovereign country's territory. As the continued 
raids on Iraq confirm, the US, has become a law unto itself, arrogantly following 
the rule of "might is right". 
After almost one year of stand-off the USA and UK succeeded 
in the Security Council when it adopted Resolution 1284 at its 4084 
meeting, against Iraq on December 17, 1999. This new resolution provides 
for establishment of UN Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC) and oversee the destruction of weapons of mass destruction, 
which will have unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, 
equipments, records and means of transport. The resolution also provides 
retaining of the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) to monitor 
Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Hans Blix, a former Swedish Foreign 
Minister and former Director General of the IAEA, has been appointed 
to head the new UN weapons inspection team. The major task before 
Blix will be to create a work programme, and then draw up a list of 
key remaining questions about Iraq's disarmament that Baghdad must 
answer before the council would consider suspending sanctions.^" 
Although the new UN weapons inspection team has not yet started 
its work, many express doubts over its success. Mere replacement of 
one team with another one with new name and more power will not help 
60. The Pioneer, January 29. 2000. 
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unless those questions are addressed which led to demise of UNSCOM. 
What is now required is a bold constructive approach that would take 
the regime of weapons inspection out of the hands of the Security Council's 
permanent members and disentangle its objectives and operations from 
US political goals. The new UN weapons inspection regime should be 
allowed to work independently under the direct supervision and control 
of the UN Secretary General. The inspection process should be conducted 
in such a way as not to enable any particular country to gain dominance. 
One of UNSCOM's biggest problems was its lack of a clearly defined 
end game. It is never easy to declare a completely satisfactory end to 
any process of weapons inspection, especially those dealing with biological 
weapons, which can be hidden away in small quantities from any regime 
of inspection. Ultimately, subjective judgement would have to be applied 
and an arbitrary line of some kind drawn as the only way of termination 
of the process. Without a clearly defined end game, the goalpost can 
easily be changed, as the US did in respect of Iraq.^' 
The US double standard and selective approach in the field of 
disarmament and arms control has always been a matter of intensive debate. 
If Washington is genuinely interested about eliminating Iraq's WMD 
capabilities, then it must not be discriminatory in its approach. It should 
work for the transformation of the entire Middle East region into a 'zone 
61. Amin Saikal. n. 2, p. 293. 
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free of WMD' . " It is only in this way that a genuine regime of arms 
control could be established in the area and that Iraq could be persuaded 
to give up its programmes of WMD altogether. Otherwise, irrespective 
of whether Saddam Hussein or some one else is in power in Baghdad, 
there would always be many other Arab and Iranian nationalists who would 
share his conviction for as long as Israel remains armed with WMD. 
Though the idea of establishment of UNSCOM to disarm Iraq of 
its WMD was novel and pioneering but from very beginning the US wanted 
to use it to promote its own political agenda rather than allow it to achieve 
the goals for which it was established. And this was at the heart of 
the whole arms inspection imbroglio in Iraq. Washington was more interested 
in destroying Saddam's regime than eliminating Iraq's WMD. And UNSCOM 
early fell into trap due to its vulnerable position on account of its financial 
dependence, composition and highly specialised method of operation. And 
most importantly the approach and style of functioning of UNSCOM's 
Chief Butler proved to be more suicidal. A combination of these issues 
was in the end largely responsible for the discrediting and demise of 
UNSCOM. Yet the problem of Iraq continues to remain unresolved." It 
is yet to be seen whether newly established UNMOVIC will succeed or 
will go UNSCOM's way. 
62. See Ibrahim A. Karawan, "The Cast for a Nuclear Weapon-Free zone in the 
Middle East", in Ramesh Thakur (ed.). Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (London: 
Macmillan, 1998). 
63. Amin Saikal, n.2, p. 294. 
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CONCLUSION 
The discovery of oil in the beginning of the last century in the 
Persian Gulf region not only entirely changed the economy but 
international political scenario of the region as well. In view of the 
increasing importance of the oil as a source of energy almost all the 
leading powers have been taking keen interest in the region. Oil is 
perhaps the most volatile commodity in the world, which has contributed 
the overthrow of many governments and wars have been fought to secure 
possession of oil fields in the Gulf. It was again the oil, which in 
fact became the main cause of the outbreak of Gulf crisis of 1991, 
which in a way acted as a catalyst for the emergence of a new regional 
and world order. 
A great deal has been written about the causes leading to the 
Iraqi attack and annexing of Kuwait in August 1990. Some of them 
undoubtedly lie in the historical claims and counter-claims, boundary 
disputes, controversy over the quantum of oil production in the Rumailah 
oil fields, Kuwait's attempt to subvert OPEC's oil prices by over 
production resulting in the loss of oil revenue to Iraq etc. Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein claimed that Arab states of the Gulf had robbed Iraq 
of $14 billion by depressing oil prices in the international market 
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and Kuwait had exploited its southern Rumailah oil field stealing oil 
worth $2-4 billion. But unfortunately the world community including 
Arab countries either failed to understand the validity of Iraq's grievances 
or they did not want to get involved in finding an acceptable solution 
to the Iraqi claims. Many dubbed Iraqi action motivated by its financial 
difficulties in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and pursuit of regional 
hegemony. 
Whatever be the causes Iraq fell into the trap by marching its 
troops into Kuwait on August 2, 1990 violating all rules of international 
legitimacy, lofty Islamic and Arab values and the principles of good 
neighbourhood which constitute a pillar in international relations. 
Paradoxically all this happened at a time when the world was witnessing 
a most impressive scene of international rapprochement. This mistake 
of Iraqi leadership led to the beginning of grief and miseries of the 
innocent Iraqi people - who had hardly any control over decisions taken 
by their leadership. 
The international response to Iraq's invasion was swift and harsh. 
Within hours Iraq's assets were frozen worldwide and the Security Council 
showing unprecedented unanimity called for an immediate and 
unconditional Iraqi withdrawal and within days economic sanctions were 
imposed. But defiant Iraqi leadership instead linked its withdrawal from 
Kuwait to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, which 
paid little dividends even among many Arab-Islamic states. In a strategic 
228 
move Iraq, hoping to forestall an imminent American attack, took all 
foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait into custody and confined them 
in strategic places to be used as human shields and their release conditional 
upon withdrawal of the US forces from Saudi Arabia and end of its 
economic boycott. All these last minute tactical moves by Iraq could 
not prevent or deter multinational forces from taking military action 
against it. 
Once Iraq failed to implement the Security Council Resolution 
660 of August 2, 1990, UN instruments of peaceful dispute settlement 
were quickly turned into instruments of coercion. Non-negotiable 
resolutions that succeeded each other swiftly became tools of waging 
war. Most notorious of all resolutions passed by the Security Council 
to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait was Resolution 678 authorizing the use 
of force as an ultimate action to achieve effective and desired end. 
There is a great deal of controversy and confusion about the legitimacy 
of authorization of use of force under Resolution 678. The resolution 
ignored the provision mentioned in chapter VII of the charter which 
specially empower the Security Council (not any member state) to 
involve in use offeree and to conduct the operation under the Military 
Staff Committee and under the UN flag. It was also in contravention 
of Article 27(3), which requires that an important resolution of the 
Security Council must have the concurrence of the five permanent 
members. Since China abstained it implied that it did not concur. 
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Moreover it was evidently clear from the war that the Security Council 
had very little control over the war authorized by it. No other than 
the then UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar himself admitted that 
"the council which has authorized all this, is informed only after the 
military actions have taken place". The disproportionate authority 
exercised by the United States over decision making and implementation 
has subverted the authority and credibility of the United Nations. It 
was also feared that the United Nations was acquiescing too readily 
in US use of force. For many this authorization was illegitimate, unwise, 
or merely constituting a multilateral veneer for unilateral action. 
The Resolution 678 also created some kind of disillusionment 
among the Arabs that the UN is not fair or evenhanded. Ordinary Arabs 
tens of millions of them from Morocco to Iraq, with little sympathy 
for oil rich oligarchies, feel that the US has never allowed UN action 
on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs and their territories are still under 
Israeli occupation. The US always blocked implementation of UN 
resolutions as it stood by Israel and did exactly opposite to Iraq. The 
US was determined to implement UN resolution by force on Iraq, yet 
it ignored other resolutions. In any case Resolution 678 even by its 
own terms could not be stretched to justify the kind of war the US 
unleashed on Iraq. The scope and intensity of the American air strikes, 
the choice of targets and the magnitude of collateral damage to civilian 
lives in Iraq, revealed a wider purpose than war ostensibly envisaged 
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by the Security Council. For more than forty days multinational forces, 
comprising mostly American air power, used their overwhelming 
superiority to destroy the economic infrastructure and the military 
power of Iraq. Even after Iraq accepted all the Security Council resolutions 
the US did not relent on its destructive course. The war proved that 
the US did not send the troops to the Gulf because Kuwait was being 
swallowed up, but its motives were different. The same thing had happened 
in Lebanon, but there was no reaction from Washington. The fact is 
that if Kuwait had been a poor Third World state without any oil, it 
is a foregone conclusion that not a single US soldiers would have 
been deployed to defend it. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait undoubtedly represented a blatant 
challenge to the body of rules governing inter-state behaviour, as laid 
down in the UN charter. But what the U.S. and its allies did in the 
name of upholding it and maintaining international peace and security 
in the region was not less blatant challenge. The way the war was fought 
by the US and allies not only demonstrated the utter helplessness of 
the Security Council but also exposed them. It would be a grave mistake 
to believe that the primary purpose of the US initiated war on Iraq 
was the eviction of Iraq from Kuwait. The eviction was no more than 
a means to various ends. It is plain enough that the United States has 
no principle (as opposed to tactical) objection to aggression by sovereign 
states against others, and so the reasons for the onslaught on Iraq must 
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be sought elsewhere. The Iraqi misadventure was not the first or only 
occasion when a UN member had committed a grave violation of its 
charter principles. The US did not work to activate the UN in military 
opposition to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and other Arab lands, 
to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor; or various South African 
invasion of Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, there is ample 
evidence that it conspired, to various degrees, in such invasions; and, 
of course, the US itself has invaded many sovereign states (notable 
Grenada and Panama in recent years). 
The war on Iraq realistically viewed was intended to serve a number 
of purposes. It was useful to demonstrate to the world that any grave 
threat to American interests would not be tolerated, particularly where 
these required the unimpeded supply of fuel to the world's most energy 
profligate nation. It was useful also to signal the new global power 
structure, the new world other' in which a post-cold war United States 
could operate without the bothersome constraint of another global super 
power. It was to educate the world about post-Soviet political realities. 
I 
The war on Iraq also proved the dictum that there is no permanent 
friend in international relations but only permanent is national interests. 
The same Iraq which was subjected to wrath of the US once enjoyed 
the support of the West and particularly USA in all matters during 
the Iran-Iraq war because it acted as an useful buffer not only between 
the revolutionary and fundamentalist Iran and the oil rich areas in the 
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Arabian Peninsula but also between Iran and Israel. However after the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war and more so after the death of Imam Khomeini 
and coming into power of a moderate like President Rafsanjani (now 
Khatmi also a moderate) in Iran, a strong Iraq became a liability. By 
1990, Iraq had become strong enough to independently threaten two 
main Western interests in West Asia. Its arsenal of long-range missiles 
and chemical warheads could for the first time in many years, credibly 
jeopardize Israeli security. Also, Iraq could threaten the GCC states 
and thereby the assured oil supply to the industrialized north. These 
two factors were seen as complementary and were linked to President 
Saddam Hussein's quest for ultimate Arab leadership. Iraqi occupation 
of Kuwait was therefore seen in the context of a domino effect. Hence, 
not only had Saddam Hussein to be destroyed and Iraqi Baathi regime 
replaced but also its military capability had also to be totally nullified. 
There were the targets that were set by most of the coalition partners. 
The UN response to the Iraqi invasion confirmed the international 
ascendancy of the United States. The US seemed to have exploited 
the Council and the UN Charter as a tool of foreign policy goals and 
the UN was an instrument in American hands. Entire operation was 
controlled by the United States. With the break up of the Soviet Union 
as an effective deterrent power to the US the latter emerged as supreme 
international actor in new international order. During the whole Gulf 
crisis Security Council functioned under the US's will. Not even a 
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single veto was exercised by any permanent member to avoid incurring 
US ill will. The whole world was clamouring against the shameful role 
of the UN in the Gulf Crisis. The UN was deaf and dumb, limp, and 
life-less - a rubber stamp in the hands of the major powers of the 
world. It was for the first time an individual had been authorized to 
take military action against another member under the umbrella of the 
UN. The US was a singular importance in the Gulf war as the sole 
surviving super power with the military superiority to conduct such 
a military operation even with little or no support of its allies. The 
UN was made a scape goat and had to take the blame for unlawful 
acts, omissions and commissions of its member states. The UN role 
was ineffective and inadequate. 
The US role in Gulf War suggests that despite the changing 
international environment, the present international system still remain 
unjust as it poses constant threat to the security of small states. Undoubtedly, 
it was the end of the cold war that the UN acted in an unusually speedy 
way in this crisis, yet it was neither the prevention of the crisis, nor the 
resolution of the problem in a peaceful way, nor it was a collective security 
action, rather it was a selective security action. In the Gulf War the US 
acted under the cover of the UN which could not be justified on strategic, 
political or on moral grounds. The US action in the Gulf War illustrates 
how a modern western state uses the concept of just war to make its 
foreign policy acceptable to its public and the world. 
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The issue that whether the war on Iraq could be considered a 
just war sparked a vigorous international debate. Politicians, academics 
and commentators were uncertain as to whether or not it was appropriate 
and just to go to war before the economic sanctions had been given 
ample time in which to succeed or fail. Elaborating upon the criteria 
set down by Aquinas, William O'Brien enumerates the conditions under 
which war may be deemed permissible. First, only 'competent authority'' 
may wage a just war. Secondly, war must be waged for 'a just cause. 
O'Brien' further elaborates just cause (i) it must be 'serious and weighty' 
(ii) the war must be defensive {\\\) proportionately must exist 'between 
the just ends and the means', (iv) War should be waged only as a last 
resort, whether all peaceful options have been tried and have failed. 
Was the coalition's attack on Iraqi positions permissible, a 
justifiable and proportional use of force on the victim's side by a 
competent authority as a last resort, and under serious and weighty 
circumstances? The answer to this question would probably go in negative 
keeping in view the entire scenario of the Gulf War in mind. 
The Gulf War exposed several weaknesses in the UN system, 
but what came after the Gulf War posed even more serious challenges 
to the United Nations that the military campaign waged against Iraq. 
The dubious legacy of the Gulf War has left its imprint both on regional 
stability and on the subsequent uses of force against Iraq. The United 
Nations has lost whatever authority and leverage it retained over Iraq 
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during the Gulf War; its role has been reduced to that of a passive 
bystander. 
The cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991) signed 
between the United Nations and the Iraqi government, which ended 
the Gulf War failed to bring any relief to innocent Iraqi people who 
were forced to pay the price of madness of their leadership. The resolution 
687 put yet another 'unjust and hard' conditions on the Iraqi people. 
The unconditional acceptance of various provision contained in it was 
made a precondition to formal cease-fire. The main provisions of the 
resolution included payment of reparation by Iraq, continuation of the 
sanctions, UN guarantee of the boundaries and Iraq's co-operation in 
the destruction of it nuclear, biological weapons or weapons based 
technology and facility. These conditions were never freely negotiated 
but rather formulated unilaterally and imposed on Iraq under chapter 
vii. of the UN charter. 
The resolution 687 would go down in history as one of the most 
unfair cease-fire frameworks. Iraq had to accept terms, which meant 
it, would have to give up almost all its earning to fund war reparation. 
Thus, the future of the succeeding generations in Iraq has been mortgaged. 
Such draconian measures - and there are others - have no precedent 
in the post-World War II era, even though the Iraq is not the only 
country to have been guilty of grave crimes. Iraqi government has rightly 
characterized the provisions of Resolution 687 as biased, iniquitous. 
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vengeful, an injustice, a severe assault on the Iraqi people's right to 
life and flagrant denial of its inalienable rights to sovereignty and 
independence and to free choice. However, Iraq had no choice but to 
accept the resolution. 
The impact of sanctions has been well documented over the years. 
All the reports from journalists, oil agencies, UN-officials and others 
convey a consensual picture of a civilian population facing unprecedented 
catastrophe. Sanctions have maximized human suffering in all 
manifestations. They have resulted in dramatic increase in child and 
maternal deaths; malnutrition; polluted water; shortage of basic human 
needs and medicines; collapse of educational system, increasing 
unemployment and diseases, and de-industrialization of Iraq. Sanctions 
have proved to be the most suicidal and destructive instrument to the 
human beings. 
Theoretically, the Security Council has authorized the unlimited 
import of food and medical products, the so-called "humanitarian goods". 
But that has been nullified by the ban on all Iraqi export. It became 
clear that the 'exemption' of medical supplies and foodstuffs was in 
fact a matter of political packaging rather than humanitarian intent. 
In reality, only aid agencies and humanitarian NGOs could bring some 
supplies to Iraq, and the resolution ensured that Iraq would have neither 
the revenues nor the permission to buy medical supplies and food stuffs 
in other countries. Even the UN "food for oil" arrangement prescribed 
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in resolution 986 of April 95 has proved highly inadequate to meet 
out the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. 
The Iraqi experience reestablishes the fact that sanctions generally 
tend to miss a country's leadership and hit the innocent. They impact 
most on democratic societies but fail to impress the dictatorial regimes 
whose leaders often remain untouched and whose civilian pay the price. 
They are in toto notoriously unsuccessful. World community should 
now realize that the continuation of sanctions in the present form would 
only hurt the innocent Iraqi people not weakens Saddam Hussein - whose 
removal has always been sought by the United States as main political 
goal of the sanctions. But unfortunately sanctions have missed the target. 
It is not a prudent policy to target the helpless people for the sins 
of their leaders. The tragedy with the hapless Iraqi people is that on 
the one side they are the victims of Saddam's insanity and on the other 
America's vindictive attitude. 
The current sanction policy towards Iraq is rigid and increasingly 
counter productive. Members of the Security Council now must sit 
together and evolve a fresh initiative not only to defuse the rising 
tensions but also to strive for an ultimate solution to end misery on 
Iraq. For more than a decade, injustice has been done to the Iraqi people 
for none of their faults. Any further extension of embargo in present 
form would further violate international law and human rights in Iraq. 
Any further move to suppress Iraqis would be mockery of the UN and 
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international watchdogs. Let us retain the all possible control over 
arms manufacture and sales of arms to Iraq. Let us retain the capacity 
to monitor and observe but give up the UN weapons of mass destruction 
- economic sanctions. 
The UN cease-fire resolution 687 made it obligatory upon Iraq 
to destroy all its weapons of mass destruction under international 
supervision and monitoring. Despite almost a decade of hard work of 
inspecting every nook and corner of Iraq in search of weapons of mass 
destruction the UN team has failed to give a certificate, so that sanctions 
could be lifted. The process has now reached a worrisome impasse, 
setting Iraq, the US and Britain and for that matter, the UN on a prolonged 
course of military confrontation, at the cost of making the region more 
unpredictable and volatile than has been the case historically and 
imperilling the chances of creating a stable Post-Cold War World Order. 
The UN weapons inspection resolutions are so punitive and 
humiliating that any slight attempt to erode them by Saddam Hussein 
has led air attacks and bombings by the US and its allies. Air strikes; 
through misinterpreting the UN resolutions, on Iraq has become almost 
a routine feature. Taken as whole, there is ample evidence to suggest 
that the US and a few of its European allies have arrogated to themselves 
the exclusive right to interpret and .implement the UN resolutions without 
recourse to the Security Council. This constitute a clear usurption 
of the functioning and authority of the United Nations. 
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The UN as an international organization working for international 
peace and security, should not surrender itself to the will of a superpower 
or allow itself to be used as an instrument for achieving certain self 
interests of that power. The UN has to play its role reflecting the 
wishes of the international community. It should bring an end to the 
dilapidation that Iraq is affected with. The Iraqi people should not be 
punished for the madness of Saddam. They are the victim of Saddam's 
insanity and US' vindictive attitude. The situation that the Iraqi people 
are passing through now is more than what human being can bear. 
Thus the UN must do something to ameliorate their condition. The 
UN will and not the desire of the US should prevail. The UN must 
be accorded full scope to act as it was intended to act, with any ultimate 
decision to employ force being made by the Security Council in 
accordance with the Charter. 
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